•  120
    Can Internalism Be Saved?
    Metaphilosophy 34 (5): 621-629. 2003.
    Richard Feldman argues that a good deal more of Chisholm's approach can be saved than I allow in “Roderick Chisholm and the Shaping of American Epistemology.” More than this, Feldman argues that there are other, and still more defensible, forms of internalism. I argue here that the problems I presented for Chisholm's view are not so easily sidestepped either within Chisholm's system or by other forms of internalism.
  •  271
    Knowledge and its place in nature
    Oxford University Press. 2002.
    Hilary Kornblith argues for a naturalistic approach to investigating knowledge. Knowledge, he explains, is a feature of the natural world, and so should be investigated using scientific methods. He offers an account of knowledge derived from the science of animal behavior, and defends this against its philosophical rivals. This controversial and refreshingly original book offers philosophers a new way to do epistemology.
  •  65
    Some social features of cognition
    Synthese 73 (1). 1987.
    This paper describes and assesses a number of dispositions which are instrumental in allowing us to take on the opinions of others unselfconsciously. It is argued that these dispositions are in fact reliable in the environments in which they tend to come into play. In addition, it is argued that agents are, by their own lights, justified in the beliefs they arrive at as a result of these processes. Finally, these processes are argued to provide a basis for rejecting the claim that fixation of be…Read more
  •  158
    Introspection and misdirection
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (4). 1989.
    Internalist theories of justification put introspection to work in service of the task of error detection. Introspecting to determine whether our beliefs are well-supported by reasons is supposed to reveal where it is that our beliefs fail to measure up to appropriate standards. Internalists do not, however, offer any empirical evidence that introspection can constructively play this role. This chapter examines relevant evidence from social psychology about the way in which introspection actu…Read more
  •  55
    Replies to Alvin Goldman, Martin Kusch and William Talbott (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2). 2005.
  •  528
    Epistemic normativity
    Synthese 94 (3). 1993.
    This paper examines the source and content of epistemic norms. In virtue of what is it that epistemic norms have their normative force? A semantic approach to this question, due to Alvin Goldman, is examined and found unacceptable. Instead, accounts seeking to ground epistemic norms in our desires are argued to be most promising. All of these accounts make epistemic norms a variety of hypothetical imperative. It is argued that such an account may be offered, grounding our epistemic norms in desi…Read more
  •  2
    Books reviews
    Mind 101 (401): 188-191. 1992.
  •  151
    Naturalistic Epistemology and Its Critics
    Philosophical Topics 23 (1): 237-255. 1995.
  •  233
    Timothy Williamson's the philosophy of philosophy
    Analysis 69 (1): 109-116. 2009.
    Timothy Williamson's new book, The Philosophy of Philosophy, has a number of central themes. The very idea that philosophy has a method which is different in kind from the sciences is one Williamson rejects. “… the common assumption of philosophical exceptionalism is false. Even the distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori turns out to obscure underlying similarities”. Although Williamson sees the book as “a defense of armchair philosophy”, he also argues that “the differences in su…Read more
  •  19
    Knowledge in Humans and Other Animals
    Noûs 33 (s13): 327-346. 1999.
  •  163
    Sosa in perspective
    Philosophical Studies 144 (1): 127--136. 2009.
    Ernest Sosa draws a distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge, and this distinction forms the centerpiece of his new book, A Virtue Epistemology . This paper argues that the distinction cannot do the work which Sosa assigns to it.
  •  103
    How internal can you get?
    Synthese 74 (3). 1988.
    This paper examines Laurence BonJour''s defense of internalism inThe Structure of Empirical Knowledge with an eye toward better understanding the issues which separate internalists from externalists. It is argued that BonJour''s Doxastic Presumption cannot play the role which is required of it to make his internalism work. It is further argued that BonJour''s internalism, and, indeed, all other internalisms, are motivated by a Cartesian view of an agent''s access to her own mental states. This C…Read more