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Patricia Churchland

University of California, San Diego
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    131
    • Most Recent
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  •  Events
    4
  •  News and Updates
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 More details
  • University of California, San Diego
    Department of Philosophy
    Unknown
San Diego, California, United States of America
  • All publications (131)
  •  1
    Neurocomputational Perspective
    Behavior and Philosophy 20 (2): 75-88. 1993.
    IntentionalityMetaphysics of MindPhilosophy of Cognitive SciencePhilosophy of Neuroscience
  •  1
    Peer Commentary
    Social Epistemology 4 162-165. 1990.
    Social EpistemologyEpistemology of Disagreement
  •  4
    Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment Reviewed by
    Philosophy in Review 2 (5): 240-242. 1982.
  • Second reply to Fodor and Lepore
    In Robert McCauley (ed.), Churchlands and Their Critics, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 278--83. 1996.
    Meaning Holism
  • McCauley's demand for a co-level competitor
    with Paul M. Churchland
    In William Bechtel, Pete Mandik, Jennifer Mundale & Robert Stufflebeam (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader, Blackwell. pp. 457--465. 2001.
    Philosophy of Psychology
  • A neuroscientist's field guide In W. Bechtel, P. Mandik, J. Mundale & RS Stufflebeam
    with Paul M. Churchland
    In William Bechtel, Pete Mandik, Jennifer Mundale & Robert Stufflebeam (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader, Blackwell. pp. 419--430. 2001.
  •  109
    Content: Semantic and information-theoretic
    with Paul M. Churchland
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1): 67-68. 1983.
    Philosophy of Cognitive SciencePhilosophy of Linguistics
  •  66
    The virtuosity of the sensory cortex and the perils of common sense
    with Paul M. Churchland
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (3): 350-351. 1978.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceAspects of Consciousness
  •  528
    Functionalism, Qualia, and Intentionality
    with Paul M. Churchland
    Philosophical Topics 12 (1): 121-145. 1981.
    Functionalism and QualiaEliminativism about QualiaThe Inverted SpectrumAbsent QualiaFunctional Reali…Read more
    Functionalism and QualiaEliminativism about QualiaThe Inverted SpectrumAbsent QualiaFunctional Realization
  •  1060
    Could a machine think?
    with Paul M. Churchland
    Scientific American 262 (1): 32-37. 1990.
    Chinese Room Argument
  •  121
    On the Contrary: Critical Essays, 1987-1997 (edited book)
    with Paul M. Churchland
    MIT Press. 1998.
    This collection was prepared in the belief that the most useful and revealing of anyone's writings are often those shorter essays penned in conflict with...
    Philosophy of Mind, General WorksTheory Reduction
  •  303
    Stalking the wild epistemic engine
    with Paul M. Churchland
    Noûs 17 (1): 5-18. 1983.
    Naturalizing Mental Content, Misc
  •  358
    Recent work on consciousness: Philosophical, theoretical, and empirical
    with Paul M. Churchland
    In Naoyuki Osaka (ed.), Neural Basis of Consciousness, John Benjamins. pp. 49--123. 2003.
    Philosophy of Consciousness, General Works
  •  2
    Can neurobiology teach us anything about consciousness?" Presidential Address to the American Philosophical Associatiojn, Pacific Division
    Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association. Lancaster Press: Lancaster, Pa. forthcoming.
  •  157
    Replies to reviews of Psychology's Place in the Science of the Mind/Brain
    Biology and Philosophy 3 (3): 393-402. 1988.
    Neurophilosophy
  •  3161
    A critique of pure vision
    with V. S. Ramachandran and Terrence J. Sejnowski
    In Christof Koch & Joel L. Davis (eds.), Large-Scale Neuronal Theories of the Brain, Mit Press. pp. 23. 1994.
    Anydomainofscientificresearchhasitssustainingorthodoxy. Thatis, research on a problem, whether in astronomy, physics, or biology, is con- ducted against a backdrop of broadly shared assumptions. It is these as- sumptionsthatguideinquiryandprovidethecanonofwhatisreasonable-- of what "makes sense." And it is these shared assumptions that constitute a framework for the interpretation of research results. Research on the problem of how we see is likewise sustained by broadly shared assump- tions, wh…Read more
    Anydomainofscientificresearchhasitssustainingorthodoxy. Thatis, research on a problem, whether in astronomy, physics, or biology, is con- ducted against a backdrop of broadly shared assumptions. It is these as- sumptionsthatguideinquiryandprovidethecanonofwhatisreasonable-- of what "makes sense." And it is these shared assumptions that constitute a framework for the interpretation of research results. Research on the problem of how we see is likewise sustained by broadly shared assump- tions, where the current orthodoxy embraces the very general idea that the business of the visual system is to create a detailed replica of the visual world, and that it accomplishes its business via hierarchical organization and by operatingessentiallyindependently of other sensorymodalitiesas well as independently of previous learning, goals, motor planning, and motor execution.
