• A neuroscientist's field guide In W. Bechtel, P. Mandik, J. Mundale & RS Stufflebeam
    with Paul M. Churchland
    In William P. Bechtel, Pete Mandik, Jennifer Mundale & Robert S. Stufflebeam (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader, Blackwell. pp. 419--430. 2001.
  •  40
    Content: Semantic and information-theoretic
    with Paul M. Churchland
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1): 67-68. 1983.
  •  15
    The virtuosity of the sensory cortex and the perils of common sense
    with Paul M. Churchland
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (3): 350-351. 1978.
  •  852
    Could a machine think?
    with Paul M. Churchland
    Scientific American 262 (1): 32-37. 1990.
  •  86
    On the Contrary: Critical Essays, 1987-1997 (edited book)
    with Paul M. Churchland
    MIT Press. 1998.
    This collection was prepared in the belief that the most useful and revealing of anyone's writings are often those shorter essays penned in conflict with...
  •  154
    Stalking the wild epistemic engine
    with Paul M. Churchland
    Noûs 17 (1): 5-18. 1983.
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    My behavior made me do it: The uncaused cause of teleological behaviorism
    with Jordan Hughes
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (1): 130-131. 1995.
    Toward a neurobiologically grounded approach to explaining self-control we discuss the case of a patient with a bilateral lesion in frontal ventromedial cortex. Patients with such lesions display a marked deficit in social decision making. Compared with an account that examines the causal antecedents of self-control, Rachlin's behaviorist approach seems lacking in explanatory strength
  •  54
    The Neurobiological Platform for Moral Values
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76 97-110. 2015.
    What we humans call ethics or morality depends on four interlocking brain processes: caring. Learning local social practices and the ways of others – by positive and negative reinforcement, by imitation, by trial and error, by various kinds of conditioning, and by analogy. Recognition of others' psychological states. Problem-solving in a social context. These four broad capacities are not unique to humans, but are probably uniquely developed in human brains by virtue of the expansion of the pref…Read more
  •  55
    How Quine perceives perceptual similarity
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (June): 251-255. 1976.
    The explanation of a child's discriminate responses to his environment turns on ascribing to the child a perceptual discrimination which counts certain things as more similar to one another than to some other thing. As Quine forcefully puts it:If an individual is to learn at all, differences in degree of similarity must be implicit in his learning pattern. Otherwise any response, if reinforced, would be conditioned equally and indiscriminately to any and every future episode, all these being equ…Read more
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    Replies to comments
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 29 (1-4). 1986.
    No abstract
  •  50
    Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us About Morality
    Princeton University Press. 2011.
    What is morality? Where does it come from? And why do most of us heed its call most of the time? In Braintrust, neurophilosophy pioneer Patricia Churchland argues that morality originates in the biology of the brain. She describes the "neurobiological platform of bonding" that, modified by evolutionary pressures and cultural values, has led to human styles of moral behavior. The result is a provocative genealogy of morals that asks us to reevaluate the priority given to religion, absolute rules,…Read more
  •  113
    A remarkable hypothesis has recently been advanced by Libet and promoted by Eccles which claims that there is standardly a backwards referral of conscious experiences in time, and that this constitutes empirical evidence for the failure of identity of brain states and mental states. Libet's neurophysiological data are critically examined and are found insufficient to support the hypothesis. Additionally, it is argued that even if there is a temporal displacement phenomenon to be explained, a neu…Read more
  •  34
    Psychology and Medical Decision-Making
    American Journal of Bioethics 9 (6-7): 79-81. 2009.
    No abstract
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    Is Neuroscience Relevant to Philosophy?
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 16 (n/a): 323-341. 1990.
    Many questions concerning the nature of the mind have remained intractable since their first systematic discussion by the ancient Greeks. What is the nature of knowledge, and how is it possible to represent the world? What are consciousness and free will? What is the self and how is it that some organisms are more intelligent than others? Since it is now overwhelmingly evident that these are phenomena of the physical brain, it is not surprising that an established empirical and theoretical found…Read more
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    The hornswoggle problem
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6): 402-8. 1996.
    Beginning with Thomas Nagel, various philosophers have propsed setting conscious experience apart from all other problems of the mind as ‘the most difficult problem’. When critically examined, the basis for this proposal reveals itself to be unconvincing and counter-productive. Use of our current ignorance as a premise to determine what we can never discover is one common logical flaw. Use of ‘I-cannot-imagine’ arguments is a related flaw. When not much is known about a domain of phenomena, our …Read more
  •  42
    Consciousness: The transmutation of a concept
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (January): 80-95. 1983.
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    Explaining the nature and mechanisms of conscious experience in neurobiological terms seems to be an attainable, if yet unattained, goal. Research at many levels is important, including research at the cellular level that explores the role of recurrent pathways between thalamic nuclei and the cortex, and research that explores consciousness from the perspective of action. Conceptually, a clearer understanding of the logic of expressions such as ‘‘causes’’ and ‘‘correlates’’, and about what to ex…Read more
  •  391
    This is a unique book. It is excellently written, crammed with information, wise and a pleasure to read.' ---Daniel C. Dennett, Tufts University
  •  2
    Filling in
    with Why Dennett is Wrong and Vilayanur S. Ramachandran
    In Antti Revonsuo & Matti Kamppinen (eds.), Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience, Lawrence Erlbaum. 1994.
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    Leapfrog over the brain
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (1): 73-74. 1987.
  •  181
    The timing of sensations: Reply to Libet
    Philosophy of Science 48 (3): 492-7. 1981.
  •  225
    Is determinism self-refuting?
    Mind 90 (January): 99-101. 1981.