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4The Value of Truth and the Truth of ValuesIn Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2009.There are least two different things we might mean when we say that truth is a value: that it is a norm of belief, and that it is an end of inquiry. This paper considers to what extent we might be irrealist about the former claim -- that truth is a norm of belief.
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284Truth and Freedom: Rorty and the Problem of PriorityThe European Legacy 19 (2): 163-173. 2014.What does truth have to do with freedom? That is, what is the relationship between our political and epistemic principles? In this paper, I grapple and reject Rorty's reasons for thinking that the former can't be based on the latter, but offer an alternative argument that supports his over-all conclusion that our epistemic and political values are ultimately intertwined.
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19The values of truth and the truth of valuesIn Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 225--42. 2009.
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82Truth Pluralism, Truth Relativism and Truth-aptnessCroatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (2): 149-158. 2011.In this paper, I make two points about Richard’s truth relativism. First, I argue his truth relativism is at odds with his account of truth-aptness. Second, I argue that his truth relativism commits him to a form of pluralism about truth.
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4A Functionalist Theory of TruthIn The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives, Mit Press. pp. 723--750. 2001.
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47Truth in Context: An Essay on Pluralism and ObjectivityMIT Press. 1998.A Choice Outstanding Academic Title for 1999 Academic debates about pluralism and truth have become increasingly polarized in recent years. One side embraces extreme relativism, deeming any talk of objective truth as philosophically naïve. The opposition, frequently arguing that any sort of relativism leads to nihilism, insists on an objective notion of truth according to which there is only one true story of the world. Both sides agree that there is no middle path. In Truth in Context, Michael …Read more
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102Sensations and pain processesPhilosophical Psychology 13 (3): 299-311. 2000.This paper discusses recent neuroscientific research that indicates a solution for what we label the ''causal problem'' of pain qualia, the problem of how the brain generates pain qualia. In particular, the data suggest that pain qualia naturally supervene on activity in a specific brain region: the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). The first section of this paper discusses several philosophical concerns regarding the nature of pain qualia. The second section overviews the current state of knowle…Read more
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67In Praise of ReasonMIT Press. 2012.Can we give objective reasons for our most basic standards of reason-- our fundamental epistemic principles? I argue, against several forms of skepticism about reason, that we can, but that the reasons we can give for epistemic principles are ultimately practical, not epistemic.
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The Truth of Values and the Values of Truth'In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2009.
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156The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives (edited book)MIT Press. 2001.These essays center around two questions: Does truth have an underlying nature? And if so, what sort of nature does it have?
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12Perspectives on the Philosophy of William P. Alston (edited book)Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2005.One of the most influential analytic philosophers of the late twentieth century, William P. Alston is a leading light in epistemology, philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of language. In this volume, twelve leading philosophers critically discuss the central topics of his work in these areas, including perception, epistemic circularity, justification, the problem of religious diversity, and truth.
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161Truth and multiple realizabilityAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3). 2004.Pluralism about truth is the view that there is more than one way for a proposition to be true. When taken to imply that there is more than one concept and property of truth, this position faces a number of troubling objections. I argue that we can overcome these objections, and yet retain pluralism's key insight, by taking truth to be a multiply realizable property of propositions.
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107Neuromedia, extended knowledge and understandingPhilosophical Issues 24 (1): 299-313. 2014.Imagine you had the functions of your smartphone miniaturized to a cellular level and accessible by your neural network. Reflection on this possibility suggests that we should not just concern ourselves with whether our knowledge is extending “out” to our devices; our devices are extending in, and with them, possibly the information that they bring. If so, then the question of whether knowledge is “extended” becomes wrapped up with the question of whether knowing is something we do, or something…Read more
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269Zombies and the case of the phenomenal pickpocketSynthese 149 (1): 37-58. 2006.A prevailing view in contemporary philosophy of mind is that zombies are logically possible. I argue, via a thought experiment, that if this prevailing view is correct, then I could be transformed into a zombie. If I could be transformed into a zombie, then surprisingly, I am not certain that I am conscious. Regrettably, this is not just an idiosyncratic fact about my psychology; I think you are in the same position. This means that we must revise or replace some important positions in the philo…Read more
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1Epistemic Circularity and Epistemic DisagreementIn Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Social Epistemology, Oxford University Press. 2008.
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85Three questions for truth pluralismIn Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates, Oxford University Press. pp. 21. 2012.
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107Alethic pluralism, logical consequence, and the universality of reasonMidwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1): 122-140. 2008.No Abstract
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21Truth in EthicsIn Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Blackwell. 2013.
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220Epistemic commitments, epistemic agency and practical reasonsPhilosophical Issues 23 (1): 343-362. 2013.In this paper, I raise two questions about epistemic commitments, and thus, indirectly, about our epistemic agency. Can we rationally defend such commitments when challenged to do so? And if so, how?
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114Relativity of Fact and ContentSouthern Journal of Philosophy 37 (4): 579-595. 1999.A common strategy amongst realists grants relativism at the level of language or thought but denies it at the level of fact. Their point is that even if our concept of an object is relative to a conceptual scheme, it doesn't follow that objects themselves are relative to conceptual schemes. This is a sensible point. But in this paper I present a simple argument for the conclusion that it is false. According to what I call the T-argument, relativism about content entails a relativism about fact
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56In Praise of Reason: Why Rationality Matters for DemocracyMIT Press. 2012.Why does reason matter, if in the end everything comes down to blind faith or gut instinct? Why not just go with what you believe even if it contradicts the evidence? Why bother with rational explanation when name-calling, manipulation, and force are so much more effective in our current cultural and political landscape? Michael Lynch's In Praise of Reason offers a spirited defense of reason and rationality in an era of widespread skepticism--when, for example, people reject scientific evidence …Read more
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Thoughts, the World and Everything in BetweenPhilosophical News 2. 2011.Two of the biggest problems faced by deflationary theories of truth are these: First, how can such views, drawing on such limited resources as they do, provide an adequate and meaningful definition of truth? And second, how can such views be reconciled with our intuition that truth involves a correspondence between thought and world? Christopher Hill has recently claimed that a broadly deflationary view of truth he calls substitutionalism can solve both problems. In this discussion, I argue that…Read more
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660Deception and the Nature of TruthIn Clancy W. Martin (ed.), The philosophy of deception, Oxford University Press. pp. 188. 2009.
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484A coherent moral relativismSynthese 166 (2). 2009.Moral relativism is an attractive position, but also one that it is difficult to formulate. In this paper, we propose an alternative way of formulating moral relativism that locates the relativity of morality in the property that makes moral claims true. Such an approach, we believe, has significant advantages over other possible ways of formulating moral relativism. We conclude by considering a few problems such a position might face.
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188Truth as one and manyClarendon Press. 2009.What is truth? Michael Lynch defends a bold new answer to this question. Traditional theories of truth hold that truth has only a single uniform nature. All truths are true in the same way. More recent deflationary theories claim that truth has no nature at all; the concept of truth is of no real philosophical importance. In this concise and clearly written book, Lynch argues that we should reject both these extremes and hold that truth is a functional property. To understand truth we must under…Read more
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University of ConnecticutDepartment of PhilosophyBoard of Trustees Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Provost Professor of The Humanities
APA Eastern Division
Areas of Specialization
Social Epistemology |
Social and Political Philosophy |
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Language |
Areas of Interest
Political Epistemology |
Truth |
Internet |
Social and Political Philosophy |