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157Truth and multiple realizabilityAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3). 2004.Pluralism about truth is the view that there is more than one way for a proposition to be true. When taken to imply that there is more than one concept and property of truth, this position faces a number of troubling objections. I argue that we can overcome these objections, and yet retain pluralism's key insight, by taking truth to be a multiply realizable property of propositions.
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University of ConnecticutDepartment of PhilosophyBoard of Trustees Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Provost Professor of The Humanities
APA Eastern Division
Areas of Specialization
| Social Epistemology |
| Social and Political Philosophy |
| Epistemology |
| Philosophy of Language |
Areas of Interest
| Political Epistemology |
| Truth |
| Internet |
| Social and Political Philosophy |