Mark Wrathall

An oft‐overlooked aspect of Sartre’s concept of selfhood is his rejection of good faith and sincerity as normative ideals. We argue that Sartre’s paradoxical treatment of good faith – claiming both that it is a manifestation of bad faith and the antithesis of it – holds a key to understanding Sartre’s account of selfhood. Contrary to other critics who have discussed good faith, we contend that Sartre sees no normative distinction between bad faith and good faith, and that he is right to do so. We begin with an analysis of Sartre’s account of the reflexive structure of selfhood and the negation involved in self‐consciousness. We then provide an in‐depth examination of the ‘circuit of ipseity’ – a concept that has been largely overlooked, but which is crucial to understanding reflexivity as ‘an immediate and non‐cognitive relationship of self to self.’ This underwrites our account of the way that both bad faith and good faith are pathological forms of selfhood. We conclude with a discussion of Sartre’s claim that selfhood necessarily involves a ‘disintegrated structure’. Sincerity and good faith are bad‐faith efforts to overcome disintegration, while authentic selfhood involves assuming the disintegration and acting with an understanding that these contradictions are an integral part of being human.

_A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism_ is a complete guide to two of the dominant movements of philosophy in the twentieth century. Written by a team of leading scholars, including Dagfinn Føllesdal, J. N. Mohanty, Robert Solomon, Jean-Luc Marion Highlights the area of overlap between the two movements Features longer essays discussing each of the main schools of thought, shorter essays introducing prominent themes, and problem-oriented chapters Organised topically, around concepts such as temporality, intentionality, death and nihilism Features essays on unusual subjects, such as medicine, the emotions, artificial intelligence, and environmental philosophy.

_The _Blackwell Companion to Heidegger_ is a complete guide to the work and thought of Martin Heidegger, one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century._ Considers the most important elements of Heidegger’s intellectual biography, including his notorious involvement with National Socialism Provides a systematic and comprehensive exploration of Heidegger's work One of the few books on Heidegger to cover his later work as well as _Being and Time_ Includes key critical responses to Heidegger's philosophy Contributors include many of the leading interpreters of, and commentators on, the work of Heidegger.

_The _Blackwell Companion to Heidegger_ is a complete guide to the work and thought of Martin Heidegger, one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century._ Considers the most important elements of Heidegger’s intellectual biography, including his notorious involvement with National Socialism Provides a systematic and comprehensive exploration of Heidegger's work One of the few books on Heidegger to cover his later work as well as _Being and Time_ Includes key critical responses to Heidegger's philosophy Contributors include many of the leading interpreters of, and commentators on, the work of Heidegger.

_A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism_ is a complete guide to two of the dominant movements of philosophy in the twentieth century. Written by a team of leading scholars, including Dagfinn Føllesdal, J. N. Mohanty, Robert Solomon, Jean-Luc Marion Highlights the area of overlap between the two movements Features longer essays discussing each of the main schools of thought, shorter essays introducing prominent themes, and problem-oriented chapters Organised topically, around concepts such as temporality, intentionality, death and nihilism Features essays on unusual subjects, such as medicine, the emotions, artificial intelligence, and environmental philosophy.

Martin Heidegger was one of the most original thinkers of the twentieth century. His work has profoundly influenced philosophers including Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Hannah Arendt, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jürgen Habermas, Charles Taylor, Richard Rorty, Hubert Dreyfus, Stanley Cavell, Emmanuel Levinas, Alain Badiou, and Gilles Deleuze. His accounts of human existence and being and his critique of technology have inspired theorists in fields as diverse as theology, anthropology, sociology, psychology, political science, and the humanities. This Lexicon provides a comprehensive and accessible guide to Heidegger's notoriously obscure vocabulary. Each entry clearly and concisely defines a key term and explores in depth the meaning of each concept, explaining how it fits into Heidegger's broader philosophical project. With over 220 entries written by the world's leading Heidegger experts, this landmark volume will be indispensable for any student or scholar of Heidegger's work.

Does truth remain an interesting philosophical topic? Deflationists would argue that it does not, for they believe that Tarskian approaches to truth have succeeded in capturing much of our understanding of the concept without the metaphysical baggage and other shortcomings of traditional attempts at definition. ;Philosophers like Donald Davidson, however, have argued that acceptance of Tarski's insights into the workings of the truth predicate require us to say something more about the concept of truth. Davidson argues that truth is a structure we find in the behavior of rational creatures--indeed, that having a concept of truth is in an important sense constitutive of what it is to be a rational creature. And thus it is necessary to explain how truth relates to human practices. ;Heidegger is often taken as an example of a philosopher who sees the task of defining and understanding truth as central to philosophy. As a result, he is criticized for indulging in the sort of metaphysical and speculative approach to truth that Tarski and others have shown us how to avoid. I argue here, however, that Heidegger is best seen as following a strategy regarding truth that is similar in important respects to Davidson's. Heidegger maintains that it is not the concept of truth which requires clarification, but the conditions of truth. These conditions are sought in the way human practices make manifest the things with which we deal about which we have beliefs and make assertions. His early work on unconcealment explores the structural features of these practices. ;The later Heidegger argued that, at least in the west, our practices, and consequently the unconcealment of what is, are shaped by the prevailing understanding of Being. Thus his work on truth focused on how it is that such an understanding of Being happens, as well as an attempt to understand the current mode of unconcealment through an understanding of the history of these understandings of Being

Heidegger and the study of his thought have earned wide acceptance, extending beyond philosophy to influence an array of other disciplines. Critically selected by leading scholars in the field, the articles in this new collection bring together the most essential and representative scholarship on Heidegger. Focusing on the major phases of his work which attracted most attention from contemporary thinkers, as well as exploring new and important areas of Heidegger scholarship, this four-volume set is an invaluable resource for any curriculum supporting philosophy, as well as political theory, literature, classics, anthropology, and cultural studies. This volume is available on its own or as part of the four-volume set, Heidegger Reexamined. For a complete list of the volume titles in this set, see the listing for Heidegger Reexamined [ISBN: 0-415-94041-9].

S. Kierkegaard argued that our highest task as humans is to realize an “intensified” or “developed” form of subjectivity—his name for self-responsible agency. A self-responsible agent is not only responsible for her actions. She also bears responsibility for the individual that she is. In this paper, I review Kierkegaard’s account of the role that our capacity for reflective self-evaluation plays in making us responsible for ourselves. It is in the exercise of this capacity that we can go from being subjective in a degraded sense—merely being an idiosyncratic jumble of accidental and arbitrary attitudes and affects—to being a subject in the ideal or eminent sense. The latter requires the exercise of my capacity for reflective self-evaluation, since it involves recognizing, identifying with, and reinforcing those aspects of my overall make-up that allow me to express successfully a coherent way of being in the world. Kierkegaard argues that taking immortality seriously is one way to achieve the right kind of reflective stance on one’s own character or personality. Thus, Kierkegaard argues that immortality as a theoretical posit can contribute to one’s effort to own or assume responsibility for being the person one is.

I argue in this paper that Heidegger, contrary to the view of many scholars, in fact endorsed a view of truth as a sort of correspondence. I first show how it is a mistake to take Heidegger's notion of 'unconcealment' as a definition of propositional truth. It is thus not only possible but also essential to disambiguate Heidegger's use of the word 'truth', which he occasionally used to refer to both truth as it is ordinarily understood and unconcealment understood as the condition of the possibility of truth. I then show how Heidegger accepted that propositional truth, or 'correctness', as he sometimes called it, consists in our utterances or beliefs corresponding to the way things are. Heidegger's objection to correspondence theories of truth was not directed at the notion of correspondence as such, but rather at the way in which correspondence is typically taken to consist in an agreement between representations and objects. Indeed, Heidegger took his account of unconcealment as explaining how it is possible for propositions to correspond to the world, thus making unconcealment the ground of propositional truth. I conclude by discussing briefly some of the consequences for Heidegger interpretation which follow from a correct understanding of Heidegger's notion of propositional truth.

This paper develops a modification of the notion of incommensurable worlds upon which Dreyfus and Spinosa base their robust realism. In particular, I argue that we cannot make sense of a conception of incommensurability according to which incommensurable worlds entail cognitively incompatible claims. Instead, as Dreyfus and Spinosa sometimes suggest, incommensurable worlds should be understood as being practically incompatible, meaning that the inhabitants of one world cannot, given their practices for dealing with some things, engage in practices central to the other world. Practical incompatibility grounds a defensible account of incommensurability while securing a necessary step in Dreyfus and Spinosa's argument for robust realism. At the same time, it shows how their idea of incommensurability is immune to the sorts of objections Donald Davidson makes to the idea of a plurality of conceptual schemes, without at the same time refuting Davidson's argument. Finally, an appreciation of the failings of cognitive accounts of incommensurability demonstrates that Dreyfus and Spinosa are not entitled to deny that all true descriptions of the universe are compatible.

Die phänomenologische Tradition war lange Zeit der Auffassung, dass die natürliche Perzeption weder konzeptuell artikuliert ist noch von deterministischen Gesetzen beherrscht wird, sondern dass sie eher nach der praktisch artikulierten Struktur des körperlichen In-der-Welt-Seins organisiert ist. Dabei bleibt die Erklärung dafür problematisch, auf welche Art und Weise die Perzeption dem Denken eine rechtfertigende Unterstützung bieten kann. Die Antwort der Phänomenologen lautet, dass es die bedeutungstragende Struktur der natürlichen Perzeption ist, die uns ermöglicht, über Objekte nachzudenken, indem sie die einzelnen Gedanken über die Objekte motiviert, wie sie sich in der Perzeption darstellen. Der Autor zeigt, welchen Ausweg aus den Sorgen der modernen Philosophie des Geistes dieser Standpunkt weist