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202Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our BelievingPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3): 70-90. 2016.Support is canvassed for a novel solution to the sceptical problem regarding our knowledge of the external world. Key to this solution is the claim that what initially looks like a single problem is in fact two logically distinct problems. In particular, there are two putative sceptical paradoxes in play here, which each trade on distinctive epistemological theses. It is argued that the ideal solution to radical scepticism would thus be a biscopic proposal—viz., a two-pronged, integrated, underc…Read more
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197The Value of KnowledgeThe Harvard Review of Philosophy 16 (1): 86-103. 2009.The value of knowledge has always been a central topic within epistemology. Going all the way back to Plato’s Meno, philosophers have asked, why is knowledge more valuable than mere true belief? Interest in this question has grown in recent years, with theorists proposing a range of answers. But some reject the premise of the question and claim that the value of knowledge is ‘swamped’ by the value of true belief. And others argue that statuses other than knowledge, such as justification or under…Read more
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6IntroductionIn Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing, Princeton University Press. pp. 1-8. 2016.
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61Extended Knowledge and Social EpistemologySocial Epistemology Review and Reply Collective (8): 105-120. 2013.The place of social epistemology within contemporary philosophy, as well as its relation to other academic disciplines, is the topic of an ongoing debate. One camp within that debate holds that social epistemology should be pursued strictly from within the perspective of individualistic analytic epistemology. In contrast, a second camp holds that social epistemology is an interdisciplinary field that should be given priority over traditional analytic epistemology, with the specific aim of radica…Read more
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245Relevant alternatives, perceptual knowledge and discriminationNoûs 44 (2): 245-268. 2010.This paper examines the relationship between perceptual knowledge and discrimination in the light of the so-called ‘relevant alternatives’ intuition. It begins by outlining an intuitive relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge which incorporates the insight that there is a close connection between perceptual knowledge and the possession of relevant discriminatory abilities. It is argued, however, that in order to resolve certain problems that face this view, it is essential to recog…Read more
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222Contextualism, Skepticism and Warranted Assertibility ManoeuvresIn Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry S. Silverstein (eds.), Knowledge and Skepticism, Mit Press. pp. 85-104. 2010.Attributer contextualists maintain that the verb 'knows' is context-sensitive in the sense that the truth conditions of a sentence of the form "S knows that p" can be dependent upon the ascriber's context. One natural objection against attributer contextualism is that it confuses the impropriety of certain assertions which ascribe knowledge to agents with the falsity of those assertions. In an influential article, Keith DeRose has defended attributer contextualism against this charge by proposin…Read more
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217Robust virtue epistemology and epistemic anti-individualismPacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1): 84-103. 2012.According to robust virtue epistemology, knowledge is a cognitive achievement, where this means that the agent's cognitive success is because of her cognitive ability. One type of objection to robust virtue epistemology that has been put forward in the contemporary literature is that this view has problems dealing with certain kinds of testimonial knowledge, and thus that it is in tension with standard views in the epistemology of testimony. We build on this critique to argue that insofar as age…Read more
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506 ABSTRACT. I outline GrecoÕs response to the Pyrrhonian challenge to 7 epistemic externalist theories of knowledge and offer two points of criticism. 8 I also argue, however, that there is an account of epistemic luck available 9 which can cast some light on the dispute that Greco is concerned with, and..
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10Chapter 7. Farewell to Epistemic AngstIn Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing, Princeton University Press. pp. 167-188. 2016.
University of St. Andrews
PhD, 2000
Irvine, California, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |