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74Epistemic obligation and the possibility of internalismIn Abrol Fairweather & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility, Oxford University Press. pp. 231--248. 2001.
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112On ReflectionOxford University Press. 2012.Hilary Kornblith presents a new account of mental reflection, and its importance for knowledge, reasoning, freedom, and normativity. He argues that reflection cannot solve the philosophical problems it has traditionally been thought to, and offers a more realistic, demystified view of its nature which draws on dual process approaches to cognition
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25Conditions on Cognitive Sanity and the Death of InternalismIn Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge, De Gruyter. pp. 77--88. 2004.
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161What is it like to be me?Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1): 48-60. 1998.Introspection plays an ineliminable role in affording us with self-knowledge, or so it is widely believed. It is argued here that introspective evidence, by itself, is often insufficient to ground reasonable belief about many of our mental states, and the knowledge we do have of much of our mental life is crucially dependent on other sources.
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20Goldman and his Critics (edited book)Blackwell. 2016.Goldman and His Critics presents a series of original essays contributed by influential philosophers who critically examine Alvin Goldman’s work, followed by Goldman’s responses to each essay. Critiques Alvin Goldman’s groundbreaking theories, writings, and ideas on a range of philosophical topics Features contributions from some of the most important and influential contemporary philosophers Covers Goldman’s views on epistemology—both individual and social—in addition to cognitive science and m…Read more
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40Knowledge needs no justificationIn Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: new essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 5--23. 2008.The Standard View in epistemology is that knowledge is justified, true belief plus something else. This chapter argues that Standard View should be rejected: knowledge does not require justification. The nature of knowledge and the nature of justification can be better understood if we stop viewing justification as one of the necessary conditions for knowledge.
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451Testimony, memory and the limits of the a prioriPhilosophical Studies 86 (1): 1-20. 1997.A number of philosophers, from Thomas Reid1 through C. A. J. Coady2, have argued that one is justified in relying on the testimony of others, and furthermore, that this should be taken as a basic epistemic presumption. If such a general presumption were not ultimately dependent on evidence for the reliability of other people, the ground for this presumption would be a priori. Such a presumption would then have a status like that which Roderick Chisholm claims for the epistemic principle that we …Read more
