•  78
    Sets and Functions in Theoretical Physics
    with Adonai S. Sant’Anna
    Erkenntnis 79 (2): 257-281. 2014.
    It is easy to show that in many natural axiomatic formulations of physical and even mathematical theories, there are many superfluous concepts usually assumed as primitive. This happens mainly when these theories are formulated in the language of standard set theories, such as Zermelo–Fraenkel’s. In 1925, John von Neumann created a set theory where sets are definable by means of functions. We provide a reformulation of von Neumann’s set theory and show that it can be used to formulate physical a…Read more
  •  2
    On the Sorites Paradox (edited book)
    Springer. forthcoming.
  •  116
    Troubles with trivialism
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (6). 2007.
    According to the trivialist, everything is true. But why would anyone believe that? It turns out that trivialism emerges naturally from a certain inconsistency view of language, and it has significant benefits that need to be acknowledged. But trivialism also encounters some troubles along the way. After discussing them, I sketch a couple of alternatives that can preserve the benefits of trivialism without the corresponding costs.
  •  62
    Book Reviews (review)
    with Rainer Bäuerle, N. C. A. Da Costa, Javier De Lorenzo, Alberto Zanardo, Alan R. Perreiah, K. Misiuna, H. Sinaceur, T. Hailperin, S. Bringsjord, A. C. Varzi, T. Wiliamson, and Barry Smith
    History and Philosophy of Logic 17 (1-2): 155-177. 1996.
    Gennaro Chtjerchia, Dynamics of meaning: anaphora, presupposition, and the the of grammar. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995.xv+ 270 pp, £59.95, £31.95 G. Pr...
  •  165
    Quasi-Truth, Supervaluations and Free Logic
    History and Philosophy of Logic 20 (3-4): 215-226. 1999.
    The partial structures approach has two major components: a broad notion of structure (partial structure) and a weak notion of truth (quasi-truth). In this paper, we discuss the relationship between this approach and free logic. We also compare the model-theoretic analysis supplied by partial structures with the method of supervaluations, which was initially introduced as a technique to provide a semantic analysis of free logic. We then combine the three formal frameworks (partial structures, fr…Read more
  •  249
    Models of Reduction
    Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 13 (3): 269-282. 2009.
    . In this paper, I examine three models of reduction. The first, and the most restrictive, is the model developed by Ernest Nagel as part of the logical empiricist program. The second, articulated by Jerry Fodor, is significantly broader, but it seems unable to make sense of a salient feature of scientific practice. The third, and the most lenient, model is developed within Newton da Costa and Steven French’s partial structures approach. I argue that the third model preserves the benefits of Fod…Read more
  •  322
    Structural Realism, Scientific Change, and Partial Structures
    Studia Logica 89 (2): 213-235. 2008.
    Scientific change has two important dimensions: conceptual change and structural change. In this paper, I argue that the existence of conceptual change brings serious difficulties for scientific realism, and the existence of structural change makes structural realism look quite implausible. I then sketch an alternative account of scientific change, in terms of partial structures, that accommodates both conceptual and structural changes. The proposal, however, is not realist, and supports a struc…Read more
  •  187
    An Easy Road to Nominalism
    Mind 121 (484): 967-982. 2012.
    In this paper, I provide an easy road to nominalism which does not rely on a Field-type nominalization strategy for mathematics. According to this proposal, applications of mathematics to science, and alleged mathematical explanations of physical phenomena, only emerge when suitable physical interpretations of the mathematical formalism are advanced. And since these interpretations are rarely distinguished from the mathematical formalism, the impression arises that mathematical explanations deri…Read more
  •  298
    The Logic of Pragmatic Truth
    with Newton C. A. da Costa and Steven French
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 27 (6): 603-620. 1998.
    The mathematical concept of pragmatic truth, first introduced in Mikenberg, da Costa and Chuaqui (1986), has received in the last few years several applications in logic and the philosophy of science. In this paper, we study the logic of pragmatic truth, and show that there are important connections between this logic, modal logic and, in particular, Jaskowski's discussive logic. In order to do so, two systems are put forward so that the notions of pragmatic validity and pragmatic truth can be a…Read more
  •  1022
    Logicism Revisited
    Principia 5 (1-2): 99-124. 2001.
    In this paper, I develop a new defense of logicism: one that combines logicism and nominalism. First, I defend the logicist approach from recent criticisms; in particular from the charge that a cruciai principie in the logicist reconstruction of arithmetic, Hume's Principle, is not analytic. In order to do that, I argue, it is crucial to understand the overall logicist approach as a nominalist view. I then indicate a way of extending the nominalist logicist approach beyond arithmetic. Finally, I…Read more
  • Table Des matieres editorial preface 3
    with Jair Minoro Abe, Curry Algebras Pt, Paraconsistent Logic, Newton Ca da Costa, Jacek Pasniczek, Beyond Consistent, Complete Possible Worlds, Vm Popov, and Inverse Negation
    Logique Et Analyse 41 1. 1998.
