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Wittgenstein, computationalism, and qualiaIn Roberto Casati & Barry Smith (eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences: Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg Am Wechsel, Austria 1993), Wien: Hölder-pichler-tempsky. 1994.
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129A reason for doubting the existence of consciousnessIn Richard J. Davidson, Gary E. Schwartz & D. H. Shapiro (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Regulation, Plenum. pp. 1--39. 1983.
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62The Rashness of Traditional Rationalism and EmpiricismCanadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (sup1): 227-258. 2004.
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2Metacognition and consciousness [Special issue]Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2 pt 1): 2000-0433. 2000.
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8I argue that, pace Chomsky (2000, 2003), standard theories of linguistic competence are committed to taking talk of representations seriously, in particular, to recognizing that the “of x” clause that invariably follows “representation” is a way of specifying that representation’s intentional content. One reason to insist upon intentional content in such cases is that the “x” in “of x” may not exist (as in "of Zeus"). This issue is especially relevant to linguistics since, recapitulating conside…Read more
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74Concepts versus conceptions (again)Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3): 221-222. 2010.Machery neglects the crucial role of concepts in psychological explanation, as well as the efforts of numerous of the last 40 years to provide an account of that role. He rightly calls attention to the wide variation in people's epistemic relations to concepts but fails to appreciate how externalist and kindred proposals offer the needed stability in concepts themselves that underlies that variation
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91Why Wittgenstein ought to have been a computationalist (and what a computationalist can gain from Wittgenstein)Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (9): 231-264. 2003.Wittgenstein’s views invite a modest, functionalist account of mental states and regularities, or more specifically a causal/computational, representational theory of the mind (CRTT). It is only by understandingWittgenstein’s remarks in the context of a theory like CRTT that his insights have any real force; and it is only by recognizing those insights that CRTT can begin to account for sensations and our thoughts about them. For instance, Wittgenstein’s (in)famous remark that “an inner process …Read more
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78A not "merely empirical" argument for the language of thoughtPhilosophical Perspectives 9 201-22. 1995.
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1349InnatenessIn Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Oxford University Press. 2012.A survey of innateness in cognitive science, focusing on (1) what innateness might be, and (2) whether concepts might be innate.
College Park, Maryland, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
20th Century Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |