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268What is it like to be me?Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1): 48-60. 1998.Introspection plays an ineliminable role in affording us with self-knowledge, or so it is widely believed. It is argued here that introspective evidence, by itself, is often insufficient to ground reasonable belief about many of our mental states, and the knowledge we do have of much of our mental life is crucially dependent on other sources.
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151Can Internalism Be Saved?Metaphilosophy 34 (5): 621-629. 2003.Richard Feldman argues that a good deal more of Chisholm's approach can be saved than I allow in “Roderick Chisholm and the Shaping of American Epistemology.” More than this, Feldman argues that there are other, and still more defensible, forms of internalism. I argue here that the problems I presented for Chisholm's view are not so easily sidestepped either within Chisholm's system or by other forms of internalism.
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145In Defense of a Naturalized EpistemologyIn John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, Wiley-blackwell. 1999.Naturalism in philosophy has a long and distinguished heritage. This is no less true in epistemology than it is in other areas of philosophy. At the same time, epistemology in the English speaking world in the first half of die twentieth century was dominated by an approach quite hostile to naturalism. Now, at the close of the twentieth century, naturalism is resurgent.
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269Sosa in perspectivePhilosophical Studies 144 (1): 127--136. 2009.Ernest Sosa draws a distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge, and this distinction forms the centerpiece of his new book, A Virtue Epistemology . This paper argues that the distinction cannot do the work which Sosa assigns to it.
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114Epistemic obligation and the possibility of internalismIn Abrol Fairweather & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue epistemology: essays on epistemic virtue and responsibility, Oxford University Press. pp. 231--248. 2001.
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138Is there room for armchair theorizing in epistemology?In Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory?, Routledge. pp. 195. 2013.Some philosophers believe that epistemological theories are a priori knowable. Others weaken this claim slightly, arguing that epistemological theorizing is properly conducted “from the armchair.” It is argued here that even this claim is far too strong. This paper defends the view that epistemological theorizing must take account of empirical work in psychology, and, without this, epistemology inevitably loses touch with the very phenomena it seeks to account for.
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1A conservative approach to social epistemologyIn Frederick F. Schmitt (ed.), Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge, Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 93--110. 1994.
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99Hilary Kornblith, Review of Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind by Lynne Rudder BakerPhilosophy of Science 65 (2): 377-379. 1998.
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125Epistemology: Classic problems and contemporary responsesAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3). 2003.Book Information Epistemology: Classic Problems and Contemporary Responses. By Laurence BonJour. Rowman and Littlefield. Lanham MD. 2002. Pp. viii + 289. Hardback, US$75. Paperback, US$23.95.
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6Appeals to intuition and the ambitions of epistemologyIn Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology futures, Oxford University Press. pp. 10--25. 2006.