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70The cogito circa ad 2000Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 36 (3). 1993.What are we to make of the cogito (cogito ergo sum) today, as the walls of Cartesian philosophy crumble around us? The enduring foundation of the cogito is consciousness. It is in virtue of a particular phenomenological structure that an experience is conscious rather than unconscious. Drawing on an analysis of that structure, the cogito is given a new explication that synthesizes phenomenological, epistemological, logical, and ontological elements. What, then, is the structure of conscious thin…Read more
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120Consciousness in actionSynthese 90 (1): 119-43. 1992.A phenomenology of action is outlined, analyzing the structure of volition, kinesthesis, and perception in the experience of action, and, finally, the experience of embodiment in action. The intentionality of action is contrasted with that of thought and perception in regard to the role of the body, and the relations between an action, the experience of acting, and the context of the action are specified
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50“Pure” logic, ontology, and phenomenologyRevue Internationale de Philosophie 224 (2): 21-44. 2003.
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107Ontological PhenomenologyThe Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 7 243-251. 2000.Phenomenology is the study of conscious experience from the first-person point of view. Husserl used principles of formal ontology even as he bracketed the natural-cultural world in describing our experience, and Heidegger pursued fundamental ontology in his variety of phenomenology describing our own modes of existence. I shall address the role of ontology in phenomenology, and vice versa. Our account of what exists depends on our account of what and how we experience. But, moreover, our unders…Read more
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122Mathematical form in the worldPhilosophia Mathematica 10 (2): 102-129. 2002.This essay explores an ideal notion of form (mathematical structure) that embraces logical, phenomenological, and ontological form. Husserl envisioned a correlation among forms of expression, thought, meaning, and object—positing ideal forms on all these levels. The most puzzling formal entities Husserl discussed were those he called ‘manifolds’. These manifolds, I propose, are forms of complex states of affairs or partial possible worlds representable by forms of theories (compare structuralism…Read more
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1Intentionality naturalized?In Naturalizing Phenomenology, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1999.
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66Symposium papers, comments and an abstract: Bodily versus cognitive intentionality?Noûs 22 (1): 51-52. 1988.The body, merleau-ponty claimed, carries a unique form of intentionality that is not reducible to the intentionality of thought. i propose to separate several different forms of intentionality concerning such ``bodily intentionality'': awareness of one's body and bodily movement; purposive action; and perception of one's environment in acting. these different forms of awareness are interdependent in specific ways. no one form of intentionality--cognitive or practical--is an absolute foundation f…Read more
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273What's the meaning of 'this'?Noûs 16 (2): 181-208. 1982."This is a sea urchin", I declare while strolling the beach with a friend. What do I refer to by uttering the demonstrative pronoun "this"? The object immediately before me, of course. As it happens on this occasion, the object in the sand at my feet. I may point at it to aid my hearer - or I may not. BUt now , if the meaning of the term is distinguished from the referent, what is the meaning of this, or of my utterance of this? I think we can distinguish the meaning of this, or of its utterance…Read more
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17Consciousness with reflexive contentIn David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2005.
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305PhenomenologyStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view. The central structure of an experience is its intentionality, its being directed toward something, as it is an experience of or about some object. An experience is directed toward an object by virtue of its content or meaning (which represents the object) together with appropriate enabling conditions
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1Intentionality, Noemata, and Individuation: The Role of Individuation in Husserl's Theory of IntentionalityDissertation, Stanford University. 1971.
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The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 7: Modern PhilosophyCharlottesville: Philosophy Doc Ctr. 2000.
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46Husserl and Tarski: the Semantic Conception of Intentionality and TruthIn Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock (ed.), Husserl as Analytic Philosopher, De Gruyter. pp. 143-174. 2016.
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39Perception, Context, and Direct RealismIn Dan Zahavi (ed.), The Oxford handbook of contemporary phenomenology, Oxford University Press. 2012.This chapter, which is concerned with the phenomenology of perception, especially the role of content and context in the intentionality of perception, tries to provide an account of the structure of perceptual experience and its intentional relation to its objects. In particular, it presents an analysis of consciousness and intentionality in perception. Perceptual experience is sensuous and paradigmatically intentional. The intentional character of a visual experience of an object is different t…Read more
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30L8 Phenomenological methods in philosophy of mindIn Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory?, Routledge. 2013.
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Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
20th Century Philosophy |
Continental Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
20th Century Philosophy |
Continental Philosophy |