-
27The Need for ThisnessesPhilosophia Christi 23 (1): 159-171. 2021.Richard Swinburne is an emergent dualist. One feature of his view is the need for a “thisness” or haecceity that makes each soul the soul that it is, distinct from other souls that may be indistinguishable from it in all qualitative respects. I argue that there is no need for thisnesses.
-
1God and Gratuitous Evil: A Response to Klass KraayOxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 9 54-67. 2019.
-
61The One Divine NatureTheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 3 (2). 2019.The doctrine of the Trinity affirms that there are three divine Persons, each of whom is fully God, who have between them a single concrete divine nature. This paper attempts two show that, and how, these claims are coherent rather than contradictory. In the process a model for the Trinity is proposed using the notion of constitution.
-
39Future truth and freedomInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 90 (2): 109-119. 2021.It is debated among open theists whether propositions about the contingent future should be regarded as straightforwardly true or false, as all false without exception, or as lacking truth-values. This article discusses some recent work on this topic and proposes a solution different than the one I have previously endorsed.
-
112The transcendental refutation of determinismSouthern Journal of Philosophy 11 (3): 175-183. 1973.
-
36Can a Latin Trinity Be Social? A Response to Scott M. WilliamsFaith and Philosophy 35 (3): 356-366. 2018.Scott Williams’s Latin Social model of the Trinity holds that the trinitarian persons have between them a single set of divine mental powers and a single set of divine mental acts. He claims, nevertheless, that on his view the persons are able to use indexical pronouns such as “I.” This claim is examined and is found to be mistaken.
-
13
-
The Nature of Human Beings: A Mediating ViewIn Melville Y. Stewart & Chih-kʻang Chang (eds.), The Symposium of Chinese-American Philosophy and Religious Studies, International Scholars Publications. pp. 1--37. 1998.
-
8A Cosmic Christ?Philosophia Christi 18 (2): 333-341. 2016.Keith Ward advocates modifications in the doctrine of God similar to those affirmed by open theism. However, he rejects social Trinitarianism, in spite of his own recognition that the two views have often gone together. I argue that, beyond this, Ward really rejects the Trinitarian and Christological doctrines of the church, as expressed in the creeds of Nicaea and Chalcedon. The implications of this are explored; one implication is that Ward’s Christ is less “cosmic” than the traditional view h…Read more
-
53Which God? What Power? A Response to Andrew H. GleesonSophia 49 (3): 433-445. 2010.Andrew H. Gleeson has written an essay commenting on an exchange between Dewi Z. Phillips and me, arguing that I was mistaken to dismiss Phillips’ criticism of the standard definition of omnipotence as unsuccessful. Furthermore, he charges Swinburne, me, and analytic theists in general, with an excessive anthropomorphism that obliterates the distinction between Creator and creature. In response, I contend that all of Gleeson’s criticisms are unsound
-
36The Present Is Necessary! Rejoinder to RotaFaith and Philosophy 29 (4): 466-471. 2012.My account of free will entails that events of the present moment are “necessary” in the same way that the past is necessary. I argue that Michael Rota’s main objection to this account is unsuccessful. I also argue that Rota’s synchronous account of contingency is inferior to the diachronic account which I favor.
-
51Can a Latin Trinity Be Social? A Response to Scott M. WilliamsFaith and Philosophy 35 (3): 356-366. 2018.Scott Williams’s Latin Social model of the Trinity holds that the trinitarian persons have between them a single set of divine mental powers and a single set of divine mental acts. He claims, nevertheless, that on his view the persons are able to use indexical pronouns such as “I.” This claim is examined and is found to be mistaken.
-
36What Is Naturalism? And Should We Be Naturalists?Philosophia Christi 15 (1): 21-34. 2013.It seems reasonable to seek a definition of naturalism, yet an accurate general definition proves to be elusive. After considering proposals from Quine, Nagel, and Chalmers, I propose that naturalism as understood by the majority of contemporary naturalists is best defined by the conjunction of mind-body supervenience, an understanding of the physical as mechanistic, and the causal closure of the physical domain. I then argue that naturalism so defined is in principle unable to account for the e…Read more
-
34The Transcendental Refutation of DeterminismSouthern Journal of Philosophy 11 (3): 175-183. 1973.
-
52Benjamin H. Arbour, Philosophical Essays Against Open TheismEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10 (4): 227-232. 2018.
-
21What Has CERN to Do with Jerusalem?Philosophia Christi 20 (1): 53-60. 2018.There is disagreement concerning the relevance of scientific data to a theological account of the nature of human beings. I contend that science is indeed relevant, but not in a way that should lead us to discount philosophical and theological ideas about human nature. I mention five different findings of science that have significant implications for our understanding of the mind-body relationship.
-
30William J. Wainwright (ed.), God, philosophy, and academic cultureInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 43 (3): 185-187. 1998.
-
29The Souls of Beasts and MenReligious Studies 10 (3). 1974.‘The organic body signifies the latent crisis of every known ontology and the touchstone of “any future one which will be able to come forward as a science.”’ —Hans Jonas ‘Thales…said that the magnet has a soul in it because it moves the iron.’— Aristotle