-
257Free choiceAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (1): 12-24. 1989.There are two inspirations for the theory presented. One is the Kantian idea that a free choice affects a deterministic sequence of events globally rather than just locally. The second is the Leibnizian idea that God chooses for actuality the possible world he deems best. But instead of God choosing, suppose free agents collectively do. Let actuality be an office which deterministic possible worlds are voted in and not of. In this way free choice can change things even if every event is full…Read more
-
367Altruism, Grief, and IdentityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2): 371-383. 2007.The divide between oneself and others has made altruism seem irrational to some thinkers, as Sidgwick points out. I use characterizations of grief, especially by St. Augustine, to question the divide, and use a composition‐as‐identity metaphysics of parts and wholes to make literal sense of those characterizations.
-
949Many-one identityPhilosophical Papers 17 (3): 193-216. 1988.Two things become one thing, something having parts, and something becoming something else, are cases of many things being identical with one thing. This apparent contradiction introduces others concerning transitivity of identity, discernibility of identicals, existence, and vague existence. I resolve the contradictions with a theory that identity, number, and existence are relative to standards for counting. What are many on some standard are one and the same on another. The theory gives a…Read more
-
421Identity through Time and the Discernibility of IdenticalsAnalysis 49 (3). 1989.Ordinary usage gives a way to think of identity through time: the Pittsburgh of 1946 was the same city as the Pittsburgh of today is--namely Pittsburgh. Problem: The Pittsburgh of 1946 does not exist; Pittsburgh still does. How can they have been identical? I reject the temporal parts view on which they were not but we may speak as though they were. Rather I argue that claiming their identity is not contradictory. I interpret ‘the Pittsburgh of 1946’ as ‘Pittsburgh as it was in 1946’ and …Read more
-
85Hume on Steadfast Objects and TimeHume Studies 27 (1): 129-148. 2001.Hume argues that there are steadfast objects - objects not themselves successions at all, yet which co-exist with successions. Given Hume's account of moments as abstractions from temporal simples, there being steadfast objects entails there being single moments that co-exist with successions of moments. Thus time is more like a wall of variously sized bricks than like a line. I formalize the assumptions behind this surprising view, in order to make sense of it and in order to show that it is co…Read more
-
48Continuity and Common SenseInternational Studies in Philosophy 24 (3): 93-97. 1992.I propose a common sense, local anti-realism for the ordinary concept of continuity. Whether or not something, e.g. a trail, is continuous ordinarily depends on people’s purposes and capabilities. This dependence entails that there is no fact of the matter whether something is continuous. Relativizing continuity to gain a fact of the matter, unacceptably fragments our ordinary concept, and makes it false that we given new information can change our minds when applying the concept.
-
493A Pyrrhonian Interpretation of Hume on AssentIn Diego Machuca & Baron Reed (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present, Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 380-394. 2016.How is it possible for David Hume to be both withering skeptic and constructive theorist? I recommend an answer like the Pyrrhonian answer to the question how it is possible to suspend all judgment yet engage in active daily life. Sextus Empiricus distinguishes two kinds of assent: one suspended across the board and one involved with daily living. The first is an act of will based on appreciation of reasons; the second is a causal effect of appearances. Hume makes the same distinction, only he e…Read more
-
294Replies to Perry, Falkenstein, and Garrett (review)Philosophical Studies 146 (3). 2009.Pace Perry, wondering whether perceived things are identical is thinking about them, for Hume, with no thought of perceptions of them. Hume is not a proto-Fregean; Hume's Difficulty is not a version of Frege's Puzzle. Pace Falkenstein, wondering about an identity is not wondering whether clearly distinct things--stages, surfaces, names--are connected in some way. Pace Garrett, wondering about the identity of an observed object is wondering whether it is really one or two things, not whether …Read more
-
452Instantiation as partial identityAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4). 2001.Construing the instantiation of a universal by a particular in terms of my theory of aspects resolves the basic mystery of this "non-relational tie", and gives theoretical unity to the four characteristics of instantiation discerned by Armstrong. Taking aspects as distinct in a way akin to Scotus's formal distinction, I suggest that instantiation is the sharing of an aspect by a universal and a particular--a kind of partial identity. This approach allows me to address Plato's multiple location a…Read more
-
364Hume, Distinctions of Reason, and Differential ResemblancePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1): 156-182. 2010.Hume discusses the distinction of reason to explain how we distinguish things inseparable, and so identical, e.g., the color and figure of a white globe. He says we note the respect in which the globe is similar to a white cube and dissimilar to a black sphere, and the respect in which it is dissimilar to the first and similar to the second. Unfortunately, Hume takes these differing respects of resemblance to be identical with the white globe itself. Contradiction results, undermining his th…Read more
-
98A Humean Temporal LogicThe Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 6 (Analytic Philosophy and Logic): 209-216. 2000.Hume argues that the idea of duration is just the idea of the manner in which several things in succession are arrayed. In other words, the idea of duration is the idea of successiveness. He concludes that all and only successions have duration. Hume also argues that there is such a thing as a steadfast object—something which co-exists with many things in succession, but which is not itself a succession. Thus, it seems that Hume has committed himself to a contradiction: A steadfast object lacks …Read more
-
342Loose identity and becoming something elseNoûs 35 (4). 2001.Armstrong has loose identity be an equivalence relation, yet in cases of something becoming something else, loose identity is not transitive. My alternate account has an attribution of loose identity be really two: a true attribution of an underlying relation (perhaps not transitive) and a false attribution--a Humean feigning-of strict identity. The feigning may become less appropriate as the underlying relation grows more distant. What makes it appropriate initially is that the underlying relat…Read more
-
32Hume on Virtue, Beauty, Composites, and Secondary QualitiesPacific Philosophical Quarterly 71 (2): 103-118. 1990.Hume’s account of virtue (and beauty) entails that distinct things--a quality in the contemplated and a perception in the contemplator--are the same thing--a given virtue. I show this inconsistency is consistent with his intent. A virtue is a composite of quality and perception, and for Hume a composite is distinct things--the parts--falsely supposed to be a single thing. False or unsubstantiated supposition is for Hume the basis of most of our beliefs. I end with an argument that for Hume se…Read more
-
187Corporeal Substances and True Unities: AbstractThe Leibniz Review 4 (2): 9-10. 1994.In the correspondence with Arnauld, Leibniz contends that each corporeal substance has a substantial form. In support he argues that to be real a corporeal substance must be one and indivisible, a true unity. I will show how this argument precludes a tempting interpretation of corporeal substances as composite unities. Rather it mandates the interpretation that each corporeal substance is a single monad.
-
370Hume on Space and TimeIn Paul Russell (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of David Hume, Oxford University Press. 2016.Understanding Hume’s theory of space and time requires suspending our own. When theorizing, we think of space as one huge array of locations, which external objects might or might not occupy. Time adds another dimension to this vast array. For Hume, in contrast, space is extension in general, where being extended is having parts arranged one right next to the other like the pearls on a necklace. Time is duration in general, where having duration is having parts occurring one aft er another like …Read more
-
597Self‐Differing, Aspects, and Leibniz's LawNoûs 52 900-920. 2018.I argue that an individual has aspects numerically identical with it and each other that nonetheless qualitatively differ from it and each other. This discernibility of identicals does not violate Leibniz's Law, however, which concerns only individuals and is silent about their aspects. They are not in its domain of quantification. To argue that there are aspects I will appeal to the internal conflicts of conscious beings. I do not mean to imply that aspects are confined to such cases, but the b…Read more
APA Eastern Division
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
11 more