Karen Bennett

There sits my trusty coffee mug. Just like yesterday, only a bit grungier. So how does it persist through time and change? Is it wholly present at every moment during which it exists, as the friends of endurance think? Or is it a four-dimensional space-time worm that has different parts at different times, as the friends of perdurance think? Or is it instead a momentary object related in various to-be-spelled-out ways to other momentary objects existing at other times? In How Things Persist, Katherine Hawley follows Theodore Sider in defending the third of these three views.

I think that there is an awful lot wrong with the exclusion problem. So, it seems, does just about everybody else. But of course everyone disagrees about exactly _what_ is wrong with it, and I think there is more to be said about that. So I propose to say a few more words about why the exclusion problem is not really a problem after all—at least, not for the nonreductive physicalist. The genuine _dualist_ is still in trouble. Indeed, one of my main points will be that the nonreductive physicalist is in a rather different position vis à vis the exclusion problem than the dualist is. Properly understanding nonreductive physicalism—and clearly recognizing that it is, after all, a form of _physicalism_—goes a long way toward solving the exclusion problem.