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60Reasons for doubting the existence of even epiphenomenal consciousnessBehavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4): 691-692. 1991.
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Wittgenstein, computationalism, and qualiaIn Roberto Casati & Barry Smith (eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences: Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg Am Wechsel, Austria 1993), Wien: Hölder-pichler-tempsky. 1994.
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129A reason for doubting the existence of consciousnessIn Richard J. Davidson, Gary E. Schwartz & D. H. Shapiro (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Regulation, Plenum. pp. 1--39. 1983.
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81Mind, Intentionality and InexistenceCroatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (3): 389-415. 2005.The present article articulates the strategy of much of my work to date, which has been concerned to understand how we can possibly come to have any objective understanding of the mind. Generally, I align myself with those who think the best prospect of such an understanding lies in a causal/computational/representational theory of thought (CRTT). However, there is a tendency in recent developments of this and related philosophical views to burden the crucial property of intentionality with what…Read more
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62The Rashness of Traditional Rationalism and EmpiricismCanadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (sup1): 227-258. 2004.
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2Metacognition and consciousness [Special issue]Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2 pt 1): 2000-0433. 2000.
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8I argue that, pace Chomsky (2000, 2003), standard theories of linguistic competence are committed to taking talk of representations seriously, in particular, to recognizing that the “of x” clause that invariably follows “representation” is a way of specifying that representation’s intentional content. One reason to insist upon intentional content in such cases is that the “x” in “of x” may not exist (as in "of Zeus"). This issue is especially relevant to linguistics since, recapitulating conside…Read more
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74Concepts versus conceptions (again)Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3): 221-222. 2010.Machery neglects the crucial role of concepts in psychological explanation, as well as the efforts of numerous of the last 40 years to provide an account of that role. He rightly calls attention to the wide variation in people's epistemic relations to concepts but fails to appreciate how externalist and kindred proposals offer the needed stability in concepts themselves that underlies that variation
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91Why Wittgenstein ought to have been a computationalist (and what a computationalist can gain from Wittgenstein)Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (9): 231-264. 2003.Wittgenstein’s views invite a modest, functionalist account of mental states and regularities, or more specifically a causal/computational, representational theory of the mind (CRTT). It is only by understandingWittgenstein’s remarks in the context of a theory like CRTT that his insights have any real force; and it is only by recognizing those insights that CRTT can begin to account for sensations and our thoughts about them. For instance, Wittgenstein’s (in)famous remark that “an inner process …Read more
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78A not "merely empirical" argument for the language of thoughtPhilosophical Perspectives 9 201-22. 1995.
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1350InnatenessIn Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Oxford University Press. 2012.A survey of innateness in cognitive science, focusing on (1) what innateness might be, and (2) whether concepts might be innate.
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18Searle's misunderstandings of functionalism and strong AIIn John Mark Bishop & John Preston (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence, Oxford University Press. pp. 201--225. 2002.
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6Externalism and inexistence in early contentIn Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning, Walter De Gruyter. pp. 503-530. 2012.
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42Chomsky, Intentionality, and a CRTTIn Louise M. Antony & Norbert Hornstein (eds.), Chomsky and His Critics, Wiley-blackwell. 2003.This chapter contains section titled: Introduction Chomsky's Commitment to CRTT Prospects and Problems of CRTT Technical Notions? Does Chomsky Need Intentionality? Chomsky's Dilemma.
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48Role, not content: Comments on David Rosenthal's "consciousness, content, and metacognitive judgments"Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2): 224-230. 2000.
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34Block's philosophical anosognosiaBehavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2): 266-267. 1995.Block's P-/A-consciousness distinction rules out P's involving a specific kind of cognitive access and commits him to a “strong” Pconsciousness. This not only confounds plausible research in the area but betrays an anosognosia about Wittgenstein's diagnosis about our philosophical “introspection” of mysterious inner processes.
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22Ontology and ideology of behaviorism and mentalismBehavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4): 640. 1984.
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65A deflated intentionalist alternative to Clark's unexplanatory metaphysicsPhilosophical Psychology 17 (4): 519-540. 2004.Throughout his discussion, Clark speaks constantly of phenomenal and qualitative properties. But properties, like any other posited entities, ought to earn their explanatory keep, and this I don't think Clark's phenomenal or qualitative properties actually do. I argue that all the work he enlists for them could be done better by purely intentional contents of our sentient states; that is, they could better be regarded as mere intentional properties, not real ones. Clark eschews such intentionali…Read more
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Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
20th Century Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |