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57Meinongian ObjectsGrazer Philosophische Studien 1 (1): 43-71. 1975.Meinong's object theory is primarily motivated by the needs of intentionality theory. I argue that Meinongian objects must be intensional entities if, as asked, they are to serve as the objects of thought in a purely object-theoretic account of intentionality. For Meinong, incomplete objects are the proper objects of thought. Complete objects are beyond our grasp; we apprehend them as best we can when we intend incomplete objects embedded in them. This yields, on a semantic plane, an account of …Read more
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10IntroductionIn David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press. 2003.Phenomenology and philosophy of mind can be defined either as disciplines or as historical traditions—they are both. As disciplines: phenomenology is the study of conscious experience as lived, as experienced from the first-person point of view, while philosophy of mind is the study of mind—states of belief, perception, action, etc.—focusing especially on the mind–body problem, how mental activities are related to brain activities. As traditions or literatures: phenomenology features the writings …Read more
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The Truth about Freud's Technique: The Encounter with the Real, by M. Guy ThompsonJournal of Phenomenological Psychology 26 120-122. 1995.
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9Born to See, Bound to Behold: The History of the Simon Silverman Phenomenology CenterSimon Silverman Phenomenology Center, Duquesne University. 2007.
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28The ecological perspective applied to social perceptionJournal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 11 (2). 1981.
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7Phenomenology and narrative psychology: the Fourteenth Annual Symposium of the Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center: lectures (edited book)Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center, Duquesne University. 1996.
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107Ontological phenomenologyIn The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, . pp. 243-251. 2000.Phenomenology is the study of conscious experience from the first-person point of view. Husserl used principles of formal ontology even as he bracketed the natural-cultural world in describing our experience, and Heidegger pursued fundamental ontology in his variety of phenomenology describing our own modes of existence. I shall address the role of ontology in phenomenology, and vice versa. Our account of what exists depends on our account of what and how we experience. But, moreover, our unders…Read more
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38Mind and bodyIn Barry Smith & David Woodruff Smith (eds.), The Cambridge companion to Husserl, Cambridge University Press. 1995.
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Rey Cogitans: The Unquestionability of ConsciousnessIn Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1987.
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113Three facets of consciousnessAxiomathes 12 (1-2): 55-85. 2001.Over the past century phenomenology has ably analyzed the basic structuresof consciousness as we experience it. Yet recent philosophy of mind, lookingto brain activity and computational function, has found it difficult to makeroom for the structures of subjectivity and intentionality that phenomenologyhas appraised. In order to understand consciousness as something that is bothsubjective and grounded in neural activity, we need to delve into phenomenologyand ontology. I draw a fundamental distin…Read more
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1From Logic through Ontology to PhenomenologyIn Jorge J. E. Gracia, Gregory M. Reichberg & Bernard N. Schumacher (eds.), The Classics of Western Philosophy: A Reader's Guide, Wiley-blackwell. 2003.
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82Mind World: Essays in Phenomenology and OntologyCambridge University Press. 2004.This collection explores the structure of consciousness and its place in the world, or inversely the structure of the world and the place of consciousness in it. Amongst the topics covered are: the phenomenological aspects of experience, dependencies between experience and the world and the basic ontological categories found in the world at large. Developing ideas drawn from historical figures such as Descartes, Husserl, Aristotle, and Whitehead, the essays together demonstrate the interdependen…Read more
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49The Several Factors of ConsciousnessRivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (3): 291-302. 2016.: In prior essays I have sketched a “modal model” of consciousness. That model “factors” out several distinct forms of awareness in the phenomenological structure of a typical act of consciousness. Here we consider implications of the model à propos of contemporary theories of consciousness. In particular, we distinguish phenomenality from other features of awareness in a conscious experience: “what it is like” to have an experience involves several different factors. Further, we should see thes…Read more
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177How to Husserl a Quine — and a Heidegger, tooSynthese 98 (1): 153-173. 1994.Is consciousness or the subject part of the natural world or the human world? Can we write intentionality, so central in Husserl's philosophy, into Quine's system of ontological naturalism and naturalized epistemology — or into Heidegger's account of human being and existential phenomenology? The present task is to show how to do so. Anomalous monism provides a key.
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70The cogito circa ad 2000Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 36 (3). 1993.What are we to make of the cogito (cogito ergo sum) today, as the walls of Cartesian philosophy crumble around us? The enduring foundation of the cogito is consciousness. It is in virtue of a particular phenomenological structure that an experience is conscious rather than unconscious. Drawing on an analysis of that structure, the cogito is given a new explication that synthesizes phenomenological, epistemological, logical, and ontological elements. What, then, is the structure of conscious thin…Read more
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120Consciousness in actionSynthese 90 (1): 119-43. 1992.A phenomenology of action is outlined, analyzing the structure of volition, kinesthesis, and perception in the experience of action, and, finally, the experience of embodiment in action. The intentionality of action is contrasted with that of thought and perception in regard to the role of the body, and the relations between an action, the experience of acting, and the context of the action are specified
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50“Pure” logic, ontology, and phenomenologyRevue Internationale de Philosophie 224 (2): 21-44. 2003.
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109Ontological PhenomenologyThe Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 7 243-251. 2000.Phenomenology is the study of conscious experience from the first-person point of view. Husserl used principles of formal ontology even as he bracketed the natural-cultural world in describing our experience, and Heidegger pursued fundamental ontology in his variety of phenomenology describing our own modes of existence. I shall address the role of ontology in phenomenology, and vice versa. Our account of what exists depends on our account of what and how we experience. But, moreover, our unders…Read more
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125Mathematical form in the worldPhilosophia Mathematica 10 (2): 102-129. 2002.This essay explores an ideal notion of form (mathematical structure) that embraces logical, phenomenological, and ontological form. Husserl envisioned a correlation among forms of expression, thought, meaning, and object—positing ideal forms on all these levels. The most puzzling formal entities Husserl discussed were those he called ‘manifolds’. These manifolds, I propose, are forms of complex states of affairs or partial possible worlds representable by forms of theories (compare structuralism…Read more
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1Intentionality naturalized?In Naturalizing Phenomenology, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1999.
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66Symposium papers, comments and an abstract: Bodily versus cognitive intentionality?Noûs 22 (1): 51-52. 1988.The body, merleau-ponty claimed, carries a unique form of intentionality that is not reducible to the intentionality of thought. i propose to separate several different forms of intentionality concerning such ``bodily intentionality'': awareness of one's body and bodily movement; purposive action; and perception of one's environment in acting. these different forms of awareness are interdependent in specific ways. no one form of intentionality--cognitive or practical--is an absolute foundation f…Read more
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Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
20th Century Philosophy |
Continental Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
20th Century Philosophy |
Continental Philosophy |