Gabriel Andrade

Projects of radical life extension have been discussed amongst scientists for years. Some bioethicists express reservations about this endeavor. A common objection appeals to demography: if the human lifespan is dramatically expanded, humanity would face an overpopulation problem. In this essay, the authors reply to this objection. They posit that radical life extension is unlikely to lead to overpopulation because overpopulation is determined more by fertility rates than by longevity, and as a result of the advanced phases of industrialization, fertility rates are likely to be reduced, and therefore, population size would become stable. However, they argue that although overpopulation is not a concern for the foreseeable future, it is still important to acknowledge its potential harms. Finally, they argue that even if overpopulation becomes a problem caused by radical life extension, there are plausible ways to solve it.

Shaming is defended by some as a necessary measure of social control. But shaming is unjust to the extent that it is disproportionate, and largely counterproductive. While much progress has been made, people with disabilities are still frequently at the receiving end of shaming. This is manifest in disregard for accommodation requests, condescending attitudes and overall lack of empathy towards people with disabilities. These trends are also manifest in clinical settings. Medical staff and healthcare workers need to seriously consider this state of affairs and embrace attitudinal changes and policies that contribute to a more welcoming atmosphere towards the disabled, and consequently curb the shaming to which they have been traditionally exposed.

This article is a libertarian critique of incest laws. On the basis of the libertarian “harm principle”, one must ask what exactly is the harm that incest brings forth. Traditionally, anthropologists have tried to rationalize the incest taboo in various theories, and lawmakers have used these principles as grounds for the criminalization of incest. These principles are the preservation of family structure, the enhancement of alliances and the avoidance of genetic risks. While I acknowledge that these rationalizations are plausible, I argue that they are still not sufficient grounds for the preservation of incest laws, and consequently, there is an ethical need to reform them.

In 1989, Thomas Donaldson requested the California courts to allow physicians to hasten his death. Donaldson had been diagnosed with brain cancer, and he desired to die in order to cryonically preserve his brain, so as to stop its further deterioration. This case elicits an important question: is this a case of euthanasia? In this article, we examine the traditional criteria of death, and contrast it with the information-theoretic criterion. If this criterion is accepted, we posit that Donaldson’s case would have been cryocide, but not euthanasia. We then examine if cryocide is an ethically feasible alternative to euthanasia. To do so, we rely on the ethical doctrine of double effect.

Incest taboos are universal, but it is questionable whether consensual incest should continue to be illegal. The most common argument in favor of the illegalization of consensual incest appeals to genetic risks and the harm to potential offspring. In this article, we examine whether public health concern is a sufficient reason to illegalize consensual incest. We posit that indeed, incest represents a risk, but this is not reason enough to illegalize incest. For, other circumstances of sexual intercourse may lead to similar risks, and yet, such practices are not illegal. While those practices may represent an added risk to public health, to forbid them as a way to improve the genetic pool would be akin to eugenic program, and that is morally objectionable. This does not imply that consensual incest ought to be legal, for there may be other good reasons to illegalize it. But they do not relate to public health and genetic risks, and consequently, medical practitioners and public health officials ought to avoid using their medical authority as a platform to make moral pronouncements.

The problem of evil is very old in philosophy (if God is omnipotent and benevolent, why does he allow evil in the world?), but it has not been sufficiently discussed in the context of sports. This article discusses how athletes and fans in sports relate to it. In sports, there are moral evils, such as cheating, trash talking and unjust retaliation. Theists have traditionally appealed to free will as a way to respond to the challenge of moral evil, but this appeal is not without problems. In sports, there are also natural evils, such as injuries and the unfair distribution of natural talents. Theists also have traditional ways of responding to that, but again, it is not clear that these answers are fully satisfactory.

In continuation with the New Thought movement that arose in the United States in the 19th Century, there is now a massive self-help industry that markets books and seminars. This industry has also extended to healthcare in the form of positive thinking, i.e., the idea that happy thoughts are essential for health. While some of these claims may seem reasonable and commonsensical, they are not free of problems. This article posits that positive thinking has some ethical underpinnings. Extreme positive thinking may promote alternative forms of medicine that ultimately substitute effective treatment, and this is unethical. The emphasis on positive thinking for cancer patients may be too burdensome for them. Likewise, unrestricted positive thinking is not necessarily good for mental health. After considering the ethics of positive thinking, this article proposes a more realistic approach.

Este artículo es un estudio comparativo de la manera en que Aristóteles y Alexis de Tocqueville conciben a la familia dentro del contexto de la democracia antigua y moderna, respectivamente. Se elabora un recorrido por la institución de la familia y el matrimonio en Grecia y Roma, y sus vinculaciones con las ideas políticas de esas civilizaciones. Igualmente, se contrasta el entendimiento antiguo de la democracia con el de Tocqueville, y se analiza la vinculación que éste estableció entre el hogar y la esfera pública en las democracias modernas.Palabras llave: Aristóteles; Alexis de Tocqueville; democracia antigua; democracia moderna; familia.This article is a comparative study of the way Aristotle and Alexis de Tocqueville conceive the institution of the family within the context of ancient and modern democracy, respectively. A survey through the institution of family and marriage in Greece and Rome is made, and their links with the political ideas of those civilizations. In the same manner, the article contrasts the ancient understanding of democracy with Tocqueville’s, and it analyzes the link that Tocqueville established between the domestic home and the public sphere in modern democracies.Palabras llave: Aristotle; Alexis de Tocqueville; ancient democracy; modern democracy; family.