    Modularity and Cognitive Penetrability
  •  73
    Ojemann's data: Provocative but mysterious
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2): 211-212. 1983.
  •  441
    Language, thought, and information processing
    Noûs 14 (2): 147-70. 1980.
    Eliminativism about Propositional Attitudes
  •  359
    Is determinism self-refuting?
    Mind 90 (January): 99-101. 1981.
    Determinism
  •  177
    Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain
    with Christopher S. Hill
    Philosophical Review 97 (4): 573. 1988.
    Neurophilosophy
  •  614
    Epistemology in the Age of Neuroscience
    Journal of Philosophy 84 (10): 544-553. 1987.
    NeurophilosophyNaturalized Epistemology
  •  242
    The Impact of Neuroscience on Philosophy
    Neuron 60 (3): 409-11. 2008.
    Philosophy, in its traditional guise, addresses questions where experimental science has not yet nailed down plausible explanatory theories. Thus, the ancient Greeks pondered the nature of life, the sun, and tides, but also how we learn and make decisions. The history of science can be seen as a gradual process whereby speculative philosophy cedes intellectual space to increasingly wellgrounded experimental disciplines—first astronomy, but followed by physics, chemistry, geology, biology, archae…Read more
    Philosophy, in its traditional guise, addresses questions where experimental science has not yet nailed down plausible explanatory theories. Thus, the ancient Greeks pondered the nature of life, the sun, and tides, but also how we learn and make decisions. The history of science can be seen as a gradual process whereby speculative philosophy cedes intellectual space to increasingly wellgrounded experimental disciplines—first astronomy, but followed by physics, chemistry, geology, biology, archaeology, and more recently, ethology, psychology, and neuroscience. Science now encompasses plausible theories in many domains, including large-scale theories about the cosmos, life, matter, and energy. The mind’s turn has now come. The classical ‘‘mind’’ questions center on free will, the self, consciousness, how thoughts can have meaning and ‘‘aboutness,’’ and how we learn and use knowledge. All these matters interlace with questions about morality: where values come from, the roles of reason and emotion in choice, and the wherefore of responsibility and punishment. The vintage mind/body problem is a legacy of Descartes: if the mind is a completely nonphysical substance, as he thought, how can it interact causally with the physical brain? Since the weight of evidence indicates that mental processes actually are processes of the brain, Descartes’ problem has disappeared. The classical mind/ body problem has been replaced with a range of questions: what brain mechanisms explain learning, decision making, self-deception, and so on. The replacement for ‘‘the mind-body problem’’ is not a single problem; it is the vast research program of cognitive neuroscience. The dominant methodology of philosophy of mind and morals in the twentieth..
    NeurophilosophyNeuroethics, Misc
  •  131
    Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us About Morality
    Princeton University Press. 2011.
    What is morality? Where does it come from? And why do most of us heed its call most of the time? In Braintrust, neurophilosophy pioneer Patricia Churchland argues that morality originates in the biology of the brain. She describes the "neurobiological platform of bonding" that, modified by evolutionary pressures and cultural values, has led to human styles of moral behavior. The result is a provocative genealogy of morals that asks us to reevaluate the priority given to religion, absolute rules,…Read more
    What is morality? Where does it come from? And why do most of us heed its call most of the time? In Braintrust, neurophilosophy pioneer Patricia Churchland argues that morality originates in the biology of the brain. She describes the "neurobiological platform of bonding" that, modified by evolutionary pressures and cultural values, has led to human styles of moral behavior. The result is a provocative genealogy of morals that asks us to reevaluate the priority given to religion, absolute rules, and pure reason in accounting for the basis of morality. Moral values, Churchland argues, are rooted in a behavior common to all mammals--the caring for offspring. The evolved structure, processes, and chemistry of the brain incline humans to strive not only for self-preservation but for the well-being of allied selves--first offspring, then mates, kin, and so on, in wider and wider "caring" circles. Separation and exclusion cause pain, and the company of loved ones causes pleasure; responding to feelings of social pain and pleasure, brains adjust their circuitry to local customs. In this way, caring is apportioned, conscience molded, and moral intuitions instilled. A key part of the story is oxytocin, an ancient body-and-brain molecule that, by decreasing the stress response, allows humans to develop the trust in one another necessary for the development of close-knit ties, social institutions, and morality. A major new account of what really makes us moral, Braintrust challenges us to reconsider the origins of some of our most cherished values.
