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Georges Rey

University of Maryland, College Park
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    104
    • Most Recent
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    • Topics
  •  Events
    7
  •  News and Updates
    96

 More details
  • University of Maryland, College Park
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor Emeritus
College Park, Maryland, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind
20th Century Philosophy
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  • All publications (104)
  •  252
    Digging deeper for the a priori (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3). 2001.
    For all the inadequacies of empiricism that BonJour admirably sets out in his first three chapters, one wonders whether rationalism is any better off. I’m afraid I don’t find BonJour’s account reassuring. It seems to be precisely the one that has led so many to be wary of the a priori in the first place. I want here to reiterate the reasons for that wariness, and sketch what seems to me a more promising approach.
    RationalismThe A Priori
  • Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
    . 2003.
  •  429
    Concepts and stereotypes
    Cognition 15 (1-3): 237-62. 1983.
    Prototype and Exemplar Theories of ConceptsConcept PossessionPhilosophy of Cognitive ScienceEthics
  •  112
    Quinity, isotropy, and Wagnerian rapture
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1): 27-28. 1985.
    Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  •  28
    Millikan's compromised externalism
    In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge, De Gruyter. pp. 2--347. 2004.
    Content Internalism and Externalism, Misc
  • Wittgenstein, computationalism, and qualia
    In Roberto Casati & Barry Smith (eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences: Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg Am Wechsel, Austria 1993), Wien: Hölder-pichler-tempsky. 1994.
    Functionalism and QualiaLudwig WittgensteinComputationalism in Cognitive Science
  •  186
    A not "merely empirical" argument for the language of thought
    Philosophical Perspectives 9 201-22. 1995.
    The Language of Thought
  • Intentional content and a chomskian linguistics
    In Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of language, Oxford University Press. pp. 140--186. 2003.
    Psychological Reality in Linguistics
  •  92
    The lack of a case for mental duality
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (4): 733-734. 1983.
    Philosophy of Cognitive SciencePhilosophy of Consciousness
  •  2169
    Innateness
    with Steven Gross
    In Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Oxford University Press. 2012.
    A survey of innateness in cognitive science, focusing on (1) what innateness might be, and (2) whether concepts might be innate.
    Nativism in Cognitive Science, MiscConcepts, Misc
  •  107
    Explanation, not Experience: Commentary on John Campbell,Reference and Consciousness
    Philosophical Studies 126 (1): 131-143. 2005.
  •  72
    Sanity surrounded by madness
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1): 48-50. 1988.
    Philosophy of Cognitive SciencePhilosophy of Psychology
  •  112
    Contemporary Philosophy of Mind: A Contentiously Classical Approach
    Wiley-Blackwell. 1997.
    This volume is an introduction to contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind. In particular, the author focuses on the controversial "eliminativist" and "instrumentalist" attacks - from philosophers such as of Quine, Dennett, and the Churchlands - on our ordinary concept of mind. In so doing, Rey offers an explication and defense of "mental realism", and shows how Fodor's representational theory of mind affords a compelling account of much of our ordinary mental talk of beliefs, hopes, and d…Read more
    This volume is an introduction to contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind. In particular, the author focuses on the controversial "eliminativist" and "instrumentalist" attacks - from philosophers such as of Quine, Dennett, and the Churchlands - on our ordinary concept of mind. In so doing, Rey offers an explication and defense of "mental realism", and shows how Fodor's representational theory of mind affords a compelling account of much of our ordinary mental talk of beliefs, hopes, and desires.
    Philosophy of Mind, General Works
  •  111
    Review of Edouard Machery, Doing Without Concepts (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (7). 2009.
    ConceptsTheories of Concepts, Misc
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