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10Resisting normativism in psychologyIn Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. 2007.“Intentional content,” as I understand it, is whatever serves as the object of “propositional” attitude verbs, such as “think,” “judge,” “represent,” “prefer” (whether or not these objects are “propositions”). These verbs are standardly used to pick out the intentional states invoked to explain the states and behavior of people and many animals. I shall take the “normativity of the intentional,” or “Normativism,” to be the claim that any adequate theory of intentional states involves considerati…Read more
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2Better to study human than world psychology - commentary on Galen Strawson's Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails PanpsychismJournal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11): 110-116. 2006.
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3Physicalism and psychology: A plea for a substantive philosophy of mindIn Carl Gillett & Barry Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents, Cambridge University Press. 2001.
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33An explanatory budget for connectionism and eliminativismIn Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.), Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 219--240. 1991.
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67Language, Music and MindPhilosophical Review 106 (4): 641. 1997.The central point of Raffman’s discussion is to distinguish the perception, knowledge, and effability of the standard chromatic “categorical” pitch events from what she calls “nuance” pitch events—events whose individuation is more fine-grained than C-events, and which seem to resist reliable, psychologically available categorization. Thus, two pitches a quarter-tone apart may be classified as the same C-event, even though they are different N-events. Experimental evidence suggests that whereas …Read more
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74The unavailability of what we mean: A reply to Quine, Fodor and LeporeIn Abraham Zvie Bar-On (ed.), Grazer Philosophische Studien, Distributed in the U.s.a. By Humanities Press. pp. 61-101. 1986.Fodor and LePore's attack on conceptual role semantics relies on Quine's attack on the traditional analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions, which in turn consists of four arguments: an attack on truth by convention; an appeal to revisability; a claim of confirmation holism; and a charge of explanatory vacuity. Once the different merits of these arguments are sorted out, their proper target can be seen to be not the Traditional Distinctions, but an implicit assumption about thei…Read more
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1Functionalism and the EmotionsIn A. O. Rorty (ed.), Explaining Emotions, Univ of California Pr. pp. 21. 1980.
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26The Analytic/Synthetic DistinctionIn Peter Adamson (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2012.
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19Folk Psychology from the Standpoint of Conceptual AnalysisIn William T. O'Donohue & Richard F. Kitchener (eds.), The Philosophy of Psychology, Sage Publications. 1996.
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35Digging Deeper for the A PrioriPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3): 649-656. 2001.For all the inadequacies of empiricism that BonJour admirably sets out in his first three chapters, one wonders whether rationalism is any better off. I’m afraid I don’t find BonJour’s account reassuring. It seems to be precisely the one that has led so many to be wary of the a priori in the first place. I want here to reiterate the reasons for that wariness, and sketch what seems to me a more promising approach.
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38Constituent causation and the reality of mindBehavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4): 620-621. 1990.
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21Systematicity and intentional realism in honeybee navigationIn Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds, Cambridge University Press. pp. 72. 2009.
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3A question about consciousnessIn Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1986.
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12Millikan's compromised externalismIn Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge, De Gruyter. pp. 2--347. 2004.
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55We Are Not All ‘Self-Blind’: A Defense of a Modest IntrospectionismMind and Language 28 (3): 259-285. 2013.Shoemaker (1996) presented a priori arguments against the possibility of ‘self-blindness’, or the inability of someone, otherwise intelligent and possessed of mental concepts, to introspect any of her concurrent attitude states. Ironically enough, this seems to be a position that Gopnik (1993) and Carruthers (2006, 2008, 2009a,b) have proposed as not only possible, but as the actual human condition generally! According to this ‘Objectivist’ view, supposed introspection of one's attitudes is not …Read more
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Intentional content and a chomskian linguisticsIn Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of language, Oxford University Press. pp. 140--186. 2003.
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57Explanation, not Experience: Commentary on John Campbell,Reference and ConsciousnessPhilosophical Studies 126 (1): 131-143. 2005.
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56Review of Edouard Machery, Doing Without Concepts (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (7). 2009.
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30Better to study human than world psychologyJournal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11): 110-116. 2006.Commentary on Galen Strawson's 'Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism'.
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143Phenomenal content and the richness and determinacy of colour experienceJournal of Consciousness Studies 14 (9-10): 112-131. 2007.
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437What’s Really Going On in Searle’s “Chinese room‘Philosophical Studies 50 (September): 169-85. 1986.
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7Language of thoughtIn L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Nature Publishing Group. 2003.
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Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
20th Century Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |