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305Identity, Continued Existence, and the External WorldIn Saul Traiger (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Hume's Treatise, Blackwell. 2006.To the question whether Hume believed in mind-independent physical objects (or as he would put it, bodies), the answer is Yes and No. It is Yes when Hume writes “We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? but ’tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings.” However the answer is No after inquiring into the causes of that belief, when he writes, “What then can we look for from this confusion…Read more
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127Corporeal Substances and True Unities: AbstractThe Leibniz Review 4 9-10. 1994.In the correspondence with Arnauld, Leibniz contends that each corporeal substance has a substantial form. In support he argues that to be real a corporeal substance must be one and indivisible, a true unity. I will show how this argument precludes a tempting interpretation of corporeal substances as composite unities. Rather it mandates the interpretation that each corporeal substance is a single monad.
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32Hume’s Empiricist MetaphysicsQuaestio: Yearbook of the History of Metaphysics 22 261-279. 2023.Hume’s empiricist reason for rejecting “school metaphysics” makes it natural to assume that Hume rejects all metaphysics. A.J. Ayer certainly reads Hume this way. The natural assumption is wrong, however. Hume only rejects the aprioricity of metaphysics, and not the science itself. I will argue that his empirical science of human nature supports three basic metaphysical principles. (1) The Contradiction Principle: The clearly conceivable implies no contradiction. (2) The Conceivability Principle…Read more
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236Hume on Abstraction and IdentityIn Stefano Di Bella & Tad M. Schmaltz (eds.), The Problem of Universals in Early Modern Philosophy, Oxford University Press. pp. 285-304. 2017.Hume’s critique of traditional abstraction entails a result that undercuts his account of the idea of identity. To save his account of identity, Hume would have to accept abstraction as well. What links these two discussions is (1) Hume’s widely shared assumption that traditional abstraction is separating in the mind what are inseparable in reality, (2) his principle that what are different are mentally separable, and (3) his principle that we cannot conceive of the impossible. Given these, it w…Read more
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18Comments on Rocknak's Imagined CausesHume Studies 45 (1): 51-58. 2019.Stefanie Rocknak has written an ambitious and challenging book1 in which she argues for a new interpretation of Hume's account of how we come to believe in external objects, and what it is we believe in. I am hampered by the fact that she and I seem to agree on so little. Thus, my criticisms run the danger of simply not seeing what she is up to.A preliminary terminological point: where Rocknak uses the word "object," I will often use the word "body," since I think Hume sometimes uses "object" in…Read more
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327Identity, Discernibility, and CompositionIn A. J. Cotnoir & Donald L. M. Baxter (eds.), Composition as Identity, Oxford University Press. pp. 244-253. 2014.There is more than one way to say that composition is identity. Yi has distinguished the Weak Composition thesis from the Strong Composition thesis and attributed the former to David Lewis while noting that Lewis associates something like the latter with me. Weak Composition is the thesis that the relation between the parts collectively and their whole is closely analogous to identity. Strong Composition is the thesis that the relation between the parts collectively and their whole is identity. …Read more
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684Social Complexes and AspectsProtoSociology 35 155-166. 2018.Is a social complex identical to many united people or is it a group entity in addition to the people? For specificity, I will assume that a social complex is a plural subject in Margaret Gilbert’s sense. By appeal to my theory of Aspects, according to which there can be qualitative difference without numerical difference, I give an answer that is a middle way between metaphysical individualism and metaphysical holism. This answer will enable answers to two additional metaphysical questions: (i)…Read more
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751Oneness, Aspects, and the Neo-ConfuciansIn Philip J. Ivanhoe, Owen Flanagan, Victoria S. Harrison, Hagop Sarkissian & Eric Schwitzgebel (eds.), The Oneness Hypothesis: Beyond the Boundary of Self, Columbia University Press. 2018.Confucius gave counsel that is notoriously hard to follow: "What you do not wish for yourself, do not impose on others" (Huang 1997: 15.24). People tend to be concerned with themselves and to be indifferent to most others. We are distinct from others so our self-concern does not include them, or so it seems. Were we to realize this distinctness is merely apparent--that our true self includes others--Confucius's counsel would be easier to follow. Concern for our true self would extend concern bey…Read more
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110Composition as Identity (edited book)Oxford University Press USA. 2014.This collection of essays is the first of its kind to focus on the relationship between composition and identity. Twelve original articles--written by internationally renowned scholars and rising stars in the field--argue for and against the controversial doctrine that composition is identity.--Provided by publisher.
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466Temporary and Contingent Instantiation as Partial IdentityInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (5): 763-780. 2018.ABSTRACT An apparent objection against my theory of instantiation as partial identity is that identity is necessary, yet instantiation is often contingent. To rebut the objection, I show how it can make sense that identity is contingent. I begin by showing how it can make sense that identity is temporary. I rely heavily on Andre Gallois’s formal theory of occasional identity, but argue that there is a gap in his explanation of how his formalisms make sense that needs to be filled by appeal to my…Read more
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739Hume on Substance: A Critique of LockeIn Paul Lodge & Tom Stoneham (eds.), Locke and Leibniz on Substance, . pp. 45-62. 2015.The ancient theory of substance and accident is supposed to make sense of complex unities in a way that respects both their unity and their complexity. On Hume’s view such complex unities are only fictitiously unities. This result follows from his thoroughgoing critique of the theory of substance. I will characterize the theory Hume is critiquing as it is presented in Locke, presupposing what Bennett calls the “Leibnizian interpretation.” Locke uses the word ‘substance’ in two senses. Call subs…Read more
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491The Problem of Universals and the Asymmetry of InstantiationAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2): 189-202. 2018.Oliver's and Rodriguez-Pereyra's important interpretation of the problem of universals as one concerning truthmakers neglects something crucial: that there is a numerical identity between numerically distinct particulars. The problem of universals is rather how to resolve the apparent contradiction that the same things are both numerically distinct and numerically identical. Baxter's account of instantiation as partial identity resolves the apparent contradiction. A seeming objection to this acc…Read more
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197Aspects and the Alteration of Temporal SimplesManuscrito 39 (4): 169-181. 2016.ABSTRACT According to David Lewis, alteration is "qualitative difference between temporal parts of something." It follows that moments, since they are simple and lack temporal parts, cannot alter from future to present to past. Here then is another way to put McTaggart's paradox about change in tense. I will appeal to my theory of Aspects to rebut the thought behind this rendition of McTaggart. On my theory, it is possible that qualitatively differing things be numerically identical. I call thes…Read more
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19Replies to Perry, Falkenstein, and GarrettPhilosophical Studies 146 (3): 445-455. 2009.Replies to criticisms by John Perry, Lorne Falkenstein, and Don Garrett of my book HUME'S DIFFICULTY: TIME AND IDENTITY IN THE TREATISE, in a book symposium in PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES.
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140Hume's Difficulty: Time and Identity in the TreatiseRoutledge. 2008.In this volume--the first, focused study of Hume on time and identity--Baxter focuses on Hume’s treatment of the concept of numerical identity, which is central to Hume's famous discussions of the external world and personal identity. Hume raises a long unappreciated, and still unresolved, difficulty with the concept of identity: how to represent something as "a medium betwixt unity and number." Superficial resemblance to Frege’s famous puzzle has kept the difficulty in the shadows. Hume’s way o…Read more
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The One and the Many: Developing Hume's Account of IdentityDissertation, University of Pittsburgh. 1984.We ordinarily make statements of the form "They are the same thing," if there has been reason to distinguish what we now judge identical. But such statements seem not to make sense. "They" indicates that there are more than one thing, whereas "same" indicates that there is only one thing. How can many be one? Hume's obscure Principle of Identity passage in the Treatise addresses this problem . Call it the Number Problem for Identity. Clarifying Hume's account reveals that, despite its richness a…Read more
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334Instantiation as Partial Identity: Replies to CriticsAxiomathes 23 (2): 291-299. 2013.One of the advantages of my account in the essay “Instantiation as Partial Identity” was capturing the contingency of instantiation—something David Armstrong gave up in his experiment with a similar view. What made the contingency possible for me was my own non-standard account of identity, complete with the apparatus of counts and aspects. The need remains to lift some obscurity from the account in order to display its virtues to greater advantage. To that end, I propose to respond to those who…Read more
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77Hume's Labyrinth Concerning the Idea of Personal IdentityHume Studies 24 (2): 203-233. 1998.In the Treatise Hume argues that the self is really many related perceptions, which we represent to ourselves as being one and the same thing. In the Appendix he finds this account inconsistent. Why? The problem arises from Hume's theory that representation requires resemblance. Only a many can represent a many recognized as such, and only a one can represent something as one. So for the many distinct perceptions (recognized as such) to be represented as one and the same, the many distinct ideas…Read more
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331Abstraction, inseparability, and identityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2): 307-330. 1997.Berkeley and Hume object to Locke's account of abstraction. Abstraction is separating in the mind what cannot be separated in reality. Their objection is that if a is inseparable in reality from b, then the idea of a is inseparable from the idea of b. The former inseparability is the reason for the latter. In most interpretations, however, commentators leave the former unexplained in explaining the latter. This article assumes that Berkeley and Hume present a unified front against Locke. Hume su…Read more
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27Leibniz on Contingent Conceptual Truths in the Arnauld CorrespondenceStudia Leibnitiana 32 (2). 2000.Zu Arnauld und im Discours de métaphysique sagt Leibniz, daß alle Wahrheiten begrifflich (prädikativ) und manche gleichwohl kontingent sind. Ich untersuche das Problem im Hinblick auf mögliche Wesen, die ich als möglich auch betrachte und versuche nachzuweisen, daß die Position keinen Widerspruch enthält, weil Leibniz zwei Arten begrifflichen Enthaltenseins unterscheidet -logisch und kausal: Die erste ist notwendig, die zweite jedoch kontingent und nur hypothetisch notwendig, notwendig also ledi…Read more
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81Hume's puzzle about identityPhilosophical Studies 98 (2): 187-201. 2000.In discussion of the "Principle of Identity" in the Treatise Hume presents a puzzle about identity - not a puzzle for semantics, like Frege's, but a puzzle for a theory of representation. In this essay I am less concerned with issues of Hume interpretation and more concerned with the puzzle itself.
