•  430
    Bhartrhari on what cannot be said
    Philosophy East and West 51 (4): 525-534. 2001.
    Bhartṛhari claims that certain things cannot be signified--for example, the signification relation itself. Hans and Radhika Herzberger assert that Bhartṛhari's claim about signification can be validated by an appeal to twentieth-century results in set theory. This appeal is unpersuasive in establishing this view, but arguments akin to the semantic paradoxes (such as the "liar" paradox) come much closer. Unfortunately, these arguments are equally telling against another of his views: that the tha…Read more
  •  82
    Set Theory with Indeterminacy of Identity
    with Peter Woodruff
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40 (4): 473-495. 1999.
    We presume a background theory which allows for indeterminacy of states of affairs involving objects, extending even to indeterminacy of identity between objects. A sentence reporting such an indeterminate state of affairs lacks truth-value. We extend this to a theory of sets, similar to ZFU, in which membership in, and identity between, sets may also be indeterminate
  •  200
    Referring to nonexistent objects
    Theory and Decision 11 (1): 95--110. 1979.
  •  93
    II*—Underlying States in the Semantical Analysis of English
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88 (1): 13-30. 1988.
    Terence Parsons; II*—Underlying States in the Semantical Analysis of English, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 88, Issue 1, 1 June 1988, Pages 13.
  •  303
    This extended investigation of the semantics of event (and state) sentences in their various forms is a major contribution to the semantics of natural language, simultaneously encompassing important issues in linguistics, philosophy, and logic. It develops the view that the logical forms of simple English sentences typically contain quantification over events or states and shows how this view can account for a wide variety of semantic phenomena. Focusing on the structure of meaning in English se…Read more