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35The editors of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research thank the members of the Editorial Board and the following scholars, who have served as referees during the period of October 2006 through July 2007 (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3). 2007.
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197Broome's argument against value incomparabilityUtilitas 16 (2): 220-224. 2004.John Broome has argued that alleged cases of value incomparability are really examples of vagueness in the betterness relation. The main premiss of his argument is ‘the collapsing principle’. I argue that this principle is dubious, and that Broome's argument is therefore unconvincing. Correspondence:c1 [email protected].
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34A Refutation of Spectrum Arguments for Nontransitive BetternessPhilosophia 51 (4): 2147-2150. 2023.This short paper states a new objection against “spectrum arguments” for nontransitive betterness. It is shown that defenders of such arguments must reject one of two very plausible principles.