-
627Why Worry about Epistemic Circularity?Journal of Philosophical Research 41 (9999): 33-52. 2016.Although Alston believed epistemically circular arguments were able to justify their conclusions, he was also disquieted by them. We will argue that Alston was right to be disquieted. We explain Alston’s view of epistemic circularity, the considerations that led him to accept it, and the purposes he thought epistemically circular arguments could serve. We then build on some of Alston’s remarks and introduce further limits to the usefulness of such arguments and introduce a new problem that stems…Read more
-
61Truth as One and Many * By Michael Lynch (review)Analysis 70 (1): 191-193. 2010.In Truth as One and Many, Michael Lynch offers a new theory of truth. There are two kinds of theory of truth in the literature. On the one hand, we have logical theories, which seek to construct formal systems that are consistent, while also containing a predicate which have as many as possible of the properties which we ordinarily take the English predicate ‘is true’ to have; salient examples include Tarski’s and Kripke’s theories of truth. On the other hand, we have metaphysical theories, whic…Read more
-
27Truth, Value and Epistemic ExpressivismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1): 76-97. 2009.
-
5The Elusive Nature of TruthPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology 4 (2): 229-256. 2000.In this essay, I present a new argument for the impossibility of defining truth by specifying the underlying structural property all and only true propositions have in common The set of considerations I use to support this claim take as that inspiration Alston's recent argument that it is impossible to define truth epistemically—in terms of justification or warrant According to what Alston calls the “intensional argument”, epistemic definitions are inconsistent with the T schema or the principle…Read more
-
Perspectives on the Philosophy of William P. AlstonTijdschrift Voor Filosofie 69 (4): 750-751. 2007.One of the most influential analytic philosophers of the late twentieth century, William P. Alston is a leading light in epistemology, philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of language. In this volume, twelve leading philosophers critically discuss the central topics of his work in these areas, including perception, epistemic circularity, justification, the problem of religious diversity, and truth
-
77Extending Wittgenstein: The pivotal move from epistemology to the sociology of scienceIn Andrew Pickering (ed.), Science as Practice and Culture, University of Chicago Press. pp. 215--265. 1992.
-
1648Epistemic Arrogance and Political DissentIn Voicing Dissent, Routledge. forthcoming.In this essay, I examine four different reasons for thinking that political dissent has epistemic value. The realization of this epistemic value hinges in part on what I’ll loosely call the epistemic environment, or the environment in which individuals come to believe, reason, inquire, and debate. In particular, to the degree that our social practices encourage and even embody an attitude of epistemic arrogance, the epistemic value of dissent will be difficult to realize. Ironically, it is preci…Read more
-
806From one to many: recent work on truthAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4): 323-340. 2016.In this paper, we offer a brief, critical survey of contemporary work on truth. We begin by reflecting on the distinction between substantivist and deflationary truth theories. We then turn to three new kinds of truth theory—Kevin Scharp's replacement theory, John MacFarlane's relativism, and the alethic pluralism pioneered by Michael Lynch and Crispin Wright. We argue that despite their considerable differences, these theories exhibit a common "pluralizing tendency" with respect to truth. In th…Read more
-
12Perspectives on the Philosophy of William P. Alston (edited book)Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2005.One of the most influential analytic philosophers of the late twentieth century, William P. Alston is a leading light in epistemology, philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of language. In this volume, twelve leading philosophers critically discuss the central topics of his work in these areas, including perception, epistemic circularity, justification, the problem of religious diversity, and truth.
-
151The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives (edited book)MIT Press. 2001.These essays center around two questions: Does truth have an underlying nature? And if so, what sort of nature does it have?
-
158Truth and multiple realizabilityAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3). 2004.Pluralism about truth is the view that there is more than one way for a proposition to be true. When taken to imply that there is more than one concept and property of truth, this position faces a number of troubling objections. I argue that we can overcome these objections, and yet retain pluralism's key insight, by taking truth to be a multiply realizable property of propositions.
-
104Neuromedia, extended knowledge and understandingPhilosophical Issues 24 (1): 299-313. 2014.Imagine you had the functions of your smartphone miniaturized to a cellular level and accessible by your neural network. Reflection on this possibility suggests that we should not just concern ourselves with whether our knowledge is extending “out” to our devices; our devices are extending in, and with them, possibly the information that they bring. If so, then the question of whether knowledge is “extended” becomes wrapped up with the question of whether knowing is something we do, or something…Read more
-
1Epistemic Circularity and Epistemic DisagreementIn Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Social Epistemology, Oxford University Press. 2008.
-
267Zombies and the case of the phenomenal pickpocketSynthese 149 (1): 37-58. 2006.A prevailing view in contemporary philosophy of mind is that zombies are logically possible. I argue, via a thought experiment, that if this prevailing view is correct, then I could be transformed into a zombie. If I could be transformed into a zombie, then surprisingly, I am not certain that I am conscious. Regrettably, this is not just an idiosyncratic fact about my psychology; I think you are in the same position. This means that we must revise or replace some important positions in the philo…Read more
-
107Alethic pluralism, logical consequence, and the universality of reasonMidwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1): 122-140. 2008.No Abstract
-
85Three questions for truth pluralismIn Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates, Oxford University Press. pp. 21. 2012.
-
212Epistemic commitments, epistemic agency and practical reasonsPhilosophical Issues 23 (1): 343-362. 2013.In this paper, I raise two questions about epistemic commitments, and thus, indirectly, about our epistemic agency. Can we rationally defend such commitments when challenged to do so? And if so, how?
-
21Truth in EthicsIn Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Blackwell. 2013.
-
114Relativity of Fact and ContentSouthern Journal of Philosophy 37 (4): 579-595. 1999.A common strategy amongst realists grants relativism at the level of language or thought but denies it at the level of fact. Their point is that even if our concept of an object is relative to a conceptual scheme, it doesn't follow that objects themselves are relative to conceptual schemes. This is a sensible point. But in this paper I present a simple argument for the conclusion that it is false. According to what I call the T-argument, relativism about content entails a relativism about fact
-
55In Praise of Reason: Why Rationality Matters for DemocracyMIT Press. 2012.Why does reason matter, if in the end everything comes down to blind faith or gut instinct? Why not just go with what you believe even if it contradicts the evidence? Why bother with rational explanation when name-calling, manipulation, and force are so much more effective in our current cultural and political landscape? Michael Lynch's In Praise of Reason offers a spirited defense of reason and rationality in an era of widespread skepticism--when, for example, people reject scientific evidence …Read more
-
638Deception and the Nature of TruthIn Clancy W. Martin (ed.), The Philosophy of Deception, Oxford University Press. pp. 188. 2009.
-
Thoughts, the World and Everything in BetweenPhilosophical News 2. 2011.Two of the biggest problems faced by deflationary theories of truth are these: First, how can such views, drawing on such limited resources as they do, provide an adequate and meaningful definition of truth? And second, how can such views be reconciled with our intuition that truth involves a correspondence between thought and world? Christopher Hill has recently claimed that a broadly deflationary view of truth he calls substitutionalism can solve both problems. In this discussion, I argue that…Read more
-
485A coherent moral relativismSynthese 166 (2). 2009.Moral relativism is an attractive position, but also one that it is difficult to formulate. In this paper, we propose an alternative way of formulating moral relativism that locates the relativity of morality in the property that makes moral claims true. Such an approach, we believe, has significant advantages over other possible ways of formulating moral relativism. We conclude by considering a few problems such a position might face.
-
186Truth as one and manyClarendon Press. 2009.What is truth? Michael Lynch defends a bold new answer to this question. Traditional theories of truth hold that truth has only a single uniform nature. All truths are true in the same way. More recent deflationary theories claim that truth has no nature at all; the concept of truth is of no real philosophical importance. In this concise and clearly written book, Lynch argues that we should reject both these extremes and hold that truth is a functional property. To understand truth we must under…Read more
-
On the True and the RealDissertation, Syracuse University. 1995.I argue for the consistency of the following views. First, there can be irreconcilable but equally true ways to categorize or "carve up" the world into objects; second, truth is an objective concept. In short, I claim that one can be a metaphysical pluralist, but an absolutist about truth. ;The first part of the work is taken up with explaining metaphysical pluralism. This is said to be the thesis that all propositions and all facts are relative to conceptual schemes. Thus, the pluralist can mai…Read more
-
30Empiricus, Sextus. The Skeptic Way: Sextus Empiricus's Outlines oj Pyrrhonism (review)Review of Metaphysics 50 (4): 886-887. 1997.
-
University of ConnecticutDepartment of PhilosophyBoard of Trustees Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Provost Professor of The Humanities
APA Eastern Division
Areas of Specialization
Social Epistemology |
Social and Political Philosophy |
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Language |
Areas of Interest
Political Epistemology |
Truth |
Internet |
Social and Political Philosophy |