William Hasker

It seems reasonable to seek a definition of naturalism, yet an accurate general definition proves to be elusive. After considering proposals from Quine, Nagel, and Chalmers, I propose that naturalism as understood by the majority of contemporary naturalists is best defined by the conjunction of mind-body supervenience, an understanding of the physical as mechanistic, and the causal closure of the physical domain. I then argue that naturalism so defined is in principle unable to account for the existence of rationality; it follows that naturalism must be rejected.

This chapter begins with a brief exposition of divine timelessness, emphasizing the particular aspects of the doctrine that are crucial for the present discussion. Then the argument is presented to show that a timeless God cannot be present — in particular, that a timeless God cannot have “immediate knowledge” of the created world. This is followed by a discussion of several different attempts, by adherents of timelessness, to show that the argument fails and that a timeless God can indeed be present in the sense that the argument denies. In the course of responding to these objections, it considers additional reasons why the aspects of the doctrine of timelessness that generate the problem are essential to that doctrine and cannot well be abandoned while retaining timelessness itself.

Thomistic dualism, based on the Aristotelian view of the soul as the form of the body, presents us with a conception of the person as part of the natural world in a way that deserves our attention. The view is outlined, following Eleonore Stump’s exposition, and some objections to it are noted. Consideration is then given to a modified version of Thomistic dualism developed by J. P. Moreland. Finally, attention is directed at the theory of “emergent dualism,” which obtains many of the benefits aimed at by the Thomistic view without its drawbacks.

George Mavrodes has argued, on the basis of John Hick’s _An Interpretation of Religion,_ that Hick is ‘probably the most important philosophical defender of polytheism in the history of Western philosophy’. Hick, however, denies that this description pro­per­ly applies to him. This paper concludes that insofar as Hick maintains the Kantian-constructivist view of the divine _personae_ and _impersonae_ that is predominant in the _Interpretation,_ he is able to avoid being classified as a polytheist. That work, however, also contains a realist view of such beings, a view which Hick defends as a viable alternative and at times seems to prefer. Where this realist view is concerned, this paper shows that Hick’s position is straightforwardly polytheistic. In his response, Hick explains his openness to a certain kind of polytheism, which he contends is consistent with his views on religious pluralism.