    Philosophy of NeuroscienceEvolution of MoralityAnimal Moral Cognition
  • Replies from the Churchlands
    with P. S. Churchland
    In Robert McCauley (ed.), Churchlands and Their Critics, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 217--306. 1996.
    Philosophy of ConsciousnessIntentionalityEliminativism about Propositional Attitudes
  •  169
    Neural representation and neural computation
    with Terrence J. Sejnowski
    Philosophical Perspectives 4 343-382. 1990.
    Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence
  •  70
    Is the Visual System as Smart as It Looks?
    PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982 541-552. 1982.
    Irvin Rock's hypothesis that certain stages of perceptual processing resemble problem solving in cognition is contrasted to some recent work in computer vision (Marr, Ullman) which tries to reduce intelligence in perception to computational organization. The focal example is subjective contours which Marr thought could be handled by computational modules without descending control, and which Rock thinks are the outcome of intelligent processing.
    Science of Perception
  •  640
    Word and Object
    with Willard Van Orman Quine and Dagfinn Føllesdal
    MIT Press. 1960.
    Willard Van Orman Quine begins this influential work by declaring, "Language is asocial art.
    W. V. O. QuineMeaning
  •  37
    Human dignity from a neurophilosophical perspective
    In Adam Schulman (ed.), Human dignity and bioethics: essays commissioned by the President's Council on Bioethics, [president's Council On Bioethics. 2008.
    Biomedical EthicsNeuroscience of Ethics
  •  402
    What Should We Expect From a Theory of Consciousness?
    In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience, Lippincott-raven. pp. 19-32. 1973.
    Within the domain of philosophy, it is not unusual to hear the claim that most questions about the nature of consciousness are essentially and absolutely beyond the scope of science, no matter how science may develop in the twenty-first century. Some things, it is pointed out, we shall never _ever_ understand, and consciousness is one of them (Vendler 1994, Swinburne 1994, McGinn 1989, Nagel 1994, Warner 1994). One line of reasoning assumes that consciousness is the manifestation of a distinctly…Read more
    Within the domain of philosophy, it is not unusual to hear the claim that most questions about the nature of consciousness are essentially and absolutely beyond the scope of science, no matter how science may develop in the twenty-first century. Some things, it is pointed out, we shall never _ever_ understand, and consciousness is one of them (Vendler 1994, Swinburne 1994, McGinn 1989, Nagel 1994, Warner 1994). One line of reasoning assumes that consciousness is the manifestation of a distinctly nonphysical thing, and hence has no physical properties that might be explored by techniques suitable to physical things. Dualism, as this view is known, is still to be found among those within the tradition of Kant and Hegel, as well as among some with religious convictions. Surprisingly, however, strenuous foot-dragging is evident even among philosophers of a materialist conviction. Indeed, one might say that it is the philosophical fashion of the 90's to pronounce consciousness unexplainable, and to find the explanatory aspirations of neurobiology to be faintly comic if not rather pitiful. The very word, "reductionism" has come to be used more or less synonymously with "benighted-scientism-run-amok", where scientistm apparently means "applying scientific techniques to domains where they are inapplicable." McGinn, perhaps the most unblushing of the naysayers, insists that we cannot expect even to make any headway on the problem. (p. 114) Ironically perhaps, here we are at a conference in honor of Dr. Herbert Jasper who was a great pioneer in moving neuroscience forward on this problem, and where results will be presented allegedly _showing_ additional progress on the problem. Because I am quite optimistic about future scientific progress on the nature of consciousness, my aim here, as a philosopher, is to address the most popular and influential of the skeptical arguments, and to explain why I find them unconvincing. Thus the overall form of the paper is negative, in the sense that I want to show why a set of naysaying arguments fail.
    Explaining Consciousness, Misc
  •  137
    Consciousness: The transmutation of a concept
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (January): 80-95. 1983.
    Eliminativism about Consciousness
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