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57Meinongian ObjectsGrazer Philosophische Studien 1 (1): 43-71. 1975.Meinong's object theory is primarily motivated by the needs of intentionality theory. I argue that Meinongian objects must be intensional entities if, as asked, they are to serve as the objects of thought in a purely object-theoretic account of intentionality. For Meinong, incomplete objects are the proper objects of thought. Complete objects are beyond our grasp; we apprehend them as best we can when we intend incomplete objects embedded in them. This yields, on a semantic plane, an account of …Read more
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10IntroductionIn David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press. 2003.Phenomenology and philosophy of mind can be defined either as disciplines or as historical traditions—they are both. As disciplines: phenomenology is the study of conscious experience as lived, as experienced from the first-person point of view, while philosophy of mind is the study of mind—states of belief, perception, action, etc.—focusing especially on the mind–body problem, how mental activities are related to brain activities. As traditions or literatures: phenomenology features the writings …Read more
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The Truth about Freud's Technique: The Encounter with the Real, by M. Guy ThompsonJournal of Phenomenological Psychology 26 120-122. 1995.
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9Born to See, Bound to Behold: The History of the Simon Silverman Phenomenology CenterSimon Silverman Phenomenology Center, Duquesne University. 2007.
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27The ecological perspective applied to social perceptionJournal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 11 (2). 1981.
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7Phenomenology and narrative psychology: the Fourteenth Annual Symposium of the Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center: lectures (edited book)Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center, Duquesne University. 1996.
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1Intentionality naturalized?In Naturalizing Phenomenology, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1999.
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66Symposium papers, comments and an abstract: Bodily versus cognitive intentionality?Noûs 22 (1): 51-52. 1988.The body, merleau-ponty claimed, carries a unique form of intentionality that is not reducible to the intentionality of thought. i propose to separate several different forms of intentionality concerning such ``bodily intentionality'': awareness of one's body and bodily movement; purposive action; and perception of one's environment in acting. these different forms of awareness are interdependent in specific ways. no one form of intentionality--cognitive or practical--is an absolute foundation f…Read more
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273What's the meaning of 'this'?Noûs 16 (2): 181-208. 1982."This is a sea urchin", I declare while strolling the beach with a friend. What do I refer to by uttering the demonstrative pronoun "this"? The object immediately before me, of course. As it happens on this occasion, the object in the sand at my feet. I may point at it to aid my hearer - or I may not. BUt now , if the meaning of the term is distinguished from the referent, what is the meaning of this, or of my utterance of this? I think we can distinguish the meaning of this, or of its utterance…Read more
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17Consciousness with reflexive contentIn David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2005.
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303PhenomenologyStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view. The central structure of an experience is its intentionality, its being directed toward something, as it is an experience of or about some object. An experience is directed toward an object by virtue of its content or meaning (which represents the object) together with appropriate enabling conditions
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1Intentionality, Noemata, and Individuation: The Role of Individuation in Husserl's Theory of IntentionalityDissertation, Stanford University. 1971.
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The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 7: Modern PhilosophyCharlottesville: Philosophy Doc Ctr. 2000.
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45Husserl and Tarski: the Semantic Conception of Intentionality and TruthIn Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock (ed.), Husserl as Analytic Philosopher, De Gruyter. pp. 143-174. 2016.
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39Perception, Context, and Direct RealismIn Dan Zahavi (ed.), The Oxford handbook of contemporary phenomenology, Oxford University Press. 2012.This chapter, which is concerned with the phenomenology of perception, especially the role of content and context in the intentionality of perception, tries to provide an account of the structure of perceptual experience and its intentional relation to its objects. In particular, it presents an analysis of consciousness and intentionality in perception. Perceptual experience is sensuous and paradigmatically intentional. The intentional character of a visual experience of an object is different t…Read more
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30L8 Phenomenological methods in philosophy of mindIn Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory?, Routledge. 2013.
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Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
20th Century Philosophy |
Continental Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
20th Century Philosophy |
Continental Philosophy |