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26The Analytic/Synthetic DistinctionIn Ed Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2012.
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35Digging Deeper for the A PrioriPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3): 649-656. 2001.For all the inadequacies of empiricism that BonJour admirably sets out in his first three chapters, one wonders whether rationalism is any better off. I’m afraid I don’t find BonJour’s account reassuring. It seems to be precisely the one that has led so many to be wary of the a priori in the first place. I want here to reiterate the reasons for that wariness, and sketch what seems to me a more promising approach.
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21Systematicity and intentional realism in honeybee navigationIn Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds, Cambridge University Press. pp. 72. 2009.
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38Constituent causation and the reality of mindBehavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4): 620-621. 1990.
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56We Are Not All ‘Self‐Blind’: A Defense of a Modest IntrospectionismMind and Language 28 (3): 259-285. 2013.Shoemaker (1996) presenteda prioriarguments against the possibility of ‘self‐blindness’, or the inability of someone, otherwise intelligent and possessed of mental concepts, to introspect any of her concurrent attitude states. Ironically enough, this seems to be a position that Gopnik (1993) and Carruthers (2006, 2008, 2009a,b) have proposed as not only possible, but as the actual human condition generally! According to this ‘Objectivist’ view, supposed introspection of one's attitudes is not ‘d…Read more
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3A question about consciousnessIn Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1986.
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12Millikan's compromised externalismIn Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge, De Gruyter. pp. 2--347. 2004.
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Intentional content and a chomskian linguisticsIn Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of language, Oxford University Press. pp. 140--186. 2003.
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57Explanation, not Experience: Commentary on John Campbell,Reference and ConsciousnessPhilosophical Studies 126 (1): 131-143. 2005.
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57Review of Edouard Machery, Doing Without Concepts (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (7). 2009.
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437What’s Really Going On in Searle’s “Chinese room‘Philosophical Studies 50 (September): 169-85. 1986.
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30Better to study human than world psychologyJournal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11): 110-116. 2006.Commentary on Galen Strawson's 'Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism'.
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143Phenomenal content and the richness and determinacy of colour experienceJournal of Consciousness Studies 14 (9-10): 112-131. 2007.
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65The Unavailability of What We MeanGrazer Philosophische Studien 46 61-101. 1993.Fodor and LePore's attack on conceptual role semantics relies on Quine's attack on the traditional analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions, which in turn consists of four arguments: an attack on truth by convention; an appeal to revisability; a claim of confirmation holism; and a charge of explanatory vacuity. Once the different merits of these arguments are sorted out, their proper target can be seen to be not the Traditional Distinctions, but an implicit assumption about thei…Read more
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7Language of thoughtIn L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Nature Publishing Group. 2003.
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90Fodor's ingratitude and change of heart?Mind and Language 19 (1): 70-84. 2004.One would have thought that Fodor's justly famous computational views about the mind and his covariation approaches to content owed a lot to the twentieth century that he now reviles. On the other hand, a number of lines he pursues in the target article make one wonder whether he hasn’t perhaps changed his mind about those famous views. Specifically, I argue that his own theory of content is open to the very same objections he raises against ‘sorting’ theories, and that the supposed circularity …Read more
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120Toward a projectivist account of conscious experienceIn Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Ferdinand Schoningh. pp. 123--42. 1995.
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88Conventions, Intuitions and Linguistic Inexistents: A Reply to DevittCroatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3): 549-569. 2006.Elsewhere I have argued that standard theories of linguistic competence are committed to taking seriously talk of “representations of” standard linguistic entities (“SLEs”), such as NPs, VPs, morphemes, phonemes, syntactic and phonetic features. However, it is very doubtful there are tokens of these “things” in space and time. Moreover, even if were, their existence would be completely inessential to the needs of either communication or serious linguistic theory. Their existence is an illusion: …Read more
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60Reasons for doubting the existence of even epiphenomenal consciousnessBehavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4): 691-692. 1991.
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Wittgenstein, computationalism, and qualiaIn Roberto Casati, B. Smith & Stephen L. White (eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences: Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg Am Wechsel, Austria 1993), Holder-pichler-tempsky. 1994.
College Park, Maryland, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
20th Century Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |