Andrews Reath

This study presents a defense of Kant's doctrine of the Highest Good. Though generally greeted with skepticism, I propose an interpretation that makes it an integral part of Kant's moral philosophy, which adds to the latter in interesting ways. Kant introduces the Highest Good as the final end of moral conduct. I argue that it is best understood as an end to be realized in history through human agency: a state of affairs in which all individuals act from the Moral Law, and in doing so achieve their intended ends. Part One is a discussion of the Moral Law oriented towards showing how it can generate a final end. I proceed by showing how Kant's conception of duty and moral conduct incorporates a concern for ends and consequences. Included is a discussion of the concept of the good as object of pure practical reason, which is the basis for the Highest Good in Kant's system. Part Two is a survey of the texts which shows that they in fact contain different versions of the Highest Good. The aim here is an interpretation that states the leading idea and yields a way of saying what is essential. Though the Highest Good is commonly viewed as a theological ideal in which happiness would exist in proportion to virtue, I argue that a complete account can be given, faithful to the texts, in which neither feature appears. Here lies the key to my defense. Standard objections do apply to the Highest Good so conceived. But since neither the theological aspect nor the proportionality of happiness and virtue are essential features of the doctrine, the problems they raise do not affect the doctrine as a whole. Moreover, a secular alternative is found that is more consistent wth Kant's overall conception of moral conduct. It would be characterized by two distinct ends: the moral perfection of all individuals and the satisfaction of their permissible ends

My aim in this paper is to explore different ways of understanding Kant’s Formula of Humanity as a formal principle. I believe that a formal principle for Kant is a principle that is constitutive of some domain of cognition or rational activity. It is a principle that both constitutively guides that activity and serves as its internal regulative norm. In the first section of this essay, I explain why it is desirable to find a way to understand the Formula of Humanity as a formal principle in this sense. In sections II and III I discuss two interpretive approaches to Kant’s idea that rational nature or humanity is an end in itself, both of which may be construed as treating the Formula of Humanity as a formal principle. By focusing on the notion of formal principle, I hope to raise a set of issues about how to understand the idea of rational nature or humanity as an end in itself, and about the relation of the Formula of Humanity [FH] to the Formula of Universal Law [FUL]. I do not resolve the issues in this paper, though I briefly sketch some resolution at the end