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6Appeals to intuition and the ambitions of epistemologyIn Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology futures, Oxford University Press. pp. 10--25. 2006.
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194Naturalism: Both Metaphysical and EpistemologicalMidwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1): 39-52. 1994.
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413What reflective endorsement cannot doPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1): 1-19. 2009.We sometimes stop to reflect on our mental states, and such reflection can lead, at times, to changing our minds. It can, as well, lead us to endorse the very attitudes which we previously held. Such reflective endorsement has been called upon to play a wide range of roles in philosophical theorizing. It has been thought to ground a distinction between two fundamentally different kinds of knowledge: reflective knowledge and mere animal knowledge. It has been thought to serve as a ground for …Read more
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145Inductive Inference and its Natural GroundMIT Press. 1993.Hilary Kornblith presents an account of inductive inference that addresses both its metaphysical and epistemological aspects. He argues that inductive knowledge is possible by virtue of the fit between our innate psychological capacities and the causal structure of the world. Kornblith begins by developing an account of natural kinds that has its origins in John Locke's work on real and nominal essences. In Kornblith's view, a natural kind is a stable cluster of properties that are bound togethe…Read more
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125Ever Since DescartesThe Monist 68 (2): 264-276. 1985.Epistemology has changed dramatically since Descartes, but many of the questions epistemologists address today are no different from the questions Descartes addressed. I begin by raising four sets of questions with which Descartes concerned himself, and explain briefly why Descartes regarded these sets of questions as interchangeable. My main purpose, however, is not historical. Rather, I wish to present an outline of a naturalistic approach to these questions. I will not defend naturalistic epi…Read more
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138Sosa on Human and Animal KnowledgeIn John Greco (ed.), Ernest Sosa: And His Critics, Wiley-blackwell. 2008.
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40Conditions on Cognitive Sanity and the Death of InternalismIn Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge, De Gruyter. pp. 77-88. 2004.
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183Review: Précis of "Knowledge and Its Place in Nature" (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2). 2005.
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55Goldman and his Critics (edited book)Blackwell. 2016.Goldman and His Critics presents a series of original essays contributed by influential philosophers who critically examine Alvin Goldman’s work, followed by Goldman’s responses to each essay. Critiques Alvin Goldman’s groundbreaking theories, writings, and ideas on a range of philosophical topics Features contributions from some of the most important and influential contemporary philosophers Covers Goldman’s views on epistemology—both individual and social—in addition to cognitive science and m…Read more
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1132Naturalism and intuitionsGrazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1): 27-49. 2007.This paper examines the relationship between methodological naturalism and the standard practice within philosophy of constructing theories on the basis of our intuitions about imaginary cases, especially in the work of Alvin Goldman. It is argued that current work in cognitive science presents serious problems for Goldman's approach.
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416Knowledge and its place in natureOxford University Press. 2002.Hilary Kornblith argues for a naturalistic approach to investigating knowledge. Knowledge, he explains, is a feature of the natural world, and so should be investigated using scientific methods. He offers an account of knowledge derived from the science of animal behavior, and defends this against its philosophical rivals. This controversial and refreshingly original book offers philosophers a new way to do epistemology.
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1237Testimony, memory and the limits of the a prioriPhilosophical Studies 86 (1): 1-20. 1997.A number of philosophers, from Thomas Reid1 through C. A. J. Coady2, have argued that one is justified in relying on the testimony of others, and furthermore, that this should be taken as a basic epistemic presumption. If such a general presumption were not ultimately dependent on evidence for the reliability of other people, the ground for this presumption would be a priori. Such a presumption would then have a status like that which Roderick Chisholm claims for the epistemic principle that we …Read more
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229Introspection and misdirectionAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (4). 1989.Internalist theories of justification put introspection to work in service of the task of error detection. Introspecting to determine whether our beliefs are well-supported by reasons is supposed to reveal where it is that our beliefs fail to measure up to appropriate standards. Internalists do not, however, offer any empirical evidence that introspection can constructively play this role. This chapter examines relevant evidence from social psychology about the way in which introspection actu…Read more
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31The Epistemology of Science and the Epistemology of Everyday LifeFacta Philosophica 1 (1): 21-37. 1999.
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356Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 2001.This anthology brings together ten papers which have defined and advanced the debate between internalism and externalism in epistemology.
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201On ReflectionOxford University Press. 2012.Hilary Kornblith presents a new account of mental reflection, and its importance for knowledge, reasoning, freedom, and normativity. He argues that reflection cannot solve the philosophical problems it has traditionally been thought to, and offers a more realistic, demystified view of its nature which draws on dual process approaches to cognition
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113Roderick Chisholm and The Shaping of American EpistemologyMetaphilosophy 34 (5): 582-602. 2003.Roderick Chisholm had a profound effect on the shape of American epistemology. In this article, I not only give an account of the large‐scale structure of Chisholm's views but also say something about the place of Chisholmian themes in contemporary work. I thus present an understanding and an appreciation of Chisholm's contribution to epistemology by exhibiting a number of alternative developments of Chisholmian ideas that are currently under discussion.
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47Knowledge needs no justificationIn Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: new essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 5--23. 2008.The Standard View in epistemology is that knowledge is justified, true belief plus something else. This chapter argues that Standard View should be rejected: knowledge does not require justification. The nature of knowledge and the nature of justification can be better understood if we stop viewing justification as one of the necessary conditions for knowledge.
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235Why Should We Care About the Concept of Knowledge?Episteme 8 (1): 38-52. 2011.Can we learn something interesting about knowledge by examining our concept of knowledge? Quite a bit, many argue. My own view, however, is that the concept of knowledge is of little epistemological interest. In this paper, I critically examine one particularly interesting defense of the view that the concept of knowledge is of great epistemological interest: Edward Craig's Knowledge and the State of Nature. A minimalist view about the value of examining our concept of knowledge is defended
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209Is Philosophical Knowledge Possible?In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and skepticism, Routledge. pp. 260. 2012.
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96The psychological turnAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 60 (3). 1982.This Article does not have an abstract
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101How central are judgment and agency to epistemology?Philosophical Studies 174 (10): 2585-2597. 2017.Ernest Sosa’s Judgment and Agency marks an important change from his earlier work in epistemology. While belief was at the center of his earlier approach to epistemological issues, a far more sophisticated mental state, judgment, plays the central role here. This paper examines the significance of this change in focus, and argues that there is reason to favor the earlier belief-centered approach over this new judgment-centered account.
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145Social Prerequisites for the Proper Function of Individual ReasonEpisteme 1 (3): 169-176. 2005.Human beings form beliefs by way of a variety of psychological processes. Some of these processes of belief acquisition are innate; others are acquired. A good deal of interesting work has been done in assessing the reliability of these processes. Any such assessment must examine not only features intrinsic to the psychological processes themselves, but also features of the environments in which those processes are exercised; a mechanism which is reliable in one sort of environment may be quite …Read more