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321Corporeal Substances and True UnitiesStudia Leibnitiana 27 (2): 157. 1995.In the correspondence with Arnauld, Leibniz contends that each corporeal substance has a substantial form. In support he argues that to be real a corporeal substance must be one and indivisible, a true unity. I will show how this argument precludes a tempting interpretation of corporeal substances as composite unities. Rather it mandates the interpretation that each corporeal substance is a single monad.
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70A Defense of Hume on Identity Through TimeHume Studies 13 (2): 323-342. 1987.In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:323 A DEFENSE OF HUME ON IDENTITY THROUGH TIME A durable complaint against Hume is that he blatantly begs the question in his Treatise account of our acquisition of the idea of identity through time. Green and Grose made the accusation in 1878; one hundred years later Stroud echoed the same accusation, its force and liveliness seemingly undiminished. I suggest that this accusation is based on a tempting but unwarranted assumption abo…Read more
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482The Discernibility of IdenticalsJournal of Philosophical Research 24 37-55. 1999.I argue via examples that there are cases in which things that are not two distinct things qualitatively differ without contradiction. In other words, there are cases in which something differs from itself. Standard responses to such cases are to divide the thing into distinct parts, or to conceive of the thing under different descriptions, or to appeal to different times, or to deny that the property had is the property lacked. I show these responses to be unsatisfactory. I then gather and syst…Read more
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550Identity in the loose and popular senseMind 97 (388): 575-582. 1988.This essay interprets Butler’s distinction between identity in the loose and popular sense and in the strict and philosophical sense. Suppose there are different standards for counting the same things. Then what are two distinct things counting strictly may be one and the same thing counting loosely. Within a given standard identity is one-one. But across standards it is many-one. An alternative interpretation using the parts-whole relation fails, because that relation should be understood …Read more
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60Hume on Infinite DivisibilityHistory of Philosophy Quarterly 5 (2): 133-140. 1988.Hume seems to argue unconvincingly against the infinite divisibility of finite regions of space. I show that his conclusion is entailed by respectable metaphysical principles which he held. One set of principles entails that there are partless (unextended) things. Another set entails that these cannot be ordered so that an infinite number of them compose a finite interval.
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354Berkeley, perception, and identityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1): 85-98. 1991.Berkeley says both that one sometimes immediately perceives the same thing by sight and touch, and that one never does. To solve the contradiction I recommend and explain a distinction Berkeley himself makes—between two uses of ‘same’. This solution unifies two seemingly inconsistent parts of Berkeley’s whole project: He argues both that what we see are bits of light and color organized into a language by which God speaks to us about tactile sensations, and yet that we directly see ordinary o…Read more
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292Précis of Hume’s difficulty: Time and identity in the TREATISEPhilosophical Studies 146 (3): 407-411. 2009.Despite its central role in his important theories of self and external world, Hume’s account of numerical identity has been neglected or misunderstood. The account is designed as a response to a difficulty concerning identity apparently original with Hume. I argue that the problem is real, crucial, and remains unresolved today. Hume’s response to the difficulty enlists his idiosyncratic, empiricist views on time: time consists of discrete, partless moments, some of which coexist with successio…Read more
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176Hume's theory of space and time in its sceptical contextIn David Fate Norton & Jacqueline Taylor (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Hume, Cambridge University Press. pp. 105-146. 1993.Hume's Treatise arguments concerning space, time, and geometry, especially ones involving his denial of infinite divisibility; have suffered harsh criticism. I show that in the section "Of the ideas of space and time," Hume gives important characterizations of his skeptical approach, in some respects Pyrrhonian, that will be developed in the rest of the Treatise. When that approach is better understood, the force of Hume's arguments can be appreciated, and the influential criticisms of them can …Read more
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