profile picture

Graham Oddie

University of Colorado, Boulder
 More details
Homepage
Boulder, Colorado, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics
Value Theory
Philosophy of Probability
Meta-Ethics
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Metaphysics
Aesthetics
Meta-Ethics
Normative Ethics
Philosophy of Probability
1 more
  • Metaphysics
    In A. Haddock & J. A. Dupré (eds.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Macmillan. 2006.
  •  285
    Harmony, purity, truth
    Mind 103 (412): 451-472. 1994.
    David Lewis has argued against the thesis he calls "Desire as Belief", claiming it is incompatible with the fundamentals of evidential decision theory. I show that the argument is unsound, and demonstrate that a version of desire as belief is compatible with a version of causal decision theory.
    Moral Realism and IrrealismDesire as BeliefDecision-Theoretic Puzzles, MiscDavid Lewis
  • A decision theoretic argument against human embryo experimentation
    In M. Fricke (ed.), Essays in honor of Bob Durrant, University of Otago Press. pp. 111-27. 1986.
    Ethics
  •  267
    An objectivist's guide to subjective value
    with Peter Menzies
    Ethics 102 (3): 512-533. 1992.
    Ethics
  •  87
    Rescuing Reason
    Philosophy 71 (277). 1996.
    Social and Political Philosophy
  •  281
    Verisimilitude by power relations
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (1): 129-135. 1990.
    A number of different theories of truthlikeness have been proposed, but most can be classified into one of two different main programmes: the probability-content programme and the likeness programme.1 In Brink and Heidema [1987] we are offered a further proposal, with the attraction of some novelty. I argue that while the heuristic path taken by the authors is rather remote from what they call ‘the well-worn paths’,2 in fact their point of arrival is rather closer to existing proposals within th…Read more
    Verisimilitude
  •  1
    The possibility and value of possibilities for value
    From the Logical Point of View 3 46-62. 1992.
  •  128
    Supervenience, goodness, and higher-order universals
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (1). 1991.
    Supervenience theses promise ontological economy without reducibility. The problem is that they face a dilemma: either the relation of supervenience entails reducibility or it is mysterious. Recently higher-order universals have been invoked to avoid the dilemma. This article develops a higher-order framework in which this claim can be assessed. It is shown that reducibility can be avoided, but only at the cost of a rather radical metaphysical proposal.
    UniversalsSupervenience, GeneralMoral Supervenience