  •  199
    Reviewed Works:Chris Mortensen, Inconsistent Mathematics.Chris Mortensen, Peter Lavers, Category Theory.William James, Closed Set Sheaves and Their Categories.Chris Mortensen, Joshua Cole, Foundations: Provability, Truth and Sets.
  •  317
    Is Logic A Priori?
    The Harvard Review of Philosophy 17 (1): 105-117. 2010.
  •  136
    Empiricism, scientific change and mathematical change
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 31 (2): 269-296. 2000.
    The aim of this paper is to provide a unified account of scientific and mathematical change in a thoroughly empiricist setting. After providing a formal modelling in terms of embedding, and criticising it for being too restrictive, a second modelling is advanced. It generalises the first, providing a more open-ended pattern of theory development, and is articulated in terms of da Costa and French's partial structures approach. The crucial component of scientific and mathematical change is spelle…Read more
  •  880
    Paradox without satisfaction
    Analysis 63 (2). 2003.
    Consider the following denumerably infinite sequence of sentences: (s1) For all k > 1, sk is not true. (s2) For all k > 2, sk is not true. (s3) For all k > 3, sk is not true.
  •  923
    Ask a philosopher what a proof is, and you’re likely to get an answer hii empaszng one or another regimentationl of that notion in terms of a finite sequence of formalized statements, each of which is either an axiom or is derived from an axiom by certain inference rules. (Wecan call this the formal conception of proof) Ask a mathematician what a proof is, and you will rbbl poay get a different-looking answer. Instead of stressing a partic- l uar regimented notion of proof, the answer the mathem…Read more
  •  377
    We offer an overview of some ways of examining the connections between stance and rationality, by surveying recent work on four central topics: the very idea of a stance, the relations between stances and voluntarism, the metaphysics and epistemology that emerge once stances are brought to center stage, and the role that emotions and phenomenology play in the empirical stance
  •  958
    The aim of this paper is two-fold: (1) To contribute to a better knowledge of the method of the Argentinean mathematicians Lia Oubifia and Jorge Bosch to formulate category theory independently of set theory. This method suggests a new ontology of mathematical objects, and has a profound philosophical significance (the underlying logic of the resulting category theory is classical iirst—order predicate calculus with equality). (2) To show in outline how the Oubina-Bosch theory can be modified to…Read more
  •  62
    In a recent debate, Eric Drexler and Richard Smalley have discussed the chemical and physical possibility of constructing molecular assemblers - devices that guide chemical reactions by placing, with atomic precision, reactive molecules. Drexler insisted on the mechanical feasibility of such assemblers, whereas Smalley resisted the idea that such devices could be chemically constructed, because we do not have the required control. Underlying the debate, there are differences regarding the approp…Read more
  •  436
    A plea for a modal realist epistemology
    with S. Shalkowski
    Acta Analytica 15 (24): 175-193. 2000.
    David Lewis’s genuine modal realism postulates the existence of concrete possible worlds that are spatio-temporally discontinuous with the concrete world we inhabit. How, then, can we have modal knowledge? How can we know that there are possible worlds and how can we know the characters of those worlds?
  •  500
    Scientific representation: A long journey from pragmatics to pragmatics Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9465-5 Authors James Ladyman, Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, 9 Woodland Rd, Bristol, BS8 1TB UK Otávio Bueno, Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124, USA Mauricio Suárez, Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, Complutense University of Madrid, 28040 Madrid, Spain Bas C. van Fraassen, Philosophy Department, San Francis…Read more
  •  88
    Modalidade, abordagem sem'ntica e mec'nica qu'ntica
    Scientiae Studia 2 (1): 85-97. 2004.
  •  167
    Styles of reasoning: A pluralist view
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (4): 657-665. 2012.
    Styles of reasoning are important devices to understand scientific practice. As I use the concept, a style of reasoning is a pattern of inferential relations that are used to select, interpret, and support evidence for scientific results. In this paper, I defend the view that there is a plurality of styles of reasoning: different domains of science often invoke different styles. I argue that this plurality is an important source of disunity in scientific practice, and it provides additional argu…Read more
  •  79
    Is the Pyrrhonist an internalist?
    In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), New essays on ancient Pyrrhonism, Brill. pp. 126--179. 2011.
  •  168
    Realism and Anti-Realism about Science
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (2): 145-167. 2015.
    Pyrrhonists provide a way of investigating the world in which conflicting views about a given topic are critically compared, assessed, and juxtaposed. Since Pyrrhonists are ultimately unable to decide between these views, they end up suspending judgment about the issues under examination. In this paper, I consider the question of whether Pyrrhonists can be realists or anti-realists about science, focusing, in particular, on contemporary philosophical discussions about it. Althoughprima faciethe …Read more