Hilary Kornblith

In Chapter Four, it is argued that coherence is evidence of truth. A sketch of a theory of approximate truth is developed in terms of the theory of reference outlined in Chapter Three, and this notion is put to work in showing that there is reason to believe that most of our beliefs are at least approximately true. It is then argued that coherence with approximately true beliefs, and thus the beliefs we have, is evidence of truth. ;In Chapter Three, the connection between the theory of knowledge and the theory of reference is explored. The relation between Russell's theory of knowledge and his theory of reference is discussed, and it is argued that Russell was quite correct in insisting that there be a close relationship between these two disciplines. A theory of reference is developed which parallels the causal theory of knowledge presented in Chapter One. This theory is a variant of the causal, or historical theory, presented by Donnellan, Kripke, Putnam and Boyd. ;In Chapter One, an outline of a causal theory of knowledge is presented. It is argued that knowledge is reliably produced true belief, and that a process is reliable just in case it tends to produce true beliefs in relevant actual, as well as counterfactual, situations. ;In Chapter Two, the implications of this account for the debate between foundationalists and coherence theorists is examined. It is argued that standard foundational and coherentist accounts of justification share a common false presupposition, that the proper account of justification must be apsychological. It is argued that by rejecting this presupposition and adopting a causal theory of knowledge, it is possible to develop a theory which contains many of the important grains of truth in both foundationalism and coherentism. ;In this thesis, a causal theory of knowledge is elaborated and its implications examined

Timothy Williamson's new book, The Philosophy of Philosophy, has a number of central themes. The very idea that philosophy has a method which is different in kind from the sciences is one Williamson rejects. “… the common assumption of philosophical exceptionalism is false. Even the distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori turns out to obscure underlying similarities”. Although Williamson sees the book as “a defense of armchair philosophy”, he also argues that “the differences in subject matter between philosophy and the other sciences are also less deep than is often supposed. In particular, few philosophical questions are conceptual questions in any distinctive sense. …”. In addition, Williamson argues that “the current philosophical mainstream has failed to articulate an adequate philosophical methodology, in part because it has fallen into the classic epistemological error of psychologizing the data. … The picture is wrong; we frequently have better epistemic access to our immediate physical environment than to our own psychology. … Our understanding of philosophical methodology must be rid of internalist preconceptions”. I am tremendously sympathetic with all of these views.In this review, I want to raise a number of questions about philosophical methodology which Williamson does not address. While Williamson is wonderfully forthright on many important issues about philosophical methodology, the view he presents is compatible with a surprisingly wide range of approaches to philosophical questions. This may be precisely what Williamson wants. At this stage in our understanding of the philosophical enterprise, it may be premature to narrow the range of methodological options more than Williamson does. There are some hints, however, that Williamson may favor some of these options more than others, and, if that is so, it would be useful to make that clear and ….

This paper examines Laurence BonJour''s defense of internalism inThe Structure of Empirical Knowledge with an eye toward better understanding the issues which separate internalists from externalists. It is argued that BonJour''s Doxastic Presumption cannot play the role which is required of it to make his internalism work. It is further argued that BonJour''s internalism, and, indeed, all other internalisms, are motivated by a Cartesian view of an agent''s access to her own mental states. This Caretsian view is argued to be untenable, and, accordingly, so is internalism.

The notion of a reason often plays a central role in epistemological theories. Justification is often explained in terms of the having of appropriate reasons, and a variety of epistemological distinctions are most naturally explained, it seems, by adverting to reasons. This paper examines the extent to which we may, instead, make do without appeal to such a notion. It is argued that the extent to which the notion of a reason should play an important role in epistemological theorizing will depend on how our psychological theories of belief acquisition and belief change are best conceptualized.

Goldman and His Critics presents a series of original essays contributed by influential philosophers who critically examine Alvin Goldman’s work, followed by Goldman’s responses to each essay. Critiques Alvin Goldman’s groundbreaking theories, writings, and ideas on a range of philosophical topics Features contributions from some of the most important and influential contemporary philosophers Covers Goldman’s views on epistemology—both individual and social—in addition to cognitive science and metaphysics Pays special attention to Goldman’s writings on philosophy of mind, including the evolution of his thoughts on Simulation-Theory (ST)

A number of philosophers, from Thomas Reid1 through C. A. J. Coady2, have argued that one is justified in relying on the testimony of others, and furthermore, that this should be taken as a basic epistemic presumption. If such a general presumption were not ultimately dependent on evidence for the reliability of other people, the ground for this presumption would be a priori. Such a presumption would then have a status like that which Roderick Chisholm claims for the epistemic principle that we are justified in believing what our senses tell us.