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657Why Worry about Epistemic Circularity?Journal of Philosophical Research 41 (9999): 33-52. 2016.Although Alston believed epistemically circular arguments were able to justify their conclusions, he was also disquieted by them. We will argue that Alston was right to be disquieted. We explain Alston’s view of epistemic circularity, the considerations that led him to accept it, and the purposes he thought epistemically circular arguments could serve. We then build on some of Alston’s remarks and introduce further limits to the usefulness of such arguments and introduce a new problem that stems…Read more
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67Truth as One and Many * By Michael Lynch (review)Analysis 70 (1): 191-193. 2010.In Truth as One and Many, Michael Lynch offers a new theory of truth. There are two kinds of theory of truth in the literature. On the one hand, we have logical theories, which seek to construct formal systems that are consistent, while also containing a predicate which have as many as possible of the properties which we ordinarily take the English predicate ‘is true’ to have; salient examples include Tarski’s and Kripke’s theories of truth. On the other hand, we have metaphysical theories, whic…Read more
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27Truth, Value and Epistemic ExpressivismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1): 76-97. 2009.
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5The Elusive Nature of TruthPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology 4 (2): 229-256. 2000.In this essay, I present a new argument for the impossibility of defining truth by specifying the underlying structural property all and only true propositions have in common The set of considerations I use to support this claim take as that inspiration Alston's recent argument that it is impossible to define truth epistemically—in terms of justification or warrant According to what Alston calls the “intensional argument”, epistemic definitions are inconsistent with the T schema or the principle…Read more
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Perspectives on the Philosophy of William P. AlstonTijdschrift Voor Filosofie 69 (4): 750-751. 2007.One of the most influential analytic philosophers of the late twentieth century, William P. Alston is a leading light in epistemology, philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of language. In this volume, twelve leading philosophers critically discuss the central topics of his work in these areas, including perception, epistemic circularity, justification, the problem of religious diversity, and truth
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77Extending Wittgenstein: The pivotal move from epistemology to the sociology of scienceIn Andrew Pickering (ed.), Science as practice and culture, University of Chicago Press. pp. 215--265. 1992.
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1712Epistemic Arrogance and Political DissentIn Lynch Michael (ed.), Voicing Dissent, Routledge. forthcoming.In this essay, I examine four different reasons for thinking that political dissent has epistemic value. The realization of this epistemic value hinges in part on what I’ll loosely call the epistemic environment, or the environment in which individuals come to believe, reason, inquire, and debate. In particular, to the degree that our social practices encourage and even embody an attitude of epistemic arrogance, the epistemic value of dissent will be difficult to realize. Ironically, it is preci…Read more
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822From one to many: recent work on truthAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4): 323-340. 2016.In this paper, we offer a brief, critical survey of contemporary work on truth. We begin by reflecting on the distinction between substantivist and deflationary truth theories. We then turn to three new kinds of truth theory—Kevin Scharp's replacement theory, John MacFarlane's relativism, and the alethic pluralism pioneered by Michael Lynch and Crispin Wright. We argue that despite their considerable differences, these theories exhibit a common "pluralizing tendency" with respect to truth. In th…Read more
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73Alethic Functionalism and Our Folk Theory of Truth: A Reply to Cory WrightSynthese 145 (1): 29-43. 2005.According to alethic functionalism, truth is a higher-order multiply realizable property of propositions. After briefly presenting the views main principles and motivations, I defend alethic functionalism from recent criticisms raised against it by Cory Wright. Wright argues that alethic functionalism will collapse either into deflationism or into a view that takes true as simply ambiguous. I reject both claims.
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649Pragmatism and the Price of TruthIn Steven Gross, Nicholas Tebben & Michael Williams (eds.), Meaning Without Representation: Essays on Truth, Expression, Normativity, and Naturalism, Oxford University Press. pp. 245-261. 2015.Like William James before him, Huw Price has influentially argued that truth has a normative role to play in our thought and talk. I agree. But Price also thinks that we should regard truth-conceived of as property of our beliefs-as something like a metaphysical myth. Here I disagree. In this paper, I argue that reflection on truth's values pushes us in a slightly different direction, one that opens the door to certain metaphysical possibilities that even a Pricean pragmatist can love.
