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120Why Wittgenstein ought to have been a computationalist (and what a computationalist can gain from Wittgenstein)Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (9): 231-264. 2003.Wittgenstein’s views invite a modest, functionalist account of mental states and regularities, or more specifically a causal/computational, representational theory of the mind (CRTT). It is only by understandingWittgenstein’s remarks in the context of a theory like CRTT that his insights have any real force; and it is only by recognizing those insights that CRTT can begin to account for sensations and our thoughts about them. For instance, Wittgenstein’s (in)famous remark that “an inner process …Read more
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167A deflated intentionalist alternative to Clark's unexplanatory metaphysicsPhilosophical Psychology 17 (4): 519-540. 2004.Throughout his discussion, Clark speaks constantly of phenomenal and qualitative properties. But properties, like any other posited entities, ought to earn their explanatory keep, and this I don't think Clark's phenomenal or qualitative properties actually do. I argue that all the work he enlists for them could be done better by purely intentional contents of our sentient states; that is, they could better be regarded as mere intentional properties, not real ones. Clark eschews such intentionali…Read more
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7Language of thoughtIn Lynn Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Nature Publishing Group. 2003.
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155Fodor's ingratitude and change of heart?Mind and Language 19 (1): 70-84. 2004.One would have thought that Fodor's justly famous computational views about the mind and his covariation approaches to content owed a lot to the twentieth century that he now reviles. On the other hand, a number of lines he pursues in the target article make one wonder whether he hasn’t perhaps changed his mind about those famous views. Specifically, I argue that his own theory of content is open to the very same objections he raises against ‘sorting’ theories, and that the supposed circularity …Read more
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186Toward a projectivist account of conscious experienceIn Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Ferdinand Schoningh. pp. 123--42. 1995.
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18The effect of contrast on affective ratings in normal and anhedonic subjectsIn Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception, Ridgeview Pub. Co. pp. 132. 1996.
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90Constituent causation and the reality of mindBehavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4): 620-621. 1990.
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169Reasons for doubting the existence of even epiphenomenal consciousnessBehavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4): 691-692. 1991.
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120Mind, Intentionality and InexistenceCroatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (3): 389-415. 2005.The present article articulates the strategy of much of my work to date, which has been concerned to understand how we can possibly come to have any objective understanding of the mind. Generally, I align myself with those who think the best prospect of such an understanding lies in a causal/computational/representational theory of thought (CRTT). However, there is a tendency in recent developments of this and related philosophical views to burden the crucial property of intentionality with what…Read more
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192Files and Singular Thoughts Without Objects or Acquaintance: The Prospects of Recanati’s “Actualism”Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2): 421-436. 2016.We argue that Recanati burdens his otherwise salutary “Mental File” account of singular thought with an “Actualist” assumption that he has inherited from the discussion of singular thought since at least Evans, according to which singular thoughts can only be about actual objects: apparent singular thoughts involving “empty” terms lack truth-valuable content. This assumption flies in the face of manifestly singular thoughts involving not only fictional and mistakenly postulated entities, such as…Read more
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126The Rashness of Traditional Rationalism and EmpiricismCanadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (sup1): 227-258. 2004.
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8I argue that, pace Chomsky (2000, 2003), standard theories of linguistic competence are committed to taking talk of representations seriously, in particular, to recognizing that the “of x” clause that invariably follows “representation” is a way of specifying that representation’s intentional content. One reason to insist upon intentional content in such cases is that the “x” in “of x” may not exist (as in "of Zeus"). This issue is especially relevant to linguistics since, recapitulating conside…Read more
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61Better to study human than world psychologyJournal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11): 110-116. 2006.Commentary on Galen Strawson's 'Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism'.
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203XV*—Semantic Externalism and Conceptual CompetenceProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92 (1): 315-334. 1992.Georges Rey; XV*—Semantic Externalism and Conceptual Competence, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 92, Issue 1, 1 June 1992, Pages 315–334, https
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83An explanatory budget for connectionism and eliminativismIn Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.), Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 219--240. 1991.
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1What are mental images?In Ned Block (ed.), Readings In Philosophy Of Psychology, V, Harvard University Press. 1981.
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42Folk Psychology from the Standpoint of Conceptual AnalysisIn William O'Donohue & Richard F. Kitchener (eds.), The philosophy of psychology, Sage Publications. 1996.
College Park, Maryland, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
| Philosophy of Mind |
| 20th Century Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
| Philosophy of Mind |
| Philosophy of Cognitive Science |