Pauline Phemister

I have awaited Professor Kulstad’s new book since Philosophia first announced its forthcoming publication in 1989. The wait perhaps increased my expectations, but now, with book in hand, I am in no way disappointed. The book concerns Leibniz’s views on apperception, consciousness and reflection. These concepts play important roles in Leibniz’s metaphysics. Scholars on the continent at the turn of the century recognized this, but anglo-american Leibnizians generally did not, although recently the issues have attracted the attention of McRae, Jolley and Rescher.

In the present book, Pauline Phemister argues against traditional Anglo-American interpretations of Leibniz as an idealist who conceives ultimate reality as a plurality of mind-like immaterial beings and for whom physical bodies are ultimately unreal and our perceptions of them illusory. Re-reading the texts without the prior assumption of idealism allows the more material aspects of Leibniz's metaphysics to emerge. Leibniz is found to advance a synthesis of idealism and materialism. His ontology posits indivisible, living, animal-like corporeal substances as the real metaphysical constituents of the universe; his epistemology combines sense-experience and reason; and his ethics fuses confused perceptions and insensible appetites with distinct perceptions and rational choice. In the light of his sustained commitment to the reality of bodies, Phemister re-examines his dynamics, the doctrine of pre-established harmony and his views on freedom. The image of Leibniz as a rationalist philosopher who values activity and reason over passivity and sense-experience is replaced by the one of a philosopher who recognises that, in the created world, there can only be activity if there is also passivity; minds, souls and forms if there is also matter; good if there is evil; perfection if there is imperfection.

Dieser Aufsatz hält es für angeraten, einen bisher vernachlässigten Aspekt der Leibnizschen Gedanken bezüglich der Willensfreiheit, nämlich die Rolle der Rationalität, näher zu betrachten. Von den drei für die Freiheit notwendigen Bedingungen gehört nur die Rationalität all denjenigen Menschen, die frei sind, und ihnen ausschließlich an. Kontingenz und Spontaneität können die Handlungen unfreier Menschen kennzeichnen. Die Rolle der Rationalität erscheint in klarem licht, wenn man sie in die Reihe folgender zueinander in Beziehung stehender Konzepte stellt: Kraft, Wahrnehmung, Tätigsein, Vollkommenheit, Schönheit, Weisheit, Liebe, Gerechtigkeit, Glück. Kritische Bemerkungen und im Sinne Leibnizens gegebene Antworten gegen Ende dieses Aufsatzes dienen nicht nur dem Zweck, Leibniz' Stellung zu beurteilen, sondern auch dem Zweck, seine Gedanken bezüglich dieses Themas näher zu erläutern

I have awaited Professor Kulstad’s new book since Philosophia first announced its forthcoming publication in 1989. The wait perhaps increased my expectations, but now, with book in hand, I am in no way disappointed. The book concerns Leibniz’s views on apperception, consciousness and reflection. These concepts play important roles in Leibniz’s metaphysics. Scholars on the continent at the turn of the century recognized this, but anglo-american Leibnizians generally did not, although recently the issues have attracted the attention of McRae, Jolley and Rescher.

The privacy, real or illusory, afforded by the personal letter allows each participant the philosophical freedom to explore a range of possible opinions, to experiment with different ideas, to hesitate, and to change his or her mind in ways that published articles and books discourage. The private letter also allows the use of language and style of writing to be altered to suit the particular recipient. This is especially evident in Leibniz's correspondence with Des Bosses. Sometimes, however, the intended recipient is not the addressee, as when Leibniz engaged with Locke through Thomas Burnett of Kemney. This situation was not an isolated occurrence in Leibniz's dealings with Locke. In this chapter, we shall see how Leibniz attempted to engage with Locke through a second correspondence and how he adapted the style and presentation of his views, not for the main correspondent, Lady Masham, but for the other intended recipient. We shall also see that the views Leibniz presents confirm his loyalty during this period to an ontology of embodied, perceiving substances. The correspondence with Damaris Masham began shortly after Lady Masham sent Leibniz a copy of her father's The True Intellectual System of the Universe (TIS) at the end of 1703. Learning that the book was on its way, Leibniz's first letter was intended to thank her in advance.

This fresh and innovative approach to human-environmental relations will revolutionise our understanding of the boundaries between ourselves and the environment we inhabit. The anthology is predicated on the notion that values shift back and forth between humans and the world around them in an ethical communicative zone called ‘value-space’. The contributors examine the transformative interplay between external environments and human values, and identify concrete ways in which these norms, residing in and derived from self and society, are projected onto the environment.

This article examines the history of ideas during the early modern period. René Descartes extended the term idea to include sensation, imagination, and memory and located ideas in the human intellect. Not all philosophers agreed with him, and among the most prominent resistors were Baruch Spinoza and Nicolas Malebranche. Spinoza viewed ideas as modes of God insofar as God possesses the attribute of thought. Malebranche too insisted on retaining the pre-Cartesian opinion that ideas exist in God and not in human minds.