-
101What is This Thing Called Philosophy? (edited book)Routledge. 2015._What is this thing called Philosophy?_ is the definitive textbook for all who want a thorough introduction to the field. It introduces philosophy using a question-led approach that reflects the discursive nature of the discipline. Edited by Duncan Pritchard, each section is written by a high-profile contributor focusing on a key area of philosophy, and contains three or four question-based chapters offering an accessible point of engagement. The core areas of philosophy covered are: Ethics Poli…Read more
-
57Wittgenstein on Faith and Reason: The Influence of NewmanIn Mirosław Szatkowski (ed.), God, Truth, and Other Enigmas, De Gruyter. pp. 197-216. 2015.
-
41IntroductionSynthese 158 (3): 273-275. 2007.I introduce the topic of this special issue of Synthese, and give an overview of the articles collected here.
-
8Meta-Epistemological Constraints on Anti-Sceptical TheoriesFacta Philosophica 3 (1): 101-26. 2001.
-
17Knowledge and ValueIn Peter Adamson (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2012.
-
57The Power, and Limitations, of Virtue EpistemologyIn Ruth Groff & John Greco (eds.), Powers and Capacities in Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism, Routledge. pp. 248--269. 2013.
-
11CoherentismIn Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology, Routledge. 2010.
-
134Epistemological disjunctivismOxford University Press. 2012.Epistemological disjunctivism in outline -- Favouring versus discriminating epistemic support -- Radical scepticsim.
-
251Zagzebski on RationalityEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (4): 39--46. 2014.This paper examines Linda Zagzebski’s account of rationality, as set out in her rich, wide-ranging, and important book, Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. We briefly describe the account that she offers and then consider its plausibility. In particular, in the first section we argue that a number of Zagzebski’s claims with regard to rationality require more support than she offers for them. Moreover, in the second section, we contend that far from offering…Read more
-
208The Structure of Sceptical ArgumentsPhilosophical Quarterly 55 (218). 2005.It is nowadays taken for granted that the core radical sceptical arguments all pivot upon the principle that the epistemic operator in question is 'closed' under known entailments. Accordingly, the standard anti-sceptical project now involves either denying closure or retaining closure by amending how one understands other elements of the sceptical argument. However, there are epistemic principles available to the sceptic which are logically weaker than closure but achieve the same result. Accor…Read more
-
2NotesIn Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing, Princeton University Press. pp. 189-216. 2016.
-
157Virtue epistemology and epistemic luck, revisitedMetaphilosophy 39 (1). 2008.In this article I return to an argument that I presented in earlier work to the effect that virtue epistemology is at worse false and at best unmotivated. In the light of recent responses to this argument from such figures as John Greco, Guy Axtell, and Kelly Becker, I here re-state and re-evaluate this argument. In the process the original argument is refined and supplemented in key respects and some of the main charges against it are shown to be unfounded. Nevertheless, I also argue that at le…Read more
-
15Chapter 5. Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Factivity of ReasonsIn Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing, Princeton University Press. pp. 121-143. 2016.
-
401Sensitivity, safety, and anti-luck epistemologyIn John Greco (ed.), The Oxford handbook of skepticism, Oxford University Press. 2008.This paper surveys attempts in the recent literature to offer a modal condition on knowledge as a way of resolving the problem of scepticism. In particular, safety-based and sensitivity-based theories of knowledge are considered in detail, along with the anti-sceptical prospects of an explicitly anti-luck epistemology.
-
199Epistemic Virtue and the Epistemology of EducationJournal of Philosophy of Education 47 (2): 236-247. 2013.A certain conception of the relevance of virtue epistemology to the philosophy of education is set out. On this conception, while the epistemic goal of education might initially be promoting the pupil's cognitive success, it should ultimately move on to the development of the pupil's cognitive agency. A continuum of cognitive agency is described, on which it is ultimately cognitive achievement, and thus understanding, which is the epistemic goal of education. This is contrasted with a view on wh…Read more
-
18MOOCS, by Jonathan Haber (review)Teaching Philosophy 38 (4): 455-458. 2015.No abstract available.
-
75Knowledge or just a lucky guess?The Philosophers' Magazine 55 (55): 66-71. 2011.Our judgements about luck – and about related things, like risk – are for the most part sensitive to what is happening in close possible worlds rather than probabilities.
-
171Scepticism and dreamingPhilosophia 28 (1-4): 373-390. 2001.In a recent, and influential, article, Crispin Wright maintains that a familiar form of scepticismwhich finds its core expression in Descartes’ dreaming argumentcan be defused (or, to use Wright’s own parlance, “imploded”), by showing how it employs self-defeating reasoning. I offer two fundamental reasons for rejecting Wright’s ‘implosion’ of scepticism. On the one hand, I argue that, even by Wright’s own lights, it is unclear whether there is a sceptical argument to implode in the first plac…Read more
-
54Are Economic Decisions Rational? Path Dependence, Lock-In, and ‘Hinge’ PropositionsPhilosophy of Management 2 (3): 29-40. 2002.According to neo-classical economic theory, free markets should eventually settle at the most efficient equilibrium. Critics of the view have claimed, however, that even if the idealised conditions demanded by the theory were met (such that the markets in question were completely fee) one would still not find those markets settling at the optimally efficient equilibrium because of the path dependent' nature of economic decision-making. Essentially, the claim is that economic decision-making is a…Read more
-
64Epistemic AxiologyIn Pedro Schmechtig & Martin Grajner (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms, and Goals, De Gruyter. pp. 407-422. 2016.
-
16IndexIn Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing, Princeton University Press. pp. 237-239. 2016.
-
8AcknowledgmentsIn Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing, Princeton University Press. 2016.
University of St. Andrews
PhD, 2000
Irvine, California, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |