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252Digging deeper for the a priori (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3). 2001.For all the inadequacies of empiricism that BonJour admirably sets out in his first three chapters, one wonders whether rationalism is any better off. I’m afraid I don’t find BonJour’s account reassuring. It seems to be precisely the one that has led so many to be wary of the a priori in the first place. I want here to reiterate the reasons for that wariness, and sketch what seems to me a more promising approach.
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Wittgenstein, computationalism, and qualiaIn Roberto Casati & Barry Smith (eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences: Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg Am Wechsel, Austria 1993), Wien: Hölder-pichler-tempsky. 1994.
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186A not "merely empirical" argument for the language of thoughtPhilosophical Perspectives 9 201-22. 1995.
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28Millikan's compromised externalismIn Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge, De Gruyter. pp. 2--347. 2004.
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2169InnatenessIn Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Oxford University Press. 2012.A survey of innateness in cognitive science, focusing on (1) what innateness might be, and (2) whether concepts might be innate.
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Intentional content and a chomskian linguisticsIn Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of language, Oxford University Press. pp. 140--186. 2003.
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107Explanation, not Experience: Commentary on John Campbell,Reference and ConsciousnessPhilosophical Studies 126 (1): 131-143. 2005.
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111Review of Edouard Machery, Doing Without Concepts (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (7). 2009.
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112Contemporary Philosophy of Mind: A Contentiously Classical ApproachWiley-Blackwell. 1997.This volume is an introduction to contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind. In particular, the author focuses on the controversial "eliminativist" and "instrumentalist" attacks - from philosophers such as of Quine, Dennett, and the Churchlands - on our ordinary concept of mind. In so doing, Rey offers an explication and defense of "mental realism", and shows how Fodor's representational theory of mind affords a compelling account of much of our ordinary mental talk of beliefs, hopes, and d…Read more
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Areas of Specialization
| Philosophy of Mind |
| 20th Century Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
| Philosophy of Mind |
| Philosophy of Cognitive Science |