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565Moral CoercionPhilosophers' Imprint 14. 2014.The practices of using hostages to obtain concessions and using human shields to deter aggression share an important characteristic which warrants a univocal reference to both sorts of conduct: they both involve manipulating our commitment to morality, as a means to achieving wrongful ends. I call this type of conduct “moral coercion”. In this paper I (a) present an account of moral coercion by linking it to coercion more generally, (b) determine whether and to what degree the coerced agent is l…Read more
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504The Permissibility of Aiding and Abetting Unjust WarsJournal of Moral Philosophy 8 (4): 513-529. 2011.Common sense suggests that if a war is unjust, then there is a strong moral reason not to contribute to it. I argue that this presumption is mistaken. It can be permissible to contribute to an unjust war because, in general, whether it is permissible to perform an act often depends on the alternatives available to the actor. The relevant alternatives available to a government waging a war differ systematically from the relevant alternatives available to individuals in a position to contribute to…Read more
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50Cosmopolitan War, by Cecile Fabre (review)Mind 123 (490): 588-592. 2014.Book review for Cecile Fabre's 'Cosmopolitan War'
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364Morally Heterogeneous WarsPhilosophia 41 (4): 959-975. 2013.According to “epistemic-based contingent pacifism” a) there are virtually no wars which we know to be just, and b) it is morally impermissible to wage a war unless we know that the war is just. Thus it follows that there is no war which we are morally permitted to wage. The first claim (a) seems to follow from widespread disagreement among just war theorists over which wars, historically, have been just. I will argue, however, that a source of our inability to confidently distinguish just from u…Read more
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