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32Trusting intuitionsIn Patrick Greenough & Michael Patrick Lynch (eds.), Truth and realism, Oxford University Press. pp. 227--238. 2006.
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118The Knowers in ChargeInternational Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (1): 53-63. 2016._ Source: _Page Count 11 Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. By Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. xiii +279. isbn 978–0–19–993647–2.
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73Hume and the Limits of ReasonHume Studies 22 (1): 89-104. 1996.The purpose of this paper is to explain Hume's account of the way both the scope and the degree of benevolent motivation is limited. I argue that Hume consistently affirms, both in the _Treatise<D> and in the second _Enquiry<D>, (i) that the scope of benevolent motivation is very broad, such that it includes any creature that is conscious and capable of thought, and (ii) that the degree of benevolent motivation is limited, such that a person is naturally inclined to feel benevolence more strongl…Read more
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122True to Life: Why Truth MattersMIT Press. 2004.In this engaging and spirited text, Michael Lynch argues that truth does matter, in both our personal and political lives. He explains that the growing cynicism over truth stems in large part from our confusion over what truth is.
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4The Value of Truth and the Truth of ValuesIn Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2009.There are least two different things we might mean when we say that truth is a value: that it is a norm of belief, and that it is an end of inquiry. This paper considers to what extent we might be irrealist about the former claim -- that truth is a norm of belief.
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225Three models of conceptual schemesInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 40 (4). 1997.Despite widespread confusion over its meaning, the notion of a conceptual scheme is pervasive in Anglo-American philosophy, particularly amongst those who call themselves ' conceptual relativists'. In this paper, I identify three different ways to understand conceptual schemes. I argue that the two most common models, deriving from Kant and Quine, are flawed, and, in addition, useless for the relativist. Instead, I urge adoption of a 'neo-Kantian', broadly Wittgensteinian model, which, it is ' a…Read more
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284Truth and Freedom: Rorty and the Problem of PriorityThe European Legacy 19 (2): 163-173. 2014.What does truth have to do with freedom? That is, what is the relationship between our political and epistemic principles? In this paper, I grapple and reject Rorty's reasons for thinking that the former can't be based on the latter, but offer an alternative argument that supports his over-all conclusion that our epistemic and political values are ultimately intertwined.
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19The values of truth and the truth of valuesIn Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 225--42. 2009.
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82Truth Pluralism, Truth Relativism and Truth-aptnessCroatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (2): 149-158. 2011.In this paper, I make two points about Richard’s truth relativism. First, I argue his truth relativism is at odds with his account of truth-aptness. Second, I argue that his truth relativism commits him to a form of pluralism about truth.
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4A Functionalist Theory of TruthIn The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives, Mit Press. pp. 723--750. 2001.
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47Truth in Context: An Essay on Pluralism and ObjectivityMIT Press. 1998.A Choice Outstanding Academic Title for 1999 Academic debates about pluralism and truth have become increasingly polarized in recent years. One side embraces extreme relativism, deeming any talk of objective truth as philosophically naïve. The opposition, frequently arguing that any sort of relativism leads to nihilism, insists on an objective notion of truth according to which there is only one true story of the world. Both sides agree that there is no middle path. In Truth in Context, Michael …Read more
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102Sensations and pain processesPhilosophical Psychology 13 (3): 299-311. 2000.This paper discusses recent neuroscientific research that indicates a solution for what we label the ''causal problem'' of pain qualia, the problem of how the brain generates pain qualia. In particular, the data suggest that pain qualia naturally supervene on activity in a specific brain region: the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). The first section of this paper discusses several philosophical concerns regarding the nature of pain qualia. The second section overviews the current state of knowle…Read more
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University of ConnecticutDepartment of PhilosophyBoard of Trustees Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Provost Professor of The Humanities
APA Eastern Division
Areas of Specialization
Social Epistemology |
Social and Political Philosophy |
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Language |
Areas of Interest
Political Epistemology |
Truth |
Internet |
Social and Political Philosophy |