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78A not "merely empirical" argument for the language of thoughtPhilosophical Perspectives 9 201-22. 1995.
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1349InnatenessIn Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Oxford University Press. 2012.A survey of innateness in cognitive science, focusing on (1) what innateness might be, and (2) whether concepts might be innate.
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18Searle's misunderstandings of functionalism and strong AIIn John Mark Bishop & John Preston (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence, Oxford University Press. pp. 201--225. 2002.
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6Externalism and inexistence in early contentIn Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning, Walter De Gruyter. pp. 503-530. 2012.
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48Role, not content: Comments on David Rosenthal's "consciousness, content, and metacognitive judgments"Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2): 224-230. 2000.
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42Chomsky, Intentionality, and a CRTTIn Louise M. Antony & Norbert Hornstein (eds.), Chomsky and His Critics, Wiley-blackwell. 2003.This chapter contains section titled: Introduction Chomsky's Commitment to CRTT Prospects and Problems of CRTT Technical Notions? Does Chomsky Need Intentionality? Chomsky's Dilemma.
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22Ontology and ideology of behaviorism and mentalismBehavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4): 640. 1984.
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34Block's philosophical anosognosiaBehavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2): 266-267. 1995.Block's P-/A-consciousness distinction rules out P's involving a specific kind of cognitive access and commits him to a “strong” Pconsciousness. This not only confounds plausible research in the area but betrays an anosognosia about Wittgenstein's diagnosis about our philosophical “introspection” of mysterious inner processes.
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63A deflated intentionalist alternative to Clark's unexplanatory metaphysicsPhilosophical Psychology 17 (4): 519-540. 2004.Throughout his discussion, Clark speaks constantly of phenomenal and qualitative properties. But properties, like any other posited entities, ought to earn their explanatory keep, and this I don't think Clark's phenomenal or qualitative properties actually do. I argue that all the work he enlists for them could be done better by purely intentional contents of our sentient states; that is, they could better be regarded as mere intentional properties, not real ones. Clark eschews such intentionali…Read more
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50In Defense of FolieismCroatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (2): 177-202. 2008.According to the “Folieism” I have been recently defending, communication is a kind of folie à deux in which speakers and hearers enjoy a stable and innocuous illusion of producing and hearing standard linguistic entities (“SLE”s) that are seldom if ever actually produced. In the present paper, after summarizing the main points of the view, I defend it against efforts of Barber, Devitt and Miščević to rescue SLEs in terms of social, response-dependent proposals. I argue that their underlying err…Read more
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5712. Toward a Computational Account of Akrasia and Self-DeceptionIn Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception, University of California Press. pp. 264-296. 1988.
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18The effect of contrast on affective ratings in normal and anhedonic subjectsIn Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception, Ridgeview Pub. Co. pp. 132. 1996.
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1Functionalism and the Emotions Explaining EmotionsIn Amélie Rorty (ed.), Explaining Emotions, University of California Press. 1980.
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67Digging deeper for the a priori (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3). 2001.For all the inadequacies of empiricism that BonJour admirably sets out in his first three chapters, one wonders whether rationalism is any better off. I’m afraid I don’t find BonJour’s account reassuring. It seems to be precisely the one that has led so many to be wary of the a priori in the first place. I want here to reiterate the reasons for that wariness, and sketch what seems to me a more promising approach.
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41XV*—Semantic Externalism and Conceptual CompetenceProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92 (1): 315-334. 1992.Georges Rey; XV*—Semantic Externalism and Conceptual Competence, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 92, Issue 1, 1 June 1992, Pages 315–334, https
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1What are mental images?In Ned Block (ed.), Readings In Philosophy Of Psychology, V, Harvard University Press. 1981.
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20L4 The possibility of a naturalistic Cartesianism regarding intuitions and introspectionIn Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory?, Routledge. pp. 243. 2013.
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3The intentional inexistence of language — but not carsIn Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 237-55. 2006.
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131Files and Singular Thoughts Without Objects or Acquaintance: The Prospects of Recanati’s “Actualism”Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2): 421-436. 2016.We argue that Recanati burdens his otherwise salutary “Mental File” account of singular thought with an “Actualist” assumption that he has inherited from the discussion of singular thought since at least Evans, according to which singular thoughts can only be about actual objects: apparent singular thoughts involving “empty” terms lack truth-valuable content. This assumption flies in the face of manifestly singular thoughts involving not only fictional and mistakenly postulated entities, such as…Read more
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95Innate a nd Learned: Carey, Mad Dog Nativism, and the Poverty of Stimuli and AnalogiesMind and Language 29 (2): 109-132. 2014.In her recent (2009) book, The Origins of Concepts, Susan Carey argues that what she calls ‘Quinean Bootstrapping’ and processes of analogy in children show that the expressive power of a mind can be increased in ways that refute Jerry Fodor's (1975, 2008) ‘Mad Dog’ view that all concepts are innate. I argue that it is doubtful any evidence about the manifestation of concepts in children will bear upon the logico-semantic issues of expressive power. Analogy and bootstrapping may be ways to bring…Read more
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1Sensational sentencesIn Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Philosophical and Psychological Essays, Blackwell. 1993.
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Philosophy of Cognitive Science |