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1312InnatenessIn Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen Stich (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.A survey of innateness in cognitive science, focusing on (1) what innateness might be, and (2) whether concepts might be innate.
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6Externalism and inexistence in early contentIn Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning, Walter De Gruyter. pp. 503-530. 2012.
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18Searle's misunderstandings of functionalism and strong AIIn John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence, Oxford University Press. pp. 201--225. 2003.
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42Chomsky, Intentionality, and a CRTTIn Louise M. Antony & Norbert Hornstein (eds.), Chomsky and His Critics, Blackwell. 2003.This chapter contains section titled: Introduction Chomsky's Commitment to CRTT Prospects and Problems of CRTT Technical Notions? Does Chomsky Need Intentionality? Chomsky's Dilemma.
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48Role, not content: Comments on David Rosenthal's "consciousness, content, and metacognitive judgments"Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2): 224-230. 2000.
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30Block's philosophical anosognosiaBehavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2): 266-267. 1995.Block's P-/A-consciousness distinction rules out P's involving a specific kind of cognitive access and commits him to a “strong” Pconsciousness. This not only confounds plausible research in the area but betrays an anosognosia about Wittgenstein's diagnosis about our philosophical “introspection” of mysterious inner processes.
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22Ontology and ideology of behaviorism and mentalismBehavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4): 640. 1984.
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57A deflated intentionalist alternative to Clark's unexplanatory metaphysicsPhilosophical Psychology 17 (4): 519-540. 2004.Throughout his discussion, Clark speaks constantly of phenomenal and qualitative properties. But properties, like any other posited entities, ought to earn their explanatory keep, and this I don't think Clark's phenomenal or qualitative properties actually do. I argue that all the work he enlists for them could be done better by purely intentional contents of our sentient states; that is, they could better be regarded as mere intentional properties, not real ones. Clark eschews such intentionali…Read more
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50In Defense of FolieismCroatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (2): 177-202. 2008.According to the “Folieism” I have been recently defending, communication is a kind of folie à deux in which speakers and hearers enjoy a stable and innocuous illusion of producing and hearing standard linguistic entities (“SLE”s) that are seldom if ever actually produced. In the present paper, after summarizing the main points of the view, I defend it against efforts of Barber, Devitt and Miščević to rescue SLEs in terms of social, response-dependent proposals. I argue that their underlying err…Read more
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18The effect of contrast on affective ratings in normal and anhedonic subjectsIn Robert Schwartz (ed.), Perception, Blackwell. pp. 132. 2004.
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1Functionalism and the Emotions Explaining EmotionsIn Amélie Rorty (ed.), Explaining Emotions, University of California Press. 1980.
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5612. Toward a Computational Account of Akrasia and Self-DeceptionIn Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception, University of California Press. pp. 264-296. 1988.
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67Digging deeper for the a priori (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3). 2001.For all the inadequacies of empiricism that BonJour admirably sets out in his first three chapters, one wonders whether rationalism is any better off. I’m afraid I don’t find BonJour’s account reassuring. It seems to be precisely the one that has led so many to be wary of the a priori in the first place. I want here to reiterate the reasons for that wariness, and sketch what seems to me a more promising approach.
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SurvivalIn Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons, University of California Press. 1976.
College Park, Maryland, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
20th Century Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |