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86Moral repair: Reconstructing moral relations after wrongdoing – by Margaret urban WalkerTheoria 74 (2): 169-172. 2008.No Abstract
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69Good-making and organic unityPhilosophical Studies 174 (6): 1499-1516. 2017.Since G. E. Moore introduced his concept of organic unity there has been some discussion of how one should best understand this notion and whether there actually are any organic unities in the Moorean sense. Such discussions do however often put general questions about part-whole relations to the side and tend to focus on interpreting our intuitive responses to possible cases of organic unity. In this paper the focus lies on the part-whole relation in valuable wholes and it is suggested that we …Read more
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23Evidence-Based Policymaking under Exceptional CircumstancesIn Nils-Eric Sahlin (ed.), Science and Proven Experience, Media-tryck. pp. 29-38. 2021.
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115Future generations as rightholdersCritical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 19 (6): 680-698. 2016.
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112Ethical Theories and the Transparency ConditionEthical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5): 449-462. 2009.Following John Rawls, writers like Bernard Williams and Christine Korsgaard have suggested that a transparency condition should be put on ethical theories. The exact nature of such a condition and its implications is however not anything on which there is any consensus. It is argued here that the ultimate rationale of transparency conditions is epistemic rather than substantively moral, but also that it clearly connects to substantive concerns about moral psychology. Finally, it is argued that o…Read more
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196Goodness, Values, ReasonsEthical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4): 329-343. 2009.Contemporary value theory has been characterized by a renewed interest in the analysis of concepts like "good" or "valuable", the most prominent pattern of analysis in recent years being the socalled buck-passing or fitting-attitude analysis which reduces goodness to a matter of having properties that provide reasons for pro-attitudes. Here I argue that such analyses are best understood as metaphysical rather than linguistic and that while the buck-passing analysis has some virtues, it still fai…Read more
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7Commentary to Transforming Incentives [paper by Barbara Herman]In Åsa Carlson (ed.), Philosophical Aspects on Emotions, . 2004.is not available.
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35Rawlsian Constructivism: A Practical Guide to Reflective EquilibriumThe Journal of Ethics 24 (3): 355-373. 2020.Many normative theorists want to contribute to making the world a better place. In recent years, it has been suggested that to realise this ambition one must start with an adequate description of real-life practices. To determine what should be done, however, one must also fundamentally criticise existing moral beliefs. The method of reflective equilibrium offers a way of doing both. Yet, its practical usefulness has been doubted and it has been largely ignored in the recent practical turn of no…Read more
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109Excellence and means: On the limits of buck-passingJournal of Value Inquiry 42 (3): 301-315. 2008.The article explores the limits of buck-passing analysis in evaluating value or goodness. It talks about the inability of back-passers to account for two important types of value or goodness, which include excellence and means. The use of delimiting strategy in buck-passing analysis in order to be in possession of goodness is discussed.
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57Contested Institutional FactsErkenntnis 84 (5): 1047-1064. 2019.A significant part of contemporary social ontology has been focused on understanding forms of collective intentionality. It is suggested in this paper that the contested nature of some institutional matters makes this kind of approach problematic, and instead an alternative approach is developed, one that is oriented towards a micro-level analysis of the institutional constraints that we face in everyday life and which can make sense of how there can be institutional facts that are deeply contes…Read more
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63Rules and ExceptionsTheoria 65 (2-3): 127-143. 1999.Over the last decades the traditional emphasis on moral rules, or principles, has been attacked by particularists like Jonathan Dancy. I argue that particularists are correct in rejecting traditional attempts at moral codification, but that it is still possible to have a rule-oriented approach to morality if we distinguish between different ways in which features can be morally relevant. I suggest that there are first a limited number of features that can serve as basic moral reasons for action,…Read more
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Stockholm UniversityRegular Faculty
Areas of Specialization
Social Ontology, Misc |
Social and Political Philosophy |
Normative Ethics, Miscellaneous |