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65Defining ‘gratuitous evil’: A response to Alan R. Rhoda: William HaskerReligious Studies 46 (3): 303-309. 2010.In his article, ‘Gratuitous evil and divine providence’, Alan Rhoda claims to have produced an uncontroversial theological premise for the evidential argument from evil. I argue that his premise is by no means uncontroversial among theists, and I doubt that any premise can be found that is both uncontroversial and useful for the argument from evil
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391Light in the Darkness? Reflections on Eleonore Stump’s TheodicyFaith and Philosophy 28 (4): 432-450. 2011.Eleonore Stump’s Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering is a major contribution to the literature on the problem of evil. This reviewessay summarizes the overall argument of the book, pointing out both merits and difficulties with Stump’s approach. In particular, the essay urges objectionsto the solution she presents for the problem of suffering.
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19Christ and the Shape of PhilosophyRoczniki Filozoficzne 64 (4): 55-65. 2016.Paul Moser claims that there is no evidence for my attribution to him of certain views in my essay, “How Christian Can Philosophy Be?” Here I review the evidence presented in my essay and reconsider its import. I also reflect further on our respective views concerning philosophy, and Christian philosophy.
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21Death, Resurrection, and Transporter Beams: An Introduction to Five Christian Views on Life after Death, by Silas N. LangleyFaith and Philosophy 32 (2): 238-240. 2015.
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80A Leftovian Trinity?Faith and Philosophy 26 (2): 154-166. 2009.Brian Leftow has proposed a “Latin” doctrine of the Trinity according to which “the Father just is God,” and so also for the Son and the Spirit. I argue that Leftow’s doctrine as he presents it really does have the consequence that Father, Son, and Spirit are all identical, a consequence that is inconsistent with orthodox Trinitarianism. A fairly minor modification would enable Leftow to avoid this untoward consequence. But the doctrine as modified will still retain a strongly modalistic flavor:…Read more
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29Can Social Trinitarianism Be Monotheist?Faith and Philosophy 30 (4): 439-443. 2013.Dale Tuggy has criticized my proposal for the doctrine of the Trinity, claiming that social trinitarianism cannot be monotheistic. I present a counter-argument, and consider the ways in which Tuggy might respond to it.
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1019Beauty and MetaphysicsEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1 (1). 2009.It is shown through examples ranging from Parmenides and Plato to Whitehead and Wittgenstein that beauty is central among the values that have made metaphysical theories appealing and credible. A common attitude would be that the aesthetic properties of metaphysical theories may be important for effective presentation but are irrelevant to the cognitive value of the theories. This however is question-begging, since it assumes without argument that ultimate reality is indifferent to ’value consid…Read more
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20Anti-Molinist ArgumentsIn Ken Perszyk (ed.), Molinism: The Contemporary Debate, Oxford University Press. pp. 73. 2011.
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27Deception and the trinity: A rejoinder to Tuggy: William HaskerReligious Studies 47 (1): 117-120. 2011.Dale Tuggy argues that his divine-deception argument against Social Trinitarianism remains unscathed, in spite of my recent objections. I maintain that his argument is question-begging and exegetically weak, and does not succeed in refuting Social Trinitarianism
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28Chrzan on Necessary Gratuitous EvilFaith and Philosophy 12 (3): 423-425. 1995.Keith Chrzan claims to have found a flaw in the central argument of my essay, “The Necessity of Gratuitous Evil.” I point out that Chrzan misstates my views on several key points, and argue that his comments fail to create any difficulty for my argument.
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93Concerning the Unity of ConsciousnessFaith and Philosophy 12 (4): 532-547. 1995.Ever since Descartes there have been philosophers who have claimed that the unity of conscious experience argues strongly against the possibility that the mind or self is a material thing. My contention is that the recent neglect of this argument is a mistake, and that it places a serious and perhaps insuperable obstacle in the way of materialist theories of the mind.
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35Constitution and the TrinityFaith and Philosophy 27 (3): 321-329. 2010.Jeffrey Brower and Michael Rea have proposed a model for the Trinity using a particular understanding of the relation of material constitution. I examine this model in detail and conclude that it cannot succeed. I then suggest, but do not fully develop, a model of the Trinity using an alternative notion of constitution.
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238All too skeptical theismInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 68 (1-3): 15-29. 2010.Skeptical theism contends that, due to our cognitive limitations, we cannot expect to be able to determine whether there are reasons which justify God’s permission of apparently unjustified evils. Because this is so, the existence of these evils does not constituted evidence against God’s existence. A common criticism is that the skeptical theist is implicitly committed to other, less palatable forms of skepticism, especially moral skepticism. I examine a recent defense against this charge mount…Read more
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83Are alternative pasts plausible? A reply to Thomas FlintReligious Studies 36 (1): 103-105. 2000.Thomas Flint has claimed that my argument against Molinism suffers from a 'seemingly irreparable logical gap'. He also contests a key assumption of that argument, namely that 'something which has had causal consequences in the past is ipso facto a hard, fixed, settled fact about the past'. In reply, I show that there is no logical gap at all in the argument. And I argue that, even though Molinists have reasons, based on Molinist principles, for rejecting the assumption in question, the assumptio…Read more
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4Does God change?In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring philosophy of religion: an introductory anthology, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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29Alston on the Rationality of Doxastic PracticesFaith and Philosophy 27 (2): 205-211. 2010.John Turri claims to have refuted the main argument of William Alston’s Perceiving God. He contests Alston’s claim that “for any established doxastic practice it is rational to suppose that it is reliable.” I show that Turri has misinterpreted Alston at several key points, and that his refutation of Alston’s argument fails.
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42Deception and the Trinity: A Rejoinder to TuggyReligious Studies 47 (1). 2011.Dale Tuggy argues that his divine-deception argument against social Trinitarianism remains unscathed, in spite of my recent objections. I maintain that his argument is question-begging and exegetically weak, and does not succeed in refuting social Trinitarianism
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95Can God be free?: Rowe's dilemma for theologyReligious Studies 41 (4): 453-462. 2005.In his book, Can God Be Free?, William Rowe has argued that if God is unsurpassably good He cannot be free; if He is free, He cannot be unsurpassably good. After following the discussion of this topic through a number of historical figures, Rowe focuses on the recent and contemporary debate. A key claim of Rowe's is that, if there exists an endless series of better and better creatable worlds, then the existence of a morally perfect creator is impossible. I show that this argument is unsound, si…Read more
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54Anti-Molinism is Undefeated!Faith and Philosophy 17 (1): 126-131. 2000.William Craig has recently objected to my defense of Robert Adams’ anti-Molinist argument. I argue that all of Craig’s objections fail, and anti-Molinism stands undefeated.