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229Introspection and misdirectionAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (4). 1989.Internalist theories of justification put introspection to work in service of the task of error detection. Introspecting to determine whether our beliefs are well-supported by reasons is supposed to reveal where it is that our beliefs fail to measure up to appropriate standards. Internalists do not, however, offer any empirical evidence that introspection can constructively play this role. This chapter examines relevant evidence from social psychology about the way in which introspection actu…Read more
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31The Epistemology of Science and the Epistemology of Everyday LifeFacta Philosophica 1 (1): 21-37. 1999.
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356Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 2001.This anthology brings together ten papers which have defined and advanced the debate between internalism and externalism in epistemology.
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201On ReflectionOxford University Press. 2012.Hilary Kornblith presents a new account of mental reflection, and its importance for knowledge, reasoning, freedom, and normativity. He argues that reflection cannot solve the philosophical problems it has traditionally been thought to, and offers a more realistic, demystified view of its nature which draws on dual process approaches to cognition
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113Roderick Chisholm and The Shaping of American EpistemologyMetaphilosophy 34 (5): 582-602. 2003.Roderick Chisholm had a profound effect on the shape of American epistemology. In this article, I not only give an account of the large‐scale structure of Chisholm's views but also say something about the place of Chisholmian themes in contemporary work. I thus present an understanding and an appreciation of Chisholm's contribution to epistemology by exhibiting a number of alternative developments of Chisholmian ideas that are currently under discussion.
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47Knowledge needs no justificationIn Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: new essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 5--23. 2008.The Standard View in epistemology is that knowledge is justified, true belief plus something else. This chapter argues that Standard View should be rejected: knowledge does not require justification. The nature of knowledge and the nature of justification can be better understood if we stop viewing justification as one of the necessary conditions for knowledge.
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235Why Should We Care About the Concept of Knowledge?Episteme 8 (1): 38-52. 2011.Can we learn something interesting about knowledge by examining our concept of knowledge? Quite a bit, many argue. My own view, however, is that the concept of knowledge is of little epistemological interest. In this paper, I critically examine one particularly interesting defense of the view that the concept of knowledge is of great epistemological interest: Edward Craig's Knowledge and the State of Nature. A minimalist view about the value of examining our concept of knowledge is defended
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209Is Philosophical Knowledge Possible?In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and skepticism, Routledge. pp. 260. 2012.
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96The psychological turnAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 60 (3). 1982.This Article does not have an abstract
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101How central are judgment and agency to epistemology?Philosophical Studies 174 (10): 2585-2597. 2017.Ernest Sosa’s Judgment and Agency marks an important change from his earlier work in epistemology. While belief was at the center of his earlier approach to epistemological issues, a far more sophisticated mental state, judgment, plays the central role here. This paper examines the significance of this change in focus, and argues that there is reason to favor the earlier belief-centered approach over this new judgment-centered account.
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145Social Prerequisites for the Proper Function of Individual ReasonEpisteme 1 (3): 169-176. 2005.Human beings form beliefs by way of a variety of psychological processes. Some of these processes of belief acquisition are innate; others are acquired. A good deal of interesting work has been done in assessing the reliability of these processes. Any such assessment must examine not only features intrinsic to the psychological processes themselves, but also features of the environments in which those processes are exercised; a mechanism which is reliable in one sort of environment may be quite …Read more
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258Distrusting reasonMidwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1). 1999.The activity of reason-giving plays an important role in our intellectual lives. Some philosophers, however, have expressed a deep distrust of this activity. This chapter examines the grounds for such distrust and argues that it deserves a far more serious hearing than it is typically given. There are important cases in which the very activity of reason giving should be called into question, but the kinds of challenges to reason giving which are most concerning are, it is argued, ones which d…Read more
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79A Naturalistic Epistemology: Selected PapersOxford University Press. 2014.This volume draws together influential work by Hilary Kornblith on naturalistic epistemology. This approach sees epistemology not as conceptual analysis, but as an explanatory project constrained and informed by work in cognitive science. These essays expound and defend Kornblith's distinctive view of how we come to have knowledge of the world.
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311Naturalizing Epistemology (edited book)Mass.: Mit Press. 1985.explores the interaction between psychology and epistemology and addresses empirical questions about how we should arrive at our beliefs, and whether the processes by which we arrive at our beliefs are the ones by which we ought to arrive at our beliefs
