Marián Zouhar

The article contains several applications of the version of the historical theory of proper names presented in the previous article . They are designed to defend its epistemologically meager point of view . It is argued that the distinction between reference of an expression and that of a speaker which lies in the very heart of the theory enables one to handle with many well-known examples . Then bounds of referential uses of proper names are tested with respect to some other examples as well . The point is that the theory is neither too narrow nor too broad: it does not exclude, on the one hand, those uses of a name that are demonstrably referrential and it does not, on the other hand, count as referring clearly non-referrential “uses” of a name

Rigid designators designate whatever they do in all possible worlds. Mathematical definite descriptions are usually considered paradigmatic examples of such expressions. The main aim of the present paper is to challenge this view. It is argued that mathematical definite descriptions cannot be rigid in the same sense as ordinary empirical definite descriptions because—assuming that mathematical facts are not determined by goings on in possible worlds—mathematical descriptions designate whatever they do independently of possible worlds. Nevertheless, there is a widespread practice of treating mathematical definite descriptions as rigid. Apart from this, there might be theoretical reasons for admitting that they are rigid in some sense. The second part of the paper suggests a way out. Borrowing from ideas proposed by Kit Fine, it develops and defends an extended notion of rigidity, which can be applied to mathematical definite descriptions. Importantly, this notion is fully compatible with the claim that mathematical facts are independent of possible worlds.

The aim of the paper is to discuss the main characteristics exhibited by so-called rigid designators. Identification of proper names and some descriptions with rigidly designating expressions almost became a truism in the philosophy of language. It is argued that proper names are rigid designators because their reference is conventional, direct and nondescriptive but descriptions are such in spite of their reference being descriptive and mediated. Certain kinds of rigid designators and rigid reference are discriminated and it is found that unlike rigidly designating descriptions most of proper names must be tied to the idea of transworld reference in order to be rigid. The conclusion is that rigidly designating descriptions must be metaphysically loaded much more than proper names for the former presuppose a kind of essentialism

The historical theory is one of the most successful and elaborated theories dealing with the referential behaviour of proper names. The aim of the article is mainly a negative one. The introduction presents a general point of view concerning proper names and their place within a language. The second and the third parts are devoted to an outline of a version of the historical theory; the main stress is placed on the well-known devices of the theory, i.e. the naming-relation and the communication chain of name uses. The fourth part contains several critical remarks concerning both of the devices: it is pointed out that the naming-relation is unable to explain the reference of proper names and that the idea of communication chain is vague and cannot serve to its proper aims

The chief aim of the article is to give an analysis of Russellś semantical theory of ordinary proper names with respect to the problem of reference. The problem can be stated in the following way: proper names are employed as devices for identifying objects - how is it possible that they can serve for this purpose? It is argued that Russellś semantics is unable to solve the problem and, moreover, it is impossible to state the problem within its conceptual framework. Russellś identification of the referent of a name with nameś meaning, together with his logico-semantical distinction between complete and incomplete symbols, and his epistemology of sense-data implies that grammatically proper names are, in fact, disguised descriptions. It is argued that in order for the theory to work it must rely on an infallible or ideal speaker

The main aim of the paper is to reject the idea that predicates of personal taste express normative meanings. According to a recent theory proposed by Daniel Gutzmann, predicates of personal taste express both a truth-conditional content and a use-conditional content, the latter being normative. The purported normativity of predicates of personal taste is supposed to consist in that when producing utterances containing such predicates, their speakers suggest how other people ought to experience the objects of taste under discussion. The paper provides a bunch of evidence to show there are utterances containing predicates of personal taste that cannot be used normatively in this sense. In particular, it is claimed that one can make such an utterance and then add a related normative piece of information without doing anything redundant; one can also make such an utterance and then deny the related normative piece of information without generating any contradiction or infelicity. At the same time, it is admitted there are situations in which the speakers do communicate something normative by producing utterances containing predicates of personal taste. We thus need an explanation to cope with such cases. Although the paper does not offer one, it provides some reasons to the effect that a correct explanation has to be pragmatic rather than semantic.

Critical statements, if true, bear ontological commitments to fictional entities. A well-known version of fictionalism about fictional characters tries to eliminate these ontological commitments by proposing that we understand critical statements as prefixed by a special sentential operator, such as ‘according to a fictional realist theory’. The aim of the present paper is to show that fictionalism about fictional characters is underdeveloped as it stands because it can be shown to be systematically inadequate. Because the fictionalist’s paraphrases of critical statements suggest that fictional realists affirm the propositions expressed by critical statements, the fictionalist mistakenly attributes to fictional realists an expertise in matters that pertain to literary criticism. Importantly, this problem of misattributed expertise paves the way to other issues that might be much more devastating to the fictionalist project. It can be shown that, because she wrongly attributes expertise to fictional realists, the fictionalist unintentionally portrays fictional realist theories in a way that renders them inconsistent and self-defeating. This undermines fictionalism about fictional characters because it leaves no workable fictional realist account in which to ground a fictionalist explanation. This is why the fictionalist about fictional characters should try to eliminate the problem of misattributed expertise and its related issues. At the end of the paper, I sketch some of the available options in this regard.