•  187
    The No-Category Ontology
    The Monist 98 (3): 233-245. 2015.
    In this paper we argue that there are no categories of being⎯at least not in the robust metaphysical sense of something fundamental. Central arguments that metaphysicians provide in support of fundamental categories, such as indispensability and theoretical utility arguments, are not adequate to guarantee their existence. We illustrate this point by examining Jonathan Lowe’s [2006] four-category ontology, and indicating its shortcomings. In contrast, we offer an alternative, no-category ontology…Read more
  •  380
    The authors provide an object-theoretic analysis of two paradoxes in the theory of possible worlds and propositions stemming from Russell and Kaplan. After laying out the paradoxes, the authors provide a brief overview of object theory and point out how syntactic restrictions that prevent object-theoretic versions of the classical paradoxes are justified philosophically. The authors then trace the origins of the Russell paradox to a problematic application of set theory in the definition of worl…Read more
  •  173
    Is there a zande logic?
    History and Philosophy of Logic 19 (1): 41-54. 1998.
    The issue of what consequences to draw from the existence of non-classical logical systems has been the subject of an interesting debate across a diversity of fields. In this paper the matter of alternative logics is considered with reference to a specific belief system and its propositions :the Azande are said to maintain beliefs about witchcraft which, when expressed propositionally, appear to be inconsistent. When the Azande have been presented with such inconsistencies, they either fail to s…Read more
  •  176
    An anti-realist account of the application of mathematics
    Philosophical Studies 173 (10): 2591-2604. 2016.
    Mathematical concepts play at least three roles in the application of mathematics: an inferential role, a representational role, and an expressive role. In this paper, I argue that, despite what has often been alleged, platonists do not fully accommodate these features of the application of mathematics. At best, platonism provides partial ways of handling the issues. I then sketch an alternative, anti-realist account of the application of mathematics, and argue that this account manages to accom…Read more
  •  381
    Suppes Predicates for Space-Time
    with Newton C. A. da Costa and Steven French
    Synthese 112 (2): 271-279. 1997.
    We formulate Suppes predicates for various kinds of space-time: classical Euclidean, Minkowski's, and that of General Relativity. Starting with topological properties, these continua are mathematically constructed with the help of a basic algebra of events; this algebra constitutes a kind of mereology, in the sense of Lesniewski. There are several alternative, possible constructions, depending, for instance, on the use of the common field of reals or of a non-Archimedian field (with infinitesima…Read more
  •  249
    Scientific representation and nominalism: an empiricist view
    Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 12 (2): 177-192. 2008.
    Can a constructive empiricist make sense of scientific representation? Usually, a scientific model is an abstract entity, and scientific representation is conceptualized as an intentional relation between scientific models and certain aspects of the world. On this conception, since both the models and the representation relation are abstract, a constructive empiricist, who is not committed to the existence of abstract entities, would be unable to invoke these notions to make sense of scientific …Read more
  •  209
    In this first paper of a series of works on the foundations of science, we examine the significance of logical and mathematical frameworks used in foundational studies. In particular, we emphasize the distinction between the order of a language and the order of a structure to prevent confusing models of scientific theories with first-order structures, and which are studied in standard model theory. All of us are, of course, bound to make abuses of language even in putatively precise contexts. Th…Read more
  •  315
    Is it possible to nominalize quantum mechanics?
    Philosophy of Science 70 (5): 1424-1436. 2003.
    Hartry Field (1980) has developed an interesting nominalization strategy for Newtonian gravitation theory—a strategy that reformulates the theory without quantification over abstract entities. According to David Malament (1982), Field's strategy cannot be extended to quantum mechanics (QM), and so it only has a limited scope. In a recent work, Mark Balaguer has responded to Malament's challenge by indicating how QM can be nominalized, and by “doing much of the work needed to provide the nominali…Read more
  • Consistency, paraconsistency and truth
    Ideas Y Valores 45 48-60. 1996.
  •  116
    Paraconsistency: Towards a tentative interpretation
    with C. A. De Costa Newton
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 16 (1): 119-145. 2001.
    In this expository paper, we examine some philosophical and technical issues brought by paraconsistency (such as, motivations for developing a paraconsistent logic, the nature of this logic, and its application to set theory). We also suggest a way of accommodating these issues by considering some problems in the philosophy of logic from a new perspective.