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Bradford Cokelet

University of Kansas
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  •  977
    Virtue Ethics and the Demands of Social Morality
    In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies Normative Ethics, Volume 4, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 236-260. 2014.
    Building on work by Steve Darwall, I argue that standard virtue ethical accounts of moral motivation are defective because they don't include accounts of social morality. I then propose a virtue ethical account of social morality, and respond to one of Darwall's core objections to the coherence of any such (non-Kantian) account.
    Deontology and Virtue EthicsObjections to Virtue Ethics, Misc
  •  28
    Character
    In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Blackwell. 2013.
    A general discussion of what character is and why having character, or good character, might be thought to increase an agent's well-being.
    Skepticism about Character
  •  73
    NDPR: Moral Character: An Empirical Theory (by Christian Miller) (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2014 (2.7). 2014.
    Review of Christian Miller's "Moral Character: An Empirical Theory." I question Miller's criteria for overall judgements about the vice and vice of people's character traits, and sketch an alternative framework.
    Virtues and VicesSkepticism about Character
  •  355
    Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice (by Martha Nussbaum) (review)
    Ethics 127 (1): 298-302. 2016.
    Summary of Nussbaum's book. Raises worries about the political neutrality of her psychoanalytic assumptions and about whether her compassion promoting policies can adequately mitigate problems like racism, selfishness, and partiality.
    Value TheoryTheories of Emotion
  •  324
    Virtue is a Great Moral Good
    According to Aristotelian virtue ethicists, virtue is a great moral good that contributes to, but cannot be reduced to, an agent's welfare. In addition, they hold that the value of virtue is different from, and in some sense greater than, the agent-neutral intrinsic goodness that consequentialists attribute to states of affair. According to Thomas Hurka (1998, 2003, 2011), these fundamental Aristotelian views are indefensible. In this paper, I rebuff Hurka's skepticism and identify an Aristote…Read more
    Objections to Virtue Ethics, Misc
  •  681
    Dispositions, Character, and the Value of Acts
    In Christian B. Miller, R. Michael Furr, Angela Knobel & William Fleeson (eds.), Character: New Perspectives in Psychology, Philosophy, and Theology, Oxford University Press. pp. 233-250. 2015.
    This paper concerns the central virtue ethical thesis that the ethical quality of an agent's actions is a function of her dispositional character. Skeptics have rightly urged us to distinguish between an agent's particular intentions or occurrant motives and dispositional facts about her character, but they falsely contend that if we are attentive to this distinction, then we will see that the virtue ethical thesis is false. In this paper I present a new interpretation and defense of the virtu…Read more
    Topics in Virtue Ethics, Misc