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22Ontology and ideology of behaviorism and mentalismBehavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4): 640. 1984.
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57A deflated intentionalist alternative to Clark's unexplanatory metaphysicsPhilosophical Psychology 17 (4): 519-540. 2004.Throughout his discussion, Clark speaks constantly of phenomenal and qualitative properties. But properties, like any other posited entities, ought to earn their explanatory keep, and this I don't think Clark's phenomenal or qualitative properties actually do. I argue that all the work he enlists for them could be done better by purely intentional contents of our sentient states; that is, they could better be regarded as mere intentional properties, not real ones. Clark eschews such intentionali…Read more
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50In Defense of FolieismCroatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (2): 177-202. 2008.According to the “Folieism” I have been recently defending, communication is a kind of folie à deux in which speakers and hearers enjoy a stable and innocuous illusion of producing and hearing standard linguistic entities (“SLE”s) that are seldom if ever actually produced. In the present paper, after summarizing the main points of the view, I defend it against efforts of Barber, Devitt and Miščević to rescue SLEs in terms of social, response-dependent proposals. I argue that their underlying err…Read more
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18The effect of contrast on affective ratings in normal and anhedonic subjectsIn Robert Schwartz (ed.), Perception, Blackwell. pp. 132. 2004.
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1Functionalism and the Emotions Explaining EmotionsIn Amélie Rorty (ed.), Explaining Emotions, University of California Press. 1980.
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5612. Toward a Computational Account of Akrasia and Self-DeceptionIn Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception, University of California Press. pp. 264-296. 1988.
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67Digging deeper for the a priori (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3). 2001.For all the inadequacies of empiricism that BonJour admirably sets out in his first three chapters, one wonders whether rationalism is any better off. I’m afraid I don’t find BonJour’s account reassuring. It seems to be precisely the one that has led so many to be wary of the a priori in the first place. I want here to reiterate the reasons for that wariness, and sketch what seems to me a more promising approach.
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SurvivalIn Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons, University of California Press. 1976.
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80XV*—Semantic Externalism and Conceptual CompetenceProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92 (1): 315-334. 1992.Georges Rey; XV*—Semantic Externalism and Conceptual Competence, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 92, Issue 1, 1 June 1992, Pages 315–334, https
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1What are mental images?In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, , Vol. 1981.
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20L4 The possibility of a naturalistic Cartesianism regarding intuitions and introspectionIn Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory?, Routledge. pp. 243. 2013.
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128Files and Singular Thoughts Without Objects or Acquaintance: The Prospects of Recanati’s “Actualism”Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2): 421-436. 2016.We argue that Recanati burdens his otherwise salutary “Mental File” account of singular thought with an “Actualist” assumption that he has inherited from the discussion of singular thought since at least Evans, according to which singular thoughts can only be about actual objects: apparent singular thoughts involving “empty” terms lack truth-valuable content. This assumption flies in the face of manifestly singular thoughts involving not only fictional and mistakenly postulated entities, such as…Read more
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90Innate a nd Learned: Carey, Mad Dog Nativism, and the Poverty of Stimuli and AnalogiesMind and Language 29 (2): 109-132. 2014.In her recent (2009) book, The Origins of Concepts, Susan Carey argues that what she calls ‘Quinean Bootstrapping’ and processes of analogy in children show that the expressive power of a mind can be increased in ways that refute Jerry Fodor's (1975, 2008) ‘Mad Dog’ view that all concepts are innate. I argue that it is doubtful any evidence about the manifestation of concepts in children will bear upon the logico-semantic issues of expressive power. Analogy and bootstrapping may be ways to bring…Read more
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3The intentional inexistence of language — but not carsIn Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 237-55. 2006.
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54(Even Higher-Order) Intentionality Without ConsciousnessRevue Internationale de Philosophie 1 (1): 51-78. 2008.
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1Sensational sentencesIn Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Philosophical and Psychological Essays, Blackwell. 1993.
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69Contemporary Philosophy of Mind: A Contentiously Classical ApproachWiley-Blackwell. 1997.This volume is an introduction to contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind. In particular, the author focuses on the controversial "eliminativist" and "instrumentalist" attacks - from philosophers such as of Quine, Dennett, and the Churchlands - on our ordinary concept of mind. In so doing, Rey offers an explication and defense of "mental realism", and shows how Fodor's representational theory of mind affords a compelling account of much of our ordinary mental talk of beliefs, hopes, and d…Read more
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10Resisting normativism in psychologyIn Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. 2007.“Intentional content,” as I understand it, is whatever serves as the object of “propositional” attitude verbs, such as “think,” “judge,” “represent,” “prefer” (whether or not these objects are “propositions”). These verbs are standardly used to pick out the intentional states invoked to explain the states and behavior of people and many animals. I shall take the “normativity of the intentional,” or “Normativism,” to be the claim that any adequate theory of intentional states involves considerati…Read more
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2Better to study human than world psychology - commentary on Galen Strawson's Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails PanpsychismJournal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11): 110-116. 2006.
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3Physicalism and psychology: A plea for a substantive philosophy of mindIn Carl Gillett & Barry Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents, Cambridge University Press. 2001.
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33An explanatory budget for connectionism and eliminativismIn Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.), Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 219--240. 1991.
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67Language, Music and MindPhilosophical Review 106 (4): 641. 1997.The central point of Raffman’s discussion is to distinguish the perception, knowledge, and effability of the standard chromatic “categorical” pitch events from what she calls “nuance” pitch events—events whose individuation is more fine-grained than C-events, and which seem to resist reliable, psychologically available categorization. Thus, two pitches a quarter-tone apart may be classified as the same C-event, even though they are different N-events. Experimental evidence suggests that whereas …Read more
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72The unavailability of what we mean: A reply to Quine, Fodor and LeporeIn Abraham Zvie Bar-On (ed.), Grazer Philosophische Studien, Distributed in the U.s.a. By Humanities Press. pp. 61-101. 1986.Fodor and LePore's attack on conceptual role semantics relies on Quine's attack on the traditional analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions, which in turn consists of four arguments: an attack on truth by convention; an appeal to revisability; a claim of confirmation holism; and a charge of explanatory vacuity. Once the different merits of these arguments are sorted out, their proper target can be seen to be not the Traditional Distinctions, but an implicit assumption about thei…Read more
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19Folk Psychology from the Standpoint of Conceptual AnalysisIn William T. O'Donohue & Richard F. Kitchener (eds.), The Philosophy of Psychology, Sage Publications. 1996.
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1Functionalism and the EmotionsIn A. O. Rorty (ed.), Explaining Emotions, Univ of California Pr. pp. 21. 1980.
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