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123Alethic Functionalism and Our Folk Theory of Truth: A Reply to Cory WrightSynthese 145 (1): 29-43. 2005.According to alethic functionalism, truth is a higher-order multiply realizable property of propositions. After briefly presenting the views main principles and motivations, I defend alethic functionalism from recent criticisms raised against it by Cory Wright. Wright argues that alethic functionalism will collapse either into deflationism or into a view that takes true as simply ambiguous. I reject both claims.
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32Trusting intuitionsIn Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Truth and realism, Oxford University Press. pp. 227--238. 2006.
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132The Knowers in ChargeInternational Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (1): 53-63. 2016._ Source: _Page Count 11 Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. By Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. xiii +279. isbn 978–0–19–993647–2.
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70Hume and the Limits of ReasonHume Studies 22 (1): 89-104. 1996.The purpose of this paper is to explain Hume's account of the way both the scope and the degree of benevolent motivation is limited. I argue that Hume consistently affirms, both in the _Treatise<D> and in the second _Enquiry<D>, (i) that the scope of benevolent motivation is very broad, such that it includes any creature that is conscious and capable of thought, and (ii) that the degree of benevolent motivation is limited, such that a person is naturally inclined to feel benevolence more strongl…Read more
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113True to Life: Why Truth MattersMIT Press. 2004.In this engaging and spirited text, Michael Lynch argues that truth does matter, in both our personal and political lives. He explains that the growing cynicism over truth stems in large part from our confusion over what truth is.
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220Three models of conceptual schemesInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 40 (4). 1997.Despite widespread confusion over its meaning, the notion of a conceptual scheme is pervasive in Anglo-American philosophy, particularly amongst those who call themselves ' conceptual relativists'. In this paper, I identify three different ways to understand conceptual schemes. I argue that the two most common models, deriving from Kant and Quine, are flawed, and, in addition, useless for the relativist. Instead, I urge adoption of a 'neo-Kantian', broadly Wittgensteinian model, which, it is ' a…Read more
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4The Value of Truth and the Truth of ValuesIn Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2009.There are least two different things we might mean when we say that truth is a value: that it is a norm of belief, and that it is an end of inquiry. This paper considers to what extent we might be irrealist about the former claim -- that truth is a norm of belief.
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360Truth and Freedom: Rorty and the Problem of PriorityThe European Legacy 19 (2): 163-173. 2014.What does truth have to do with freedom? That is, what is the relationship between our political and epistemic principles? In this paper, I grapple and reject Rorty's reasons for thinking that the former can't be based on the latter, but offer an alternative argument that supports his over-all conclusion that our epistemic and political values are ultimately intertwined.
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19The values of truth and the truth of valuesIn Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 225--42. 2009.
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82Truth Pluralism, Truth Relativism and Truth-aptnessCroatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (2): 149-158. 2011.In this paper, I make two points about Richard’s truth relativism. First, I argue his truth relativism is at odds with his account of truth-aptness. Second, I argue that his truth relativism commits him to a form of pluralism about truth.
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48Truth in Context: An Essay on Pluralism and ObjectivityMIT Press. 1998.A Choice Outstanding Academic Title for 1999 Academic debates about pluralism and truth have become increasingly polarized in recent years. One side embraces extreme relativism, deeming any talk of objective truth as philosophically naïve. The opposition, frequently arguing that any sort of relativism leads to nihilism, insists on an objective notion of truth according to which there is only one true story of the world. Both sides agree that there is no middle path. In Truth in Context, Michael …Read more
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100Sensations and pain processesPhilosophical Psychology 13 (3): 299-311. 2000.This paper discusses recent neuroscientific research that indicates a solution for what we label the ''causal problem'' of pain qualia, the problem of how the brain generates pain qualia. In particular, the data suggest that pain qualia naturally supervene on activity in a specific brain region: the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). The first section of this paper discusses several philosophical concerns regarding the nature of pain qualia. The second section overviews the current state of knowle…Read more
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67In Praise of ReasonMIT Press. 2012.Can we give objective reasons for our most basic standards of reason-- our fundamental epistemic principles? I argue, against several forms of skepticism about reason, that we can, but that the reasons we can give for epistemic principles are ultimately practical, not epistemic.
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The Truth of Values and the Values of Truth'In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2009.
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151The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives (edited book)MIT Press. 2001.These essays center around two questions: Does truth have an underlying nature? And if so, what sort of nature does it have?
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12Perspectives on the Philosophy of William P. Alston (edited book)Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2005.One of the most influential analytic philosophers of the late twentieth century, William P. Alston is a leading light in epistemology, philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of language. In this volume, twelve leading philosophers critically discuss the central topics of his work in these areas, including perception, epistemic circularity, justification, the problem of religious diversity, and truth.
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158Truth and multiple realizabilityAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3). 2004.Pluralism about truth is the view that there is more than one way for a proposition to be true. When taken to imply that there is more than one concept and property of truth, this position faces a number of troubling objections. I argue that we can overcome these objections, and yet retain pluralism's key insight, by taking truth to be a multiply realizable property of propositions.
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104Neuromedia, extended knowledge and understandingPhilosophical Issues 24 (1): 299-313. 2014.Imagine you had the functions of your smartphone miniaturized to a cellular level and accessible by your neural network. Reflection on this possibility suggests that we should not just concern ourselves with whether our knowledge is extending “out” to our devices; our devices are extending in, and with them, possibly the information that they bring. If so, then the question of whether knowledge is “extended” becomes wrapped up with the question of whether knowing is something we do, or something…Read more
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268Zombies and the case of the phenomenal pickpocketSynthese 149 (1): 37-58. 2006.A prevailing view in contemporary philosophy of mind is that zombies are logically possible. I argue, via a thought experiment, that if this prevailing view is correct, then I could be transformed into a zombie. If I could be transformed into a zombie, then surprisingly, I am not certain that I am conscious. Regrettably, this is not just an idiosyncratic fact about my psychology; I think you are in the same position. This means that we must revise or replace some important positions in the philo…Read more
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1Epistemic Circularity and Epistemic DisagreementIn Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Social Epistemology, Oxford University Press. 2008.
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85Three questions for truth pluralismIn Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates, Oxford University Press. pp. 21. 2012.
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107Alethic pluralism, logical consequence, and the universality of reasonMidwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1): 122-140. 2008.No Abstract
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21Truth in EthicsIn Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Blackwell. 2013.
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University of ConnecticutDepartment of PhilosophyBoard of Trustees Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Provost Professor of The Humanities
APA Eastern Division
Areas of Specialization
Social Epistemology |
Social and Political Philosophy |
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Language |
Areas of Interest
Political Epistemology |
Truth |
Internet |
Social and Political Philosophy |