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614Why Worry about Epistemic Circularity?Journal of Philosophical Research 41 (9999): 33-52. 2016.Although Alston believed epistemically circular arguments were able to justify their conclusions, he was also disquieted by them. We will argue that Alston was right to be disquieted. We explain Alston’s view of epistemic circularity, the considerations that led him to accept it, and the purposes he thought epistemically circular arguments could serve. We then build on some of Alston’s remarks and introduce further limits to the usefulness of such arguments and introduce a new problem that stems…Read more
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60Truth as One and Many * By Michael Lynch (review)Analysis 70 (1): 191-193. 2010.In Truth as One and Many, Michael Lynch offers a new theory of truth. There are two kinds of theory of truth in the literature. On the one hand, we have logical theories, which seek to construct formal systems that are consistent, while also containing a predicate which have as many as possible of the properties which we ordinarily take the English predicate ‘is true’ to have; salient examples include Tarski’s and Kripke’s theories of truth. On the other hand, we have metaphysical theories, whic…Read more
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27Truth, Value and Epistemic ExpressivismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1): 76-97. 2009.
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5The Elusive Nature of TruthPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology 4 (2): 229-256. 2000.In this essay, I present a new argument for the impossibility of defining truth by specifying the underlying structural property all and only true propositions have in common The set of considerations I use to support this claim take as that inspiration Alston's recent argument that it is impossible to define truth epistemically—in terms of justification or warrant According to what Alston calls the “intensional argument”, epistemic definitions are inconsistent with the T schema or the principle…Read more
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Perspectives on the Philosophy of William P. AlstonTijdschrift Voor Filosofie 69 (4): 750-751. 2007.One of the most influential analytic philosophers of the late twentieth century, William P. Alston is a leading light in epistemology, philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of language. In this volume, twelve leading philosophers critically discuss the central topics of his work in these areas, including perception, epistemic circularity, justification, the problem of religious diversity, and truth
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77Extending Wittgenstein: The pivotal move from epistemology to the sociology of scienceIn Andrew Pickering (ed.), Science as Practice and Culture, University of Chicago Press. pp. 215--265. 1992.
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1615Epistemic Arrogance and Political DissentIn Voicing Dissent, Routledge. forthcoming.In this essay, I examine four different reasons for thinking that political dissent has epistemic value. The realization of this epistemic value hinges in part on what I’ll loosely call the epistemic environment, or the environment in which individuals come to believe, reason, inquire, and debate. In particular, to the degree that our social practices encourage and even embody an attitude of epistemic arrogance, the epistemic value of dissent will be difficult to realize. Ironically, it is preci…Read more
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799From one to many: recent work on truthAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4): 323-340. 2016.In this paper, we offer a brief, critical survey of contemporary work on truth. We begin by reflecting on the distinction between substantivist and deflationary truth theories. We then turn to three new kinds of truth theory—Kevin Scharp's replacement theory, John MacFarlane's relativism, and the alethic pluralism pioneered by Michael Lynch and Crispin Wright. We argue that despite their considerable differences, these theories exhibit a common "pluralizing tendency" with respect to truth. In th…Read more
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359Truth and Freedom: Rorty and the Problem of PriorityThe European Legacy 19 (2): 163-173. 2014.What does truth have to do with freedom? That is, what is the relationship between our political and epistemic principles? In this paper, I grapple and reject Rorty's reasons for thinking that the former can't be based on the latter, but offer an alternative argument that supports his over-all conclusion that our epistemic and political values are ultimately intertwined.
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19The values of truth and the truth of valuesIn Pritchard, Haddock & MIllar (eds.), Epistemic Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 225--42. 2009.
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81Truth Pluralism, Truth Relativism and Truth-aptnessCroatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (2): 149-158. 2011.In this paper, I make two points about Richard’s truth relativism. First, I argue his truth relativism is at odds with his account of truth-aptness. Second, I argue that his truth relativism commits him to a form of pluralism about truth.
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47Truth in Context: An Essay on Pluralism and ObjectivityMIT Press. 1998.A Choice Outstanding Academic Title for 1999 Academic debates about pluralism and truth have become increasingly polarized in recent years. One side embraces extreme relativism, deeming any talk of objective truth as philosophically naïve. The opposition, frequently arguing that any sort of relativism leads to nihilism, insists on an objective notion of truth according to which there is only one true story of the world. Both sides agree that there is no middle path. In Truth in Context, Michael …Read more
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98Sensations and pain processesPhilosophical Psychology 13 (3): 299-311. 2000.This paper discusses recent neuroscientific research that indicates a solution for what we label the ''causal problem'' of pain qualia, the problem of how the brain generates pain qualia. In particular, the data suggest that pain qualia naturally supervene on activity in a specific brain region: the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). The first section of this paper discusses several philosophical concerns regarding the nature of pain qualia. The second section overviews the current state of knowle…Read more
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64In Praise of ReasonMIT Press. 2012.Can we give objective reasons for our most basic standards of reason-- our fundamental epistemic principles? I argue, against several forms of skepticism about reason, that we can, but that the reasons we can give for epistemic principles are ultimately practical, not epistemic.
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The Truth of Values and the Values of Truth'In Pritchard, Haddock & MIllar (eds.), Epistemic Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2009.
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10Perspectives on the Philosophy of William P. Alston (edited book)Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2005.One of the most influential analytic philosophers of the late twentieth century, William P. Alston is a leading light in epistemology, philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of language. In this volume, twelve leading philosophers critically discuss the central topics of his work in these areas, including perception, epistemic circularity, justification, the problem of religious diversity, and truth.
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149The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives (edited book)MIT Press. 2001.These essays center around two questions: Does truth have an underlying nature? And if so, what sort of nature does it have?
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157Truth and multiple realizabilityAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3). 2004.Pluralism about truth is the view that there is more than one way for a proposition to be true. When taken to imply that there is more than one concept and property of truth, this position faces a number of troubling objections. I argue that we can overcome these objections, and yet retain pluralism's key insight, by taking truth to be a multiply realizable property of propositions.
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101Neuromedia, extended knowledge and understandingPhilosophical Issues 24 (1): 299-313. 2014.Imagine you had the functions of your smartphone miniaturized to a cellular level and accessible by your neural network. Reflection on this possibility suggests that we should not just concern ourselves with whether our knowledge is extending “out” to our devices; our devices are extending in, and with them, possibly the information that they bring. If so, then the question of whether knowledge is “extended” becomes wrapped up with the question of whether knowing is something we do, or something…Read more
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265Zombies and the case of the phenomenal pickpocketSynthese 149 (1): 37-58. 2006.A prevailing view in contemporary philosophy of mind is that zombies are logically possible. I argue, via a thought experiment, that if this prevailing view is correct, then I could be transformed into a zombie. If I could be transformed into a zombie, then surprisingly, I am not certain that I am conscious. Regrettably, this is not just an idiosyncratic fact about my psychology; I think you are in the same position. This means that we must revise or replace some important positions in the philo…Read more
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1Epistemic Circularity and Epistemic DisagreementIn Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology, Oxford University Press. 2010.
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84Three questions for truth pluralismIn Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates, Oxford University Press. pp. 21. 2012.
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University of ConnecticutDepartment of PhilosophyBoard of Trustees Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Provost Professor of The Humanities
APA Eastern Division
Areas of Specialization
Social Epistemology |
Social and Political Philosophy |
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Language |
Areas of Interest
Political Epistemology |
Truth |
Internet |
Social and Political Philosophy |