Este ensayo critica la postura del multiculturalismo, movimiento filosófico-político en boga que defiende la igualdad de las culturas, pero ésta no está implicada en la igualdad natural de los hombres, y el relativismo, que defiende la igualdad de las culturas, es problemático desde un punto de vista lógico. La noción misma de igualdad llevaría a la conclusión paradójica de que las sociedades igualitarias son superiores a las sociedades jerárquicas. Igualmente, amerita destacar la singularidad de Occidente respecto a otras culturas. Pero el rechazo a la igualdad de las culturas, no excluye una forma limitada de multiculturalismo posible aún.Palabras llave: Igualdad cultural; multiculturalismo; relativismo cultural.This essay critiques the position of multiculturalism, a philosophico-political movement which is in vogue nowadays and that defends cultural equality, but this equality is not implied in the natural equality of men, and relativism, which defends cultural equality, presents problems from a logical point of view. The notion of equality itself would lead to the paradoxical conclusion that societies which are egalitarian are superior to those hierarchical ones. In the same manner, it is valuable to outline West’s singularity with respect to other cultures. But to reject cultural equality does not exclude a limited form of multiculturalism.Palabras llave: Cultural equality; multiculturalism; cultural relativism.

The purpose of this article is to tackle the way postmodernists have attacked science. Departing from the doctrine of relativism, postmodernists have long claimed that science does not deserve any priority over pseudoscientific or even anti-scientific approaches. Regrettably, in the 20th Century, some philosophers were part of this trend. Claude Levi Strauss’ views on rationality and irrationality, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s notion of “language games”, Paul Feyerabend’s epistemological anarchism, and Thomas Kuhn’s theories about paradigms and their incommensurability, are objects of critique in this article. This article also defends some of Karl Popper’s views on the philosophy of science, and addresses the way some postmodernists have erroneously used Popper’s philosophy to advance their own views.

As it has historically been the case with many pandemics, the Covid-19 experience will induce many philosophers to reconsider the value of medical practice. This should be a good opportunity to critically scrutinize the way medical research and medical interventions are carried out. For much of its history, medicine has been very inefficient. But, even in its contemporary forms, a review of common protocols in medical research and medical interventions reveal many shortcomings, especially related to methodological flaws, and more importantly, conflicts of interests due to profit incentives. In the face of these problems, we propose a program of “gentle medicine”. This term, originally formulated by philosopher Jacob Stegenga, describes a form of medicine in which physicians intervene less than they currently do. As part of this general program, we advance a series of reform recommendations that could be enacted both by medical staff in their everyday practice, but also by public health officials and policymakers.

Monogamy in Western countries has recently undergone criticisms, because it is perceived as an oppressive institution, adjacent to reactionary cultural values. In this article, I argue that monogamy is in fact a force of social progress and women’s empowerment. I point out that, given our natural tendencies, the most likely alternative to monogamy is polygyny. By its very nature, polygyny faces a numerical difficulty, to the extent that (given the equitable male to female ratio) when one man engages in romantic or sexual relationships with multiple female partners, inequality and social conflict ensues. I present historical and sociological data that sustains the argument that polygyny is associated with greater inequality, violence, poverty and women’s vulnerability. Nevertheless, while monogamy can be considered a force of social progress, I argue that the State is not morally entitled to prosecute non-monogamous lifestyles, but there may still be non-coercive ways to promote monogamy.

Immortality is the indefinite continuation of a person’s existence, even after death. In common parlance, immortality is virtually indistinguishable from afterlife, but philosophically speaking, they are not identical. Afterlife is the continuation of existence after death, regardless of whether or not that continuation is indefinite. Immortality implies a never-ending existence, regardless of whether or not the body dies (as a matter of fact, some hypothetical medical technologies offer the prospect of a bodily immortality, but not an afterlife). Immortality has been one of mankind’s major concerns, and even though it has been traditionally mainly confined to religious traditions, it is also important to philosophy. Although a wide variety of cultures have believed in some sort of immortality, such beliefs may be reduced to basically three non-exclusive models: (1) the survival of the astral body resembling the physical body; (2) the immortality of the immaterial soul (that is an incorporeal existence); (3) resurrection of the body (or re-embodiment, in case the resurrected person does not keep the same body as at the moment of death). This article examines philosophical arguments for and against the prospect of immortality. A substantial part of the discussion on immortality touches upon the fundamental question in the philosophy of mind: do souls exist? Dualists believe souls do exist and survive the death of the body; materialists believe mental activity is nothing but cerebral activity and thus death brings the total end of a person’s existence. However, some immortalists believe that, even if immortal souls do not exist, immortality may still be achieved through resurrection. Discussions on immortality are also intimately related to discussions of personal identity because any account of immortality must address how the dead person could be identical to the original person that once lived. Traditionally, philosophers have considered three main criteria for personal identity: the soul criterion, the body criterion and the psychological criterion. Although empirical science has little to offer here, the field of parapsychology has attempted to offer empirical evidence in favor of an afterlife. More recently, secular futurists envision technologies that may suspend death indefinitely (such as Strategies for Engineered Negligible Senescence, and mind uploading), thus offering a prospect for a sort of bodily immortality.