Louise Antony

_In this compelling volume, ten distinguished thinkers -- William G. Lycan, Galen Strawson, Jeffrey Poland, Georges Rey, Frances Egan, Paul Horwich, Peter Ludlow, Paul Pietroski, Alison Gopnik, and Ruth Millikan -- address a variety of conceptual issues raised in Noam Chomsky's work._ Distinguished list of critics: William G. Lycan, Galen Strawson, Jeffrey Poland, Georges Rey, Frances Egan, Paul Horwich, Peter Ludlow, Paul Pietroski, Alison Gopnik, and Ruth Millikan. Includes Chomsky's substantial new replies and responses to each essay. The best critical introduction to Chomsky's thought as a whole.

Rae Langton holds that speech act theory can explain the “self-verifying” character of pornography. The chapter argues that this faces two problems. First, the account is inconsistent: it requires that pornography be simultaneously an _expositive_ speech act that _describes_ women as inferior, and a _verdictive/exercitive_ speech act that _brings it about_ that women are inferior. But no verdictive/exercitive speech act can describe the very state of affairs it brings about. Second, the account is inaccurate about the conditions necessary for the performance of a verdictive/exercitive speech act: that there must exist accepted background conventions giving the pornographer authority to render verdicts or to take executive action. Langton’s discussion conflates the normative notion of authority with a non-normative notion, namely _power_. The chapter concludes that speech act theory is inapt for Langton’s purpose, and that the familiar social constructionist notion of a “looping kind” better illuminates pornography’s role in maintaining gender oppression.

Jennifer Saul has argued recently that the demonstrated intrusion of implicit bias into reasoning tasks gives rise to a particularly pernicious form of skepticism—one that challenges not only our knowledge claims, but also our epistemic self-conceptions. I argue that the proper response to Saulish skepticism is to take a naturalistic view of knowledge and the mind. Doing so reveals, ironically, that bias is not always bad: it plays an essential and constructive role in the development of human knowledge. Understanding the salutary role biases play in human cognition affords us better tools for identifying the conditions under which pernicious biases form and operate. These conditions typically involve the exercise of healthy cognitive habits in the context of environments shaped by injustice.

Philosophical tradition distinguishes the “logical” argument from evil from the “evidential” argument from evil. The logical argument aims to show that theism _cannot_ be true, given the facts about suffering, while the evidential argument aims to show that theism is _very unlikely_ to be true, given the facts about suffering. There is a fairly wide consensus among today’s atheist philosophers that the logical argument is unsuccessful, and so the evidential argument has become the more popular strategy. Peter van Inwagen, however, does not care which argument the atheist deploys. He believes that he has developed a “defense” of theism powerful enough to work against any appeal to suffering whatsoever. This paper disputes this and intends to show that van Inwagen’s “defense” is no defense at all.

I distinguish two types of feminist projects within philosophy. One, which I call the “practicalist” project, aims simply to solve philosophical issues of concern to feminism, with no prior assumptions about the suitability of particular methods or theories. Another, which I call the “replacement” project, rejects certain methods or theories as too androcentric to serve feminist goals, and aims to replace them with “feminist” alternatives. I argue that we should abandon the replacement project. Because the replacement project depends on discrediting, rather than arguing against, the philosophical views to be replaced, it is potentially disrespectful to and exclusionary of feminists who happen to support the stigmatized view. The practicalist project, on the other hand, acknowledges that different feminists may find value in different places, even in work that is compromised by sexism. I illustrate my point by critically examining Jennifer Hornsby's arguments in favor of a certain view in the philosophy of language, and against another, on the grounds that the latter stems from “malestream” thinking. I argue that Hornsby's view is no less malestream than the view she rejects. I also argue that there are strong arguments in favor of the view she rejects, arguments that are obscured by her style of attack. Finally, I argue that the view Hornsby stigmatizes is actually more useful for feminist purposes than the view she favors. Thus, I conclude, there is justification for Hornsby's claim that hers is the more “feminist” philosophy of language.

I defend a lexical account of slurs against criticisms mounted by Stojnić and Lepore, and present positive reasons for preferring a lexical account over the articulation account they put forward. A lexical account, I argue, explains why articulations of a slur give offense: viz., they are recognized as articulations of a particular word. A lexical account also does better than the articulation account in explaining the naive acquisition and use of slurs, facts about mishearing and mispronouncing, the evolution of certain words into or away from status as slurs, and the fact that “reclaimed” slurring words still give offense when used as slurs.

_In this compelling volume, ten distinguished thinkers -- William G. Lycan, Galen Strawson, Jeffrey Poland, Georges Rey, Frances Egan, Paul Horwich, Peter Ludlow, Paul Pietroski, Alison Gopnik, and Ruth Millikan -- address a variety of conceptual issues raised in Noam Chomsky's work._ Distinguished list of critics: William G. Lycan, Galen Strawson, Jeffrey Poland, Georges Rey, Frances Egan, Paul Horwich, Peter Ludlow, Paul Pietroski, Alison Gopnik, and Ruth Millikan. Includes Chomsky's substantial new replies and responses to each essay. The best critical introduction to Chomsky's thought as a whole.

Atheists are frequently demonized as arrogant intellectuals, antagonistic to religion, devoid of moral sentiments, advocates of an "anything goes" lifestyle. Now, in this revealing volume, nineteen leading philosophers open a window on the inner life of atheism, shattering these common stereotypes as they reveal how they came to turn away from religious belief. These highly engaging personal essays capture the marvelous diversity to be found among atheists, providing a portrait that will surprise most readers. Many of the authors, for example, express great affection for particular religious traditions, even as they explain why they cannot, in good conscience, embrace them. None of the contributors dismiss religious belief as stupid or primitive, and several even express regret that they cannot, or can no longer, believe. Perhaps more important, in these reflective pieces, they offer fresh insight into some of the oldest and most difficult problems facing the human mind and spirit. For instance, if God is dead, is everything permitted? Philosophers without Gods demonstrates convincingly, with arguments that date back to Plato, that morality is independent of the existence of God. Indeed, every writer in this volume adamantly affirms the objectivity of right and wrong. Moreover, they contend that secular life can provide rewards as great and as rich as religious life. A naturalistic understanding of the human condition presents a set of challenges--to pursue our goals without illusions, to act morally without hope of reward--challenges that can impart a lasting value to finite and fragile human lives. Collectively, these essays highlight the richness of atheistic belief--not only as a valid alternative to religion, but as a profoundly fulfilling and moral way of life.

Jennifer Saul has argued recently that the demonstrated intrusion of implicit bias into reasoning tasks gives rise to a particularly pernicious form of skepticism—one that challenges not only our knowledge claims, but also our epistemic self-conceptions. I argue that the proper response to Saulish skepticism is to take a naturalistic view of knowledge and the mind. Doing so reveals, ironically, that bias is not always bad: it plays an essential and constructive role in the development of human knowledge. Understanding the salutary role biases play in human cognition affords us better tools for identifying the conditions under which pernicious biases form and operate. These conditions typically involve the exercise of healthy cognitive habits in the context of environments shaped by injustice.

Disputes between realists and non-realists about the nature of truth and objectivity have appeared intractable when stated in metaphysical terms. Michael Dummett has proposed that one can work one's way into these issues by considering the theoretical demands of an adequate account of meaning in a natural language. Specifically, he argues that questions about the nature of truth can be profitably recast as questions about the role of the notion of truth in a full explanation of human linguistic behavior. Dummett develops a specific conception of a meaning-theory for natural language--a conception driven by his view of language as a rational practice--and argues on the basis of this that a realist, i.e. non-epistemic, notion of truth is unacceptable. This thesis is an attempt to motivate, rationally reconstruct, and defend Dummett's conception. ;I begin by defending Dummett's characterization of realism in terms of commitment to classical logic. I then outline the formal adequacy requirements Dummett lays on a meaning-theory. These formal constraints follow, on Dummett's view, from more substantive requirements, namely that a meaning-theory be genuinely molecular and that a meaning-theory embody a substantive conception of truth. and derive, in turn, from Dummett's assumption that speakers possess a body of semantic knowledge which can be isolated and studied apart from the speaker's general empirical knowledge. I argue that it is the issue of the psychological reality of semantic knowledge that divides Dummett from truth-conditional theorists like Donald Davidson. The two constraints are discussed and defended separately. I conclude with a sketch of the sort of meaning-theory I believe Dummett to be envisioning, and in a brief coda, connect his meaning-theoretic conclusions with his metaphysical views.

Epistemological internalists have a problem about perceptual knowledge: how can perceptual experience both provide faithful information about the external world and justification for empirical belief? This is Sellars’s famous problem about “the given.” Chapter 12 argues, first, that this problem is not just for internalists—a version of it arises for naturalistic externalists. But, second, it argues that the problem can be solved within naturalistic bounds, by appealing to a category of causal relations called “intelligible causation.”

ABSTRACT There is currently a great deal of enthusiasm for projects known sometimes as “amelioration” and sometimes as “conceptual engineering.” Such projects advocate either the revision of existing concepts, or the intentional creation of new concepts. It is held by advocates of amelioration that projects of this sort are necessary for the accomplishment of a variety of social justice goals. So, for example, many feminist theorists hold that the concept WOMAN must be revised if we are to properly characterize and struggle against women’s oppression. With regard to these projects, I will argue for three theses: 1) Amelioration/Conceptual Engineering is impossible, because there is no conception of concepts which satisfies all the prerequisites for either change or intentional replacement; 2) Amelioration/Conceptual Engineering is undesirable, because if it were possible it would amount to pernicious thought-control; and 3) Amelioration/Conceptual Engineering is unnecessary, because our political goals can be conceived using existing concepts – having a concept of WOMAN does not commit us to any particular beliefs about women.

In a series of influential articles, Rae Langton has argued that Austinian speech-act theory can illuminate the way in which pornography contributes to the subordination of women. I will argue that Langton’s application of Austin is incorrect. In earlier work, I have argued against Langton’s view on the grounds that being subordinated is not the sort of condition that can be brought about through an illocutionary act. In this paper, however, I will set aside that objection and focus instead on Langton’s claims about the type of illocutionary act pornography might be. I will argue, first, that Langton cannot say what she wants to say about the content of pornography and still have it that pornography is a verdictive or exercitive speech act, in Austin’s sense. Verdictive and exercitive speech acts do not, and cannot describe the states of affairs they bring about. Second, I will argue that pornography does not in any case satisfy the conditions necessary for a speech act to be verdictive or exercitive. Specifically, there do not exist accepted background conventions that would give the pornographer authority to render verdicts or to take executive action. This objection to Langton’s view has been made before; I’ll show that her response to the objection betrays a confusion of authority with power.

In this revealing volume, nineteen leading philosophers open a window on the inner life of atheism, shattering common stereotypes as they reveal how they came to turn away from religious belief. These highly engaging personal essays capture the marvellous diversity to be found among atheists, providing a portrait that will surprise most readers. Many of the authors express great affection for particular religious traditions, even as they explain why they cannot embrace them. Philosophers Without Gods demonstrates convincingly, with arguments that date back to Plato, that morality is independent of the existence of God. Collectively, these essays highlight the richness of atheistic belief – not only as a valid alternative to religion, but as a profoundly fulfilling and moral way of life.