• PhilPapers
  • PhilPeople
  • PhilArchive
  • PhilEvents
  • PhilJobs
  • Sign in
PhilPeople
 
  • Sign in
  • News Feed
  • Find Philosophers
  • Departments
  • Radar
  • Help
 
profile-cover
Drag to reposition
profile picture

Ruth Millikan

University of Connecticut
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    163
    • Most Recent
    • Most Downloaded
    • Topics
  •  Events
    12
  •  News and Updates
    80

 More details
  • University of Connecticut
    Department of Philosophy
    Retired faculty
Email (login required)
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
  • All publications (163)
  •  146
    Naturalist Reflections on Knowledge
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65 (4): 315-334. 1984.
    Naturalized Epistemology
  •  138
    Teleological Theories of mental content
    In Lynn Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Nature Publishing Group. 2003.
    Teleological Accounts of Mental Content
  •  1
    Chapter 13
    The Jean-Nicod Lectures 2002
  •  121
    Knowing What I'm Thinking Of
    with Andrew Woodfield
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 67 (1): 91-124. 1993.
    Varieties of KnowledgeSelf-Knowledge, MiscKnowledge-WhMeaning
  •  200
    Seismograph Readings for explaining behavior
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4): 807-812. 1990.
    Explanatory Role of Content
  •  284
    Styles of Rationality
    In Susan Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals?, Oxford University Press. 2006.
    By whatever general principles and mechanisms animal behavior is governed, human behavior control rides piggyback on top of the same or very similar mechanisms. We have reflexes. We can be conditioned. The movements that make up our smaller actions are mostly caught up in perception-action cycles following perceived Gibsonian affordances. Still, without doubt there are levels of behavior control that are peculiar to humans. Following Aristotle, tradition has it that what is added in humans is ra…Read more
    By whatever general principles and mechanisms animal behavior is governed, human behavior control rides piggyback on top of the same or very similar mechanisms. We have reflexes. We can be conditioned. The movements that make up our smaller actions are mostly caught up in perception-action cycles following perceived Gibsonian affordances. Still, without doubt there are levels of behavior control that are peculiar to humans. Following Aristotle, tradition has it that what is added in humans is rationality ("rational soul"). Rationality, however, can be and has been characterized in many different ways. I am going to speculate about two different kinds of cognitive capacities that we humans seem to have, each of which is at least akin to rationality as Aristotle described it. The first I believe we share with many other animals, the second perhaps with none. Since this session of the conference on rational animals has been designated a "brainstorming" session, I will take philosopher's license, presenting no more than the softest sort of intuitive evidence for these ideas
    RationalityRationality and Cognitive Science
  • Intensjonalność
    Przeglad Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria 65. 2008.
    (tłum. Katarzyna Paprzycka)
  •  281
    Representations, targets and attitudes
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1): 103-111. 2000.
    Inferentialist Accounts of Meaning and Content
  • Bibliography
    Bibliography of *Varieties of Meaning*.
  •  232
    Words, concepts, and entities: With enemies like these, I don't need friends
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1): 89-100. 1998.
    A number of clarifications of the target article and some corrections are made. I clarify which concepts the thesis was intended to be about, what “descriptionism” means, the difference between “concepts” and “conceptions,” and why extensions are not determined by conceptions. I clarify the meaning of “substances,” how one knows what inductions to project over them, the connection with “basic level categories,” how it is determined what substance a given substance concept is of, how equivocation…Read more
    A number of clarifications of the target article and some corrections are made. I clarify which concepts the thesis was intended to be about, what “descriptionism” means, the difference between “concepts” and “conceptions,” and why extensions are not determined by conceptions. I clarify the meaning of “substances,” how one knows what inductions to project over them, the connection with “basic level categories,” how it is determined what substance a given substance concept is of, how equivocation in concepts occurs, and the role of language in the conception of substances. Finally, I clarify exactly why I said that concepts of individuals, real kinds, and stuffs have “a common structure,”.
    Recognitional ConceptsPhilosophy of Cognitive ScienceAtomist Theories of ConceptsMental Files
  • Explanation
    In Biopsychology in Mental Causation, Clarendon Press. 1993.
    Psychological Explanation
  •  207
    Purposes and Cross-Purposes: On the Evolution of Languages and Language
    The Monist 84 (3): 392-416. 2001.
    §1. Both the human capacity for language and individual languages have evolved, in part, by natural selection. This paper considers certain aspects and consequences of this, concerning, among other things, the semanticspragmatics distinction.
  •  2
    A bet with Peacocke
    In Cynthia MacDonald & Graham MacDonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation, Blackwell. pp. 285--292. 1994.
    IntentionalityInferential Theories of Concepts
  • Prev.
  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • 4
  • 5
  • 6
  • Next
PhilPeople logo

On this site

  • Find a philosopher
  • Find a department
  • The Radar
  • Index of professional philosophers
  • Index of departments
  • Help
  • Acknowledgments
  • Careers
  • Contact us
  • Terms and conditions

Brought to you by

  • The PhilPapers Foundation
  • The American Philosophical Association
  • Centre for Digital Philosophy, Western University
PhilPeople is currently in Beta Sponsored by the PhilPapers Foundation and the American Philosophical Association